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Summary 
 
This thesis interrogates how geopolitics as a political theory travels inter-regionally in 
an effort to expand the field of inquiry of critical geopolitics to non-Western states. 
As a case study, it examines the impact of German geopolitics on Japan during the 
second quarter of the last century, with a particular focus on the theory of the state as 
a living organism. Existing studies of critical geopolitics argue that geographical 
knowledge oppressed local knowledge by discursively actualizing the divided world 
when it was disseminated all over the world, However, given that critical geopolitical 
literature on non-Western countries is scarce, there is limited understanding on how 
classical geopolitics was interpreted in non-Western contexts. Contrastingly to 
common assumptions, aiming to fill this knowledge gap, this thesis argues that 
geopolitical knowledge becomes power in a foreign community only when it fits into 
the vernacular that is embedded in the local landscape. This thesis highlights the role 
of cognitive gaps that arise between analytical spaces in the course of the travel. In the 
gaps, the local mode of power mutates the concept without changing its appearance. 
Seeing intellectuals as a part of the wider community, this thesis unearths the neglected 
evolution of a traveling theory by thoroughly clarifying the context of the space of 
interpretation. Thus, it aspires to examine how spatial difference is manifested in 
International Relations discourses and why and how knowledge is making the world 
ostensibly one, despite the absence of consensus and therefore unsynthesizable.  
     Japan is a country that is said to have become the first non-Western state by 
importing a number of European political theories. Analysing scholarly articles and 
discussions on space and knowledge in Japan, this thesis argues that in Japan, 
geopolitics helped Japanese people to imagine a different shape of the world. This was 
a borderless world in which the modern states dissolved into regions. Geopolitical 
theories supported Japanese government’s attempt to replace the deteriorating 
European world order of states with a regionalism called the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. In Japanese geopolitical discussions, its environmental 
determinism tuned into ecological fatalism. Therefore, at least in the first half of the 
twentieth century, geopolitics was knowledge that rationalized a localized worldview, 
but not a particular (European) geopolitical tradition, exposing the diversified political 
practices in world politics.  
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Introduction: Standing in a Place, Imagining a Space 
 
The adjective ‘abnormal’ is often used to describe Japan in the context of world 
politics. While some may see this as a mere self-branding or a stereotype, it is in fact 
widely used not only in scholarly analyses but also in broader geopolitical and 
geoeconomic discourses. At the same time, Japan is more often than not labelled as a 
‘model’ to which the non-Western world should aspire. An interesting consequence 
of this ambivalent identity of Japan is that it has contributed to the construction of fault 
lines in world politics. This has been the case at least quite recently when China as 
another ‘abnormal great power’ (Huang, 2015) has come to attract the attention of 
Western elites.  
     To illustrate, in a 2003 speech at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment 
of Democracy, then US President George W. Bush claimed that ‘[s]ome skeptics of 
democracy assert that the traditions of Islam are inhospitable to the representative 
government. This “cultural condescension”, as Ronald Reagan termed it, has a long 
history. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, a so-called Japan expert asserted that 
democracy in that former empire would “never work”’ (National Endowment for 
Democracy, 2003; see also Dower, 2011: 14). Here, Japan is drawn as the first 
example to attest the validity of American promotion of democracy. In this way, Japan 
has acted as a gatekeeper, if not ‘the front office’ (Jackson, 2009), for the West and/or 
modernity. 
     Whether Japan is ‘normal’ or not has generated considerable debate in Japanese 
International Relations (IR). As the debate circles around Japan’s post-war security 
arrangement and the possibility of its remilitarisation, the focus of the debate has been 
on whether Japan’s behaviour is abnormal. In contrast to a realist perspective, which 
is likely to make a black-or-white judgement, constructivists tend to avoid judging, 
and argue that the standard of abnormality is an (inter-subjective) social construction 
(cf. Hook et al. 2005; Hagström, 2015). Despite the disagreement, both perspectives 
espouse the premise that the scientific concept of ‘the state’ is understood with the 
same meaning in any spatio-temporal context. In other words, in asking whether a 
behaviour is abnormal or not for the state, what has been missing is an inquiry into 
whether the geographical concept means essentially the same everywhere in the world. 
Here, a glaring but neglected fact behind the debate is that Japan was the first non-
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Western example of the Westphalian modern state. This ‘first’ evidently has 
contributed to the discourse of abnormality in reference to the implicit assumption of 
the European experience as standard. However, in our diversified world today, as 
evidenced in the rising discourse of ‘abnormal’ China, the effect of this ‘first’ has been 
diminished while attention paid to ‘exceptions’ to the Westphalian state increases ever 
more (cf. Krasner, 1995). Consequently, it perhaps becomes more pertinent to 
conceive abnormality as difference. In this context, John Agnew (2017: 13) has 
presented an intriguing proposition: the ‘abnormal’ Japan, together with the 
‘exceptional’ United States, ‘should be seen as important guides to what they bring to 
global society’. What he proposes is the necessity to investigate ‘the broad historical 
dynamics of statehood, comparing the European experience with that of the rest of the 
world’. Arguing for the contingency of statehood, he points out that ‘writing about 
“the” state in the abstract’ in reference to mostly European experiences misses the 
historical and geographical contingencies of every ‘state’. Following him, then, Japan 
can be analysed as a state, rather than the state, thus being liberated from the role of a 
gatekeeper. 
     In 2003, David Kang claims that ‘the state’, as a concept that emerged out of 
European experiences, is ill-equipped to explain other parts of the world (see also 
Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 378). Nonetheless, the ways in which the concept is 
insufficient and therefore different according to context are still a significantly under-
cultivated area of study. Furthermore, as Stuart Elden (2013) has stated, even the 
concept of territory, which defines the state’s bounded land, has historically been little 
investigated even within Europe, because its meaning is considered to be self-evident, 
despite the fact that the concept can be morphed into different meanings under various 
contexts. Drawing on these research, there is, then, plenty of reason to re-examine the 
concept of ‘the state’.  
     In addition, as the field of IR, in its post-Western focus, pivots upon ways to deal 
with differences, the localisation of concepts is increasingly becoming an important 
agenda. IR scholars are urged ‘to develop concepts … from non-Western contexts on 
their own terms and to apply them … to other contexts’ (Acharya, 2014, emphasis in 
original). As Edward Said reminds us, however, the travelling of theory is nothing 
new, and has been a ‘fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of activity’ (Said, 
1982: 196). In the course of travel, concepts that eventually constitute a theory must 
undergo mutation. It is therefore essential to study existing cases of localisation in 
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order to gain a more fruitful understanding of how knowledge is systematically 
localised. Here, two things need to be clarified: first, how the meaning of a concept 
has evolved as it travels globally; and second, what such transformation has done to 
the globalising world. It is this specific field of inquiry of the globalisation of 
knowledge to which this thesis aims to contribute.  
     Treating a state literally as a state means examining thoroughly its particular spatio-
temporal context and its language as a system of mean conversion. It has been said for 
decades that the social science, followed by IR studies, has undergone a linguistic turn. 
In doing so, international studies have taken a historiographical turn (Armitage, 2004, 
2012; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Devetak, 2015: Buzan and Lawson, 2015). However, 
while the spatial turn has gone on in the social science for decades (cf. Jessop et al., 
2008), it has only just begun in IR (Armitage, 2012; Starr, 2013). In political 
geography, by contrast, it has been argued that spatiality is an indispensable 
consideration in any analysis of knowledge consumption and production (Livingstone, 
2005; Agnew, 2007, 2011). Yet, the task is still largely undone in both political 
geography and IR to consider the political economy of spaces of interpretation, 
particularly in the Western/non-Western nexus.  
     This focus on the space of interpretation opens up a number of new questions, as 
knowledge can be morphed both tactically and unwittingly when it travels across 
linguistic and geographical borders. The distance of travel is not only material, but 
intellectual; not just spatial, but also temporal. Particularly, this thesis claims the 
importance of a cognitive gap that has unfortunately gone largely unrecognised. In the 
gap, unknown quality of foreign knowledge is comprehended essentially sensory and 
intuitively. Accordingly, the difference of interpretations gets sucked between 
analytical spaces. Because of this ‘less-than-conscious’ (Solomon and Steele, 2016: 
3) quality of knowledge production, the space of interpretation has to be envisaged not 
as a space for intellectuals but one that is embedded in a wider geographical 
community.  
     My intention is not to merely emphasising difference and plurality, but consider 
the duality of the global. Why and how is knowledge making the world apparently as 
one, despite the difference? Even if the interpretations vary, there must still exist a 
‘sameness’ that actualises hegemonic power, which wraps the different interpretations 
together in the name of ‘the universal’. David Armitage (2012: 30) argues that the 
different conditions through which text travels has generated ‘dissimilitude out of 
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similarity’. The concept of the state became universal because it was understood as a 
state in respective spaces. Modern Japan’s import of the Westphalian state is one of 
the ‘most typical case[s]’ (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009: 716) of such 
transformation, although it is mostly referred to as a successful example. However, 
even a brief observation would indicate that the import was not substantial but rather 
nominal. For in the process of import, an already established indigenous idea played 
a fundamental but largely hidden role. Not sharing the European historical experiences 
that had forged the concept, the Japanese people interpreted the concept in their own 
context by replacing it with an indigenous and ubiquitous term that has its own history, 
rather than by coining a new term. This process is not just a conscious replacement, 
but it is accompanied by an unconscious filtering of logic in the local language. Clearly, 
this mutation is not a product of a single structure, but should be better understood as 
a highly contingent event that happened at the intersection of the two. This has not 
been problematised to date, because both Western scholars and the indigenous 
scholars have not paid adequate attention to the issue of language and space until quite 
recently (Nakamura, 1971). By treating the space(s) of politics and its role seriously, 
the present thesis aims to interrogate global knowledge (re-)creation by using Japan 
as an example.  
 
1. Research Questions in Critical Geopolitics 
This thesis addresses a couple of questions by situating them in the literature of critical 
geopolitics, a sub-discipline of political geography. The first is theoretical: how does 
a geopolitical thought travel long distance and contribute to processes of political 
spatialisation in the recipient country? The second is empirical: how did Japanese 
people form their geopolitical imagination(s) by importing theories of classical 
European geopolitics in the first half of the twentieth century? A geopolitical concept 
created in a particular space conveys a specific imagination with the space’s native 
geography and history as background. When it travels to a foreign space, what kind of 
image can it project onto the minds of the people at the destination? With a distance, 
to say the least, the image conveyed would be different from the original. The gap had 
to be considerably wide when, in the early twentieth century, only very few people 
could have a chance to travel outside of their country.       
     The main contribution that this thesis makes is in expanding the scope of critical 
geopolitical investigation towards the non-Western world. In addition, as its by-
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product, it offers an analytical framework for analysing how theory travels inter-
regionally. This research began originally with an empirical puzzle of mine on the 
question of Japan’s volatile identity. I selected critical geopolitics as the field of 
inquiry because it problematises geographical knowledge as power, particularly in 
terms of the boundary-making practices of the Great Powers. As the research 
advanced, however, the theoretical inquiry came to occupy a greater part of the project. 
This was because of an absence of a theoretical debate in not only critical geopolitics 
but also in international studies in general, on how political theory travels. In search 
of a proper theoretical underpinning, the scope of inquiry has been expanded outside 
of not only disciplinary but also regional and linguistic confinements. Some might 
wonder if this is a study of intellectual history where the case is classical geopolitics, 
or that of critical geopolitics with Japan as a case relying on a method of intellectual 
history. This research has been rather question-driven, and I believe that the most 
important contribution of this study is to critical geopolitics, since the analytical 
framework presented in this thesis was developed to critically analyse none other than 
geopolitical theories.  
     The conclusion of this thesis is as follows: Geopolitical knowledge becomes power 
in a foreign community only when it fits into the vernacular, which defines the relation 
of geography and politics developed in the community according to its collective 
experiences. In order to be effective as power, knowledge has to be imagined in a 
particular way. Japan in the twentieth century did not follow what John Agnew (2003) 
calls the modern geopolitical imagination disseminated from Europe despite the 
importation of geopolitical thought. Japanese geopolitics envisaged the transformation 
of world order differently from the West. They imagined the state not as a bounded 
space, but precisely as an unbounded space. Although I partly agree with the critical 
geopolitical statement that geographical knowledge is power (Ó Tuathail, 1996b), it 
does not necessarily mean that the expansion of geopolitical knowledge is the 
expansion of European power per se. Rather, how power is imagined in each space is 
an open question.  
     As Adriana Cavarero (2002) has pointed out, political theory is fundamentally 
oxymoronic; it is a putatively universal theory supported by local practices. Once it is 
implanted into a foreign space, its practices have to be replaced by local ones, 
inflecting the theory itself in unforeseeable ways. This thesis examines the role of 
epistemological difference in global knowledge production, which is rarely discussed. 
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Despite the negligence, the difference contributed to globalisation nonetheless. 
Intellectual globalisation is therefore not necessarily a process of integration by a 
particular tradition, but a more complex aggregation of different intellectual traditions. 
It is argued that globalising knowledge is difficult to be fully synthesised despite the 
so-called common quality. If the main concern of critical geopolitics is ‘exposing the 
ground of knowledge production’ (Power and Campbell, 2010; see also Dodds et al., 
2013: 7), this thesis can make a pertinent contribution to the debate.  
 
Geopolitics and Critical Geopolitics 
Classical geopolitics is argued to have originated through the work of Friedrich Ratzel 
(1844-1904), a German geographer in the late nineteenth century.1 During the interwar 
period, classical geopolitics developed in Germany and was said to have prospered 
during the Nazi period.2 At the same time, similar theories were developed both in the 
United Kingdom and the United States (Ó Tuathail, 1996b; Dodds et al., 2013), 
making this worldwide phenomenon. In the late 1920s, Japanese scholars imported 
these theories of geopolitics, particularly the German version, in order to theorise the 
expansionist policy of the Empire, known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. In this development, Japan was the sole non-Western 3  state in which 
geopolitics enjoyed high academic and public popularity (Watanabe, 1942; Iizuka, 
1975 [1942-43]; Takagi, 2009).  
     To date, however, geopolitics has been more a politically useful term than an 
academic field of study, as it has repeatedly gained popular support in the time of 
uncertainty everywhere in the world. This means that what geopolitical theory actually 
is has rarely been questioned. The term almost disappeared after the Second World 
War because geographers regretted their contributions to the war discourse, or because 
the term evoked intellectual closeness to Nazism. Only occasionally was geopolitics 
referred to as a means to stabilise the provisional world political map. According to Ó 
Tuathail (1996b), in the Anglo-American world, Henry Kissinger in the 1970s evoked 
the term as ‘a synonym for balance-of-power politics’. Under the Reagan 
                                                
1 The term ‘geopolitics’ was coined by the Swedish political scientist Rudolph Kjellén. 
2 Murphy (1997) however contends that Weimar Germany, more than Nazi Germany, was responsible. 
3  This thesis uses the term ‘the West’ not to denote primordial geographical and intellectual 
communities, but as a conventional term in order to consider different geographical traditions, whose 
membership are however ephemeral. 
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administration, it came to partake a more ideological meaning, and its usage increased 
not only among intellectuals but also in the mass media (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 58).4 
     Critical geopolitics emerged as a response to the rapid transformation of world 
politics in the 1980s and 1990s, which saw the end of the Cold War (cf. Power and 
Campbell, 2010; Moisio, 2015). It was a search for an alternative discourse of world 
politics. Questioning the powerful ambiguity of the term, what critical geopolitics 
problematised was the fundamental ‘epistemological principles’ governing white male 
elites that produce geopolitical discourses (Ó Tuathail, 1994: 319, 1996b). Ó Tuathail 
and Agnew (1992: 192) re-conceptualise classical geopolitics as ‘a discursive practice 
by intellectuals of statecraft spatializ[ing] international politics in such a way to 
represent a “world” characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas’. 
In his seminal work, Ó Tuathail (1996b, 15) argues that geopolitics is ‘a convenient 
fiction’ of a ‘set of practices within the civil societies of the Great Powers that sought 
to explain the meaning of the new global conditions of space, power, technology’. It 
is an ensemble of heterogeneous efforts that nevertheless shared common traditions. 
These traditions are: first, that the acts of ‘geo-writing’ is ‘invariably imperialist’; 
second, that their view is presupposed by Social Darwinism, which underwrites white 
supremacist assumptions; and finally, that the theories have developed a ‘distinctive 
way of approaching international politics’ grounded in ‘Cartesian perspectivalism’, 
which has provided them with a geographical gaze that sees the reality of the world as 
‘out there’ (ibid.: 22-23). For these traditions, the world is composed of ‘a viewing 
subject’ and a ‘viewed object’ (ibid.: 29). Its gaze ‘degeographicalize[s] and 
depoliticize[s] the study of international politics’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 53, 1996a, 
2010b).  
     Thus, critical geopolitics defines geopolitics ‘as the practice of spatialization within 
the statecraft’ (Guzzini, 2012: 19) that has dominated world politics, rather than seeing 
it as a substantial theory. For scholars of critical geopolitics, classical geopolitics 
represents an overwhelmingly Eurocentric view that is ‘informed by racial and 
environmental determinism’ (Dodds et al., 2013: 3) and significantly reduces the 
messy reality of the world. Such argument aspires to rectify the ‘sectoral narrowness’ 
(Buzan and Little, 2001) of studies of international politics, whose origin can be traced 
                                                
4 In Japan, for example, a book titled Aku no Ronri: Chiseigaku towa Nanika (A Theory of Evil: What 
is Geopolitics?) was published in 1977 (Kuramae, 1977), and became bestseller.  
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back to classical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1996b; Ashworth, 2014; Buzan and Lawson, 
2015). In short, critical geopolitics problematises the politics of space by the Great 
Powers.  
 
Japan and Geopolitics  
Inspired by this argument, my aim is to expand the scope of investigation of critical 
geopolitics to non-Western states by examining the wartime discourse of Japanese 
geopolitics. For the tradition of geopolitics, wartime Japan would be an ambivalent 
destination for a few reasons. First, it did not share its intellectual tradition with 
Europe. Second, it is a non-white country located in the Far East. Third and therefore, 
it is viewed as an object for Europe, rather than an ‘observing subject’ (Ó Tuathail, 
1996b: 23). Major classical geopoliticians—Ratzel, Rudolph Kjellén (1864-1922), 
and Karl Haushofer (1869-1946)—analysed Japan by stressing its abnormality from 
Europe (cf. Kjellén, 1918; Haushofer, 1941, 1942a, 1942b; Tanaka, 1996; Marklund, 
2014). Analysed in such a discriminatory way,5 it was impossible for Japan to become 
an observing subject that actively employs geopolitics. In addition, the timing of the 
import has to be questioned. While Japan fought the Second World War against 
Anglo-America, it became part of ‘Western Civilisation’ (Jackson, 2006) afterwards, 
ultimately stabilising the US-led political map. Then it was violence, not power and 
knowledge (Arendt, 1970), that created the boundary. Obviously, they are 
contradictory to the assertion of critical geopolitics.  
     A broader popular narrative similarly posits that Japan entered into European 
international relations rather forcefully but at the same time willingly (cf. Suzuki, 
2011). It posits that Japan was ‘forced’ to open up by the United States through 
Commodore Perry’s black ships in the mid-nineteenth century. After the opening, 
however, it enterprisingly assimilated almost every piece of European knowledge in 
an effort to render itself not only the modern nation-state but also one of the Great 
Powers. Thus, the conventional narrative of modern Japan is ambivalent when it is 
reconsidered in relation to power and knowledge. This contradiction does not explain, 
but rather confuses, how Japan overcame the racial and geographical reality. If the 
power of geographical knowledge is that can be imposed as critical geographers argue, 
                                                
5 While Ratzel and Kjellén obviously had a racially biased view towards the Japanese, Haushofer 
actually rather admired the Japanese race. This point will be further discussed in chapter 5. 
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employing the theory for coloured races has to mean obeying the domination. The 
fluctuation is likely to lead to a conclusion that Japan is an abnormal state. On the 
other hand, if the discrimination is so easy to overcome by simply imitating political 
practice, the existence of rigid Eurocentric world politics per se has to be doubted. By 
contrast, the rarely discussed fact is that Japan tried to destabilise the imperialist 
European world order by fighting the Second World War, an act that tends to be treated 
as a mere wartime militarist propaganda to mask its own imperialism. However, 
geopolitics, which supported this self-claimed rebellious effort against European 
imperialism, was very popular among people. In this context, it was the defeat that 
made Japan ultimately obey the Western power by abandoning its own geopolitics. 
Thus, Japan’s example possibly dismantles the critical geopolitics’ view of knowledge 
as a power, which rather seemed to endorse material power (i.e. violence).  
     Here, the key to understand this contradiction is in the spaces of politics in which 
a putatively analogous object is understood differently. Critical geopolitics on the 
other hand claims plural geopolitical traditions (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994; Ó 
Tuathail, 1996b; Atkinson and Dodds, 2000). However, this remark has been 
somewhat obscured as critical geopolitics has confined its inquiry largely within the 
United States and Europe (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000; Dodds, 2001; Hepple, 2001; Ó 
Tuathail, 2010a; Dodds et.al, 2013). Consequently, an ‘inability of critical geopolitics’ 
to expand its scope of investigations to outside of the West has been acknowledged 
(Dittmer, 2015; cf. Thrift, 2000; Hepple, 2001; Kelly, 2006). Some notable attempts 
have been made to remediate this concern (e.g. Slater, 1993, 1994; Sidaway, 1997; 
Megoran, 2006; Sharp, 2011; Ó Tuathail, 2010a, 2011), but the effort has been far 
from enough. If Japan’s contradiction is addressed to affirm the plurality of 
geopolitics, this limitation of critical geopolitics can also be overcome to a certain 
extent. 
     This irreconcilability of Japanese geopolitics is a product of double negligence. 
First, it has been forgotten by Japanese scholars themselves, and second, it is 
unrecognised by Western scholars. To date, studies on Japanese geopolitics have been 
surprisingly underdeveloped in Anglophone academia and in Japan. A laudable 
exception is the pioneering work of Takeuchi Keiichi6 (1974, 1986, 2000), and a 
comparative account done by Spang (2001, 2006) focusing on the relation of Japanese 
                                                
6 For Japanese names, this thesis follows the Japanese custom of mentioning the family name first. 
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and German geopolitics. Since most of the existing studies put too much emphasis on 
the reflection of Imperial Japan’s wartime mistake and accordingly the political 
linkage between geopoliticians and the government, what Japanese geopolitics 
actually was in comparison to European geopolitics has been only scarcely addressed 
(e.g. Fukushima, 1997; Hisatake, 1999, 2000; Sato, 2005; Shibata, 2006). As they 
stress Japan’s imperialist aspect, it has been assumed that ideologically Japan followed 
the steps of European imperialism. By contrast, recent contributions within IR have 
suggested that wartime Japan actually had a different worldview from the West, and 
have devised an IR theory of Japan’s own variety, which carry implications to today’s 
plural world order (Jones, 2002; Ong, 2004; Inoguchi, 2007; Shimizu et al. 2008; 
Shimizu, 2015). 
     Clarifying how the theory was mutated to gain different meanings in different 
spaces and why it has been ignored to date is therefore of as much importance to post-
Western IR as it is to critical geopolitics. For sure, as Buzan (2016) has stated, the ‘so-
called national schools of IR’, notably Japan’s Kyoto School which supported the 
expansionist policy, risk falling into an ‘inward-looking thinking’. On the other hand, 
however, this inquiry has the potential to reinvigorate the discussion for alternative 
approaches beyond the dichotomy of the West and the non-West. Jo Sharp (2011: 297) 
has claimed that critical geopolitical approaches can be strengthened by interrogating 
the neglected ‘non-Western perceptions to current geopolitics and nature of fear’. 
However, my point, though sympathetic to hers, is that as Japan’s perception falls into 
a cognitive gap between analytical spaces, it has been misrecognised, neglected, or 
possibly forgotten (rather than supressed) by not only the West but also the Japanese. 
While this forgetting seemingly enhances critical geopolitics’ assertion of knowledge 
as power, the fact that the state, located in the historical liminal space between the 
West and the rest, is treated as exception has also possibly impeded the expansion of 
its scope to the non-Western world. That is, it is a missing link in understanding 
knowledge and power in world politics. If this is the case, excavating this particular 
‘forgotten’ geopolitics can help clarify the complex deployment of power-knowledge 
relations in world politics. 
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Japan and Geopolitics  
In order to explicate what Japanese geopolitics was, however, the obscurity of 
geopolitics has to be first spelled out. Indeed, it is rather this opacity of critical 
geopolitics than that of classical geopolitics that expunges plurality, as different 
interpretations are neglected in cognitive gaps generated as theory travels. The 
oversight of geopolitical plurality is a theoretical corollary of critical geopolitics, in 
which epistemic difference is not taken into consideration. The classical geopolitics 
against which critical geographers argue is not classical geopolitics per se but the 
interpretations of a specific American geopolitical imagination as it aimed to oppose 
an American geopolitical discourse. In other words, geopolitics seen in the debate 
within critical geopolitics is one that is understood by a particular epistemic tradition, 
namely that of the contemporary United States, as Ó Tuathail (1996b: 114) candidly 
confirms. Nonetheless, it is equally frequently mentioned that classical geopolitics 
itself is a theory of imperialism and white supremacism (e.g. Dodds et al., 2013). This 
tendency obscures subjectivity as an effect of discourse, but it possibly creates an 
arbitrary subject of knowledge. This automatically requires an analyst to state which 
disciplinary strategy a particular subject is subject to (Alcoff, 2000). Since critical 
geopolitics assumes that the geopolitical imagination of the strong is followed by the 
weaker, it automatically posits that appropriation of knowledge accompanies 
epistemic transformation. Bluntly put, in their arguments, while the European 
epistemic tradition is static, other traditions and therefore subjectivities are highly 
malleable. Accordingly, the argument possibly but unwittingly articulates a 
consolidated but hollow subject paradoxically asserting European intellectual 
superiority to the rest.  
     Anyhow, assuming an epistemic transformation with no concrete proof is too rough 
as an argument. By contrast, this thesis evidences that in the case of Japan, geopolitical 
theory was reframed in the course of import, and the locus of power was displaced to 
assist an apparently racially discriminatory theory, only to be supported by that exact 
discriminated race. That is, the power of the knowledge of geopolitical theories, being 
read differently especially in relation to space, allowed the Japanese to establish their 
particular subjectivity and geopolitical imagination, enabling them to be subject to 
their own law. Nonetheless, Japanese geopolitics has been misrecognised to date as it 
has been seen from almost only one standpoint of ‘Western’ academic tradition and 
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its understanding of power, which includes today’s Japanese scholars at least since the 
end of the Second World War. There is only, then, one single analytical space. 
     With ‘standpoint’ I do not mean a ‘perspective’, but a socio-historical condition 
that a particular context provides for a subject (see Mannheim, 1985: 79-81; 
Maruyama, 1978), in which different perspectives and ‘isms’ coexist. As Japanese 
geopolitics has been analysed from particularly a Western point of view, the 
polymorphous nature of knowledge and power that the ever-changing standpoints 
provide has not been captured. In order to unearth the complexity, as Aydin (2007: 3) 
argues, anti-Western ideas should be examined in its own right and not as reactions or 
struggles against the West. Re-constructing a neglected socio-historical standpoint is 
necessary to pin down this double negligence. Recognising this multiplicity of 
analytical space is more crucial in geopolitics than other political theories because 
geopolitics is a theory that makes people aware of the importance of spaces of politics 
in their perception. Rather than ‘de-constructing’ a particular analytical space in the 
way critical geopoliticians do, therefore, this thesis wants to see each space as ‘a 
particular, unique point’ of the intersection of ‘all those networks of social relations 
and movements and communications’ (Massey, 1993: 66). At the intersection, what is 
highlighted is the important role of apparent ‘self-centred’ imagination projected from 
each standpoint.  
     The theoretical shortage of critical geopolitics that overlooks this multiplicity is 
what Jef Huysmans (2002) calls a ‘normative dilemma’. He argues that social 
constructivist authors, embracing a politicised assumption in mind, ‘write or speak 
about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to 
avoid, what one criticizes’. Simon Dalby (2010: 280) asserts that, contrary to the 
‘strategic ambition of imperial geopolitics’, critical geopolitics is a ‘tactical form of 
knowledge’ that demonstrates the geopolitical tradition as a social construction. 
However, as it emphasises the construction of hegemony, it unwittingly shoves the 
actual diversity of practice aside. By contrast, Neil Smith (2000: 368) contends that, 
by relying on a poststructuralism that could actually tempt ‘a reformed positivism’, 
critical geopolitics ‘does not resolve the problem of how to talk about reality but 
potentially compounds it’. In this respect, the distinction between tactics and strategy 
is dangerous, for both could equally construct a specific meaning and lead to a 
dilemma. Relying on a deconstructive method (cf. Dodds and Sidaway, 1994; 
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Hyndman, 2010), as Martin Müller states (2013: 53), critical geopolitics reapply ‘the 
very form of meaning-construction that is deconstructed’. This can lead critical 
geopolitics to the very self-righteousness that it accuses of American geopolitics. 
     In an effort to restore this neglected multiplicity, the present thesis demonstrates 
how and why geopolitics was modified from the original in Japan by way of 
considering how and why it has been neglected to date. Its aim is therefore not to 
identify the real Japanese geopolitics but to excavate one dimension of the ever-
changing polymorphous thought called ‘geopolitics’ at a particular space-time 
intersection (cf. Wusten and Dijkink, 2002; Dijkink, 2004). This is an investigation of 
how spatial difference is manifested in international relations discourse particularly in 
the process of subjectification in knowledge production. The question here is whose 
geopolitics in which context, rather than which geopolitics (Guzzini, 2012: 18). The 
mutation of geopolitics enabled wartime Japanese scholars to justify a particular way 
of organising space that was fundamentally different from the Western (American) 
way. In the course of this appropriation, the original practice that supported the theory 
was abandoned in the space of interpretation by the interpreting subject. By reframing 
the theory in accordance with their own epistemic practice, Japanese geopoliticians 
envisaged that world history as well as the distribution of space on the globe was 
changing into what they believed to be just.  
     Whilst critical geopolitics denounces the powerful boundary-making practice of 
the West, it does not question how and why only Japan, amongst other non-Western 
states, is easily posited to have transgressed the discursive threshold. This unwittingly 
contributes to the discourse of Japan as an abnormal state, as it sees japan as a deviant 
of the state. Treating Japan as a state, this thesis instead argues that Japan fought 
against the West not because it followed the European imperialistic model of 
organising the world by learning geopolitics, but it did so in its own reading of 
geopolitics. This counterargument against European geopolitics insists that the any 
boundaries, including national borders, were a social construction. That is, it did not 
transgress the discursive boundary, but for Japan, such boundary simply did not exist. 
Yet it was not because Japan was intellectually progressive, anticipating structuralism 
or even poststructuralism; rather, the interpretation was according to their indigenous 
intellectual tradition. In Japan, therefore, the knowledge supposedly originated from 
Europe was re-situated into its own tradition, allowing Japan to imagine a different 
world. 
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     In arguing for plural geopolitical traditions, critical geopolitics ends up assuming 
that there are only two varieties: classical and the alternative, both of which Japanese 
geopolitics does not fit into. This exclusion arises because its concept of discourse 
privileges knowledge to its author (Müller, 2008: 325). As far as critical geopolitics is 
concerned, only the Western geopolitical ‘vision’ and ‘imagination’ are to be 
problematised (see also Agnew, 2013). This particular practice has to exist exactly in 
order for it to be refuted. However, the question remains open whether turning 
‘geopolitical vision against itself is possible, or even meaningful’ (Hughes, 2013: 75). 
By contrast, this thesis claims that all geopolitics and their visions are rather different 
than antithetic.  
 
Another ‘Critical’ Geopolitics? 
Japanese geopolitics’ attempt to turn geopolitical vision against Europe was motivated 
by an aspiration to overcome the similar dilemma to critical geopolitics also contained 
in Japanese history. Due to Japan’s complex position in world politics as an imperial 
power on the one hand, and a newly-rising non-Western power on the other, two major 
standpoints collaterally exist in modern Japanese history. Accordingly, researchers 
tend to find opposing philosophical implications. When Japan is seen as the former, 
as Agnew (2003) claims, it is understood as the most assertive follower of Western 
political practice by becoming the first non-Western modern state. From this point of 
view, the application of geopolitics by Japanese scholars during the War was a 
vindication of the evolving Western hegemony in world politics (Agnew, 2003). It 
argues that Japan learned the ‘general grammar’ (Guzzini, 2012: 15) of international 
politics. Needless to say, the discourse of abnormality arises when the behaviour of 
the state seemingly violates the grammar.  
     By contrast, when the latter position is emphasised, a converse connotation comes 
to the fore, this time unearthing the fallacy of the Eurocentric world order. For this 
position, Japan is the advance party of non-Western modernity as it emphasises 
uniqueness of the state rather than its abnormality. It should be noted that the 
difference of the two cannot be explained as a confrontation of regressive view and a 
progressive view. These two views occasionally become closer as well as far apart. 
Japan imported geopolitical theory when Japan’s intellectual climate came to be 
rebellious against the West after long intellectual obedience and the consecutive social 
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malaise that caused by the rapid assimilation of foreign knowledge of more than a half 
century. This particular tide of public opinion was developed later into an intellectual 
movement known as the debate on ‘overcoming modernity’ (Nishitani et al., 
1979[1942]), with modernity being equated with the West. At this particular 
intersection, the latter view was perceived as more progressive, supported by many 
liberal thinkers. Accordingly, in search for an alternative, Japanese geopolitics became 
something similar to today’s critical geopolitics as it tried to fault the reductionist 
world map depicted by Europeans. Through this accusation, Japanese geopolitics 
argued for a regional world order where state boundaries, being an ideological 
construct given by the West, had to be erased. For the Japanese geopoliticians, it was 
a ‘counter-hegemonic struggle’ that opposed the rule ‘from above’ (Routledge, 2006: 
233). In other words, although they stressed difference, it was only in contrast to the 
West, which means that in their worldview there were only the West and the non-West. 
     Thus, these two views contain in each a normative dilemma. In the former, sharing 
a ‘view from nowhere’ (Agnew, 2003: 15) with the West, the Japanese discourse has 
to enhance the Western discourse. By contrast, in the latter standpoint, the Japanese 
claims a uniquely ‘Japanese point of view’ (Komaki, 1942), and must oppose Western 
discourse. What is important is that the former standpoint requires forgetting the latter 
and vice versa. As this thesis demonstrates, Japanese geographers in the first half of 
the twentieth century criticised national identity as a social construction and as 
exclusive in an effort to present a more inclusive identity, in a similar manner to 
today’s critical geopolitics. Their view was however highly geopolitical as well as 
counter-hegemonic, rather than ‘anti-geopolitical’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996a; Routledge, 
1998; Dowler and Sharp, 2001: 167). Hence, it is possible to say that Japanese 
geopolitics questions the plausibility of the critical perspective.  
     Critical geopolitics and wartime Japanese geopolitics share the dilemma because, 
as they focus on the comparison of the self and other, the two views accordingly but 
automatically looked for the standard. The natural consequence of this procedure is 
that it ends up to judge whether the current standard (of the self, in most cases) is true 
or false however leaving behind the interrogation of what more substantial difference 
among multiple actors is. It is not to argue that the approach of critical geopolitics was 
wrong. On the contrary, whilst acknowledging the necessity of launching the 
enterprise in that way, the exact premise must be thoroughly re-examined in order to 
proceed to the next step. To avoid the dilemma, a theoretical discussion in reference 
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to concrete empirical evidence is needed. Opposing the Western discourse, Japanese 
scholars believed that the alternative discourse they presented must be supported by 
another non-white people. The irony was that as they argued for the alternative by 
emphasising the fallacy of the current order, the alternative automatically became the 
truth for them.  
     Hence, this thesis questions an unexamined proposition in critical geopolitics: 
Classical geopolitics disseminated Western spatialisation practices to the rest of the 
world. It argues for geopolitics as knowledge that rationalises a localised worldview, 
but not one that rationalises a particular geopolitical tradition. In doing so, it analyses 
Japan as a state but not as an exception of the state. It claims that the expansion of the 
geopolitical theory contributed to an exposure of diversified, rather than homogenised, 
spatialisation practices in world politics, thus inducing conflict. At least in the first 
half of the previous century, therefore, there existed multiple cognisance of the world. 
Not all people conceived of the earth as a sphere occupied by states confined in 
territories, despite the dissemination of this very idea of Westphalian sovereignty. 
What this thesis does is to take the role of the space of politics seriously in order to 
question a common sense in international politics studies in general and in critical 
geopolitics in particular.  
 
2. Methodology 
Proposing an alternative to the current order does not work in itself because, as 
Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 406, emphasis in original) argued, in the discursive 
production of imaginative geographies, ‘performativity rather than construction’ is 
‘the better theoretical assumption’. Discourse cannot be constructed intentionally, but 
only performed. How it performs is different in each space. We need to examine ‘how 
meanings are made and disseminated’ (Ringmar, 2016: 101) in each space, rather than 
how discourse is constructed. At the same time, however, the respective spaces have 
to be considered in relation and not in isolation. The question for the present study is 
how a theory, a product of a particular epistemic tradition, is being read in a different 
tradition. What this thesis wants to analyse is a condition of possibility per se, 
presented by a particular intersection of theory and space. This condition can be rightly 
observed only by thoroughly re-constructing the context in which the intersection is 
situated. Unlike the conventional historical study, therefore, its focus is on 
intersections, not on a lineage of development. 
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Inter-Regional Conceptual Analysis 
To this end, this thesis calls for an inter-regional conceptual analysis. It is inter-
regional, not inter-cultural, because its focus is on how space makes difference. 
Following Patrick Jackson (2009: 658), the thesis aims to provide a ‘systematic 
demonstration of what one gets, empirically, if one apprehends the world with a given 
sensibility’. It is a ‘disciplined effort to envision what the world would look like if 
explained and understood according to some ideal-typically elaborated set of value-
commitments’. It adopts a comparative approach, but not in an ordinary sense. 
Huysmans (2002) proposes a strategy to use dilemma as an entry point of research, 
and then to take ‘a split research strategy that oscillates between a representational and 
performative understanding of language’. In this strategy, the first research question 
becomes ‘a heuristic one of how to understand what is happening’. ‘What is to be 
done?’ is the second question, which however does not mean it is secondary. 
Huysmans argues that the premise of conceptual analysis is that ‘we know more or 
less what it [security] means when we use it’. Its purpose is not to redefine the concept, 
but to ‘formulat[e] a common denominator’ (Huysmans, 1998: 230-231) by 
identifying the diverse range of usage. For this formulation, critical theory in 
international politics needs to be proceeded in a historical mode (Devetak, 2014), and 
not in an explanatory or philosophical mode, which tends to assume a conclusion from 
the beginning. It is, in other words, approached from within (Jenco, 2007). ‘A main 
source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use 
of words’ (Wittgenstein in Norval, 2006: 233). By examining the variety of usage, the 
‘self-identical subject’ that specifies the disciplinary strategies (Alcoff, 2000) of 
classical geopolitics in critical geopolitics has to be dissolved into multiple subjects 
(Müller, 2008: 322).  
     For the purpose of such an analysis, this thesis develops an analytical framework 
by relying on the recently growing literature of assemblage thinking (cf. Collier and 
Ong, 2005; Ong, 2007; Marcus and Saka, 2006; Anderson et al., 2012; Allen, 2011, 
2012; Acuto and Curtis., 2013; Sassen, 2013; Dittmer 2013: Grossburg, 2014). Marcus 
and Saka (2006) define assemblage as ‘a topological concept that designates the 
actualisations of the virtual causes or causal processes that are immanent in an open 
system of intensities that is under the influence of the force that is external to it’. It 
observes ‘always-emergent conditions’ at the intersection of two open systems. I 
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employ it because it liberates me from claiming a particular theoretical stance to the 
utmost extent, since it treats theory and empirics in the same arena. This point is 
crucial because the present study cuts across plural social structures and problematises 
epistemic differences that understand an allegedly identical theory differently.  
     Here I do not want to consider the term assemblages as what belongs to a particular 
intellectual tradition but as a mode of thought seen in some other regions including 
Japan. In Japan, the localisation of knowledge has been a subject of study since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, due to its history of incessant importations of 
foreign ideas such as from China back in the seventh century (Yoshino 1927; Tsuda, 
1938; Maruyama, 1949, 1952). Space has been an essential element for this 
intellectual inquiry (Nishida, 1911, 1926, 1927). Among them, Maruyama Masao 
developed the concept of basso ostinato driven by this conundrum (Maruyama, 1972, 
1976b, 1979, 1984, 1985, 1988). This term denotes a substratum underlying human 
thought, implying the ‘thingness’ around which assemblages are formed. It is in 
constant flux as it is socio-historically constructed in a geographical community, but 
is experienced by people as a relatively stable yet intangible intellectual framework. 
By developing the concept through Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, 
Maruyama tried to identify subtle mutations largely exerted unconsciously on any 
imported ideas. Drawing on Rodney Nelson (1992), this thesis employs this concept 
as a heuristic device to detect a particular way of converting travelling ideas in a 
community, and identifies the role of a cognitive gap that facilitates the process of 
mutation. Using abductive analysis as a pragmatic research strategy (Friedrichs and 
Kratochwil, 2000), this study follows Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2001: 34) and 
analyses ‘different stories about IR’ in ‘parallel’ and not ‘in opposition to each other’ 
in order to know what is going on both regionally and globally’ (see also Maruyama, 
1960).   
     Assemblages thinking enables us not to label thoughts with words like 
‘progressive’, ‘regressive’, ‘post-’, or ‘pre-’ in accordance with a particular tradition 
of thought (Vasilaki, 2012). Thus, this thesis aims to scrutinise the local and the global, 
the internal and the external, micro and macro, subject and object, sameness and 
difference, all in relation rather than in opposition (Collier and Ong, 2005; Allen, 
2012). At the same time, however, following John Allen (2012: 190), my concern is 
not just multiplicity, relationality, and ephemerality, but ‘an emergent “thingness” 
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beyond relational effects’. It is this ‘thingness’ in relation to a particular site that this 
study ultimately hopes to approach. 
 
A Frame of Community  
Practice, derived from everyday experience, is affective (thus linked to one’s 
subconsciousness), and is more site-specific than cultural-specific. It concerns a 
particular space, but not necessarily a particular society. Practice is an ever-changing 
condition of possibility available to actors in a given space, and such condition defines 
agency. In order to analyse the practice, a space is posited experimentally for 
investigation here. 
     To specify this space, this study considers people living in Japan—regardless of 
their nationalities—as a community of experience developed in an imaginative 
relational space (Harvey, 2006). Its membership is not defined by nationality but by 
shared experiences. Doing so means escaping determinism by simultaneously 
emphasising its communal character as well as individualistic elements. As this 
community is envisioned as a relational space, it is individually perceived but the 
cognisance is still vaguely shared among its members. In this community, a specific 
collective ‘identity’ can be superficially recognised, but it is merely an aggregate of 
individual perceptions. People continuously define and re-define themselves by 
assembling often unconsciously around a specific node and imagining their 
experiences in a particular environment that is however equally continuously 
changing. As they increase the apparently shared experiences over time, the 
community as an aggregation of individuals develops a tacit collective thought style, 
which contributes to this incipience. This community is in flux but simultaneously 
ostensibly stable due to the fundamental less-than-conscious character.  
     In this community, people develop their own geopolitical imaginations. This 
concept is borrowed from Agnew (2003; see also Agnew and Muscarà, 2011), but not 
without modification. For Agnew, the modern geopolitical imagination denotes the 
commonsensical knowledge of world politics that ‘arose from European-American 
experience but was then projected on to the rest of the world and into the future in the 
theory and practice of world politics’ (Agnew, 2003: 2). By contrast, this thesis aspires 
to depict the modern geopolitical imagination as an actual composite of numerous 
imaginations that can never be synthesised but in which locals connect themselves to 
the global in their own manners. Modern European geopolitical imagination is 
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superimposed on local imaginations on the surface, nonetheless buttressed by 
numerous different imaginations. Each imagination reflects its site-specific mode of 
power, rather than the power supposedly imposed. Following Allen (1999: 212), 
‘power is always already spatial, but it is neither uniform, nor continuous over space. 
It is actualized in different and combined modes precisely because spatiality makes a 
difference to the effects that power can have’ (cf. Agnew, 1999). In the ostensibly 
hegemonic modern geopolitical imagination, heterogeneous imaginations of multiple 
subjects are actually imbricated without being amalgamated into one, generating the 
polymorphous nonetheless vibrant image of ‘the actual global’ (Collier and Ong, 
2005). Thus, the term has to be re-conceptualised as a co-constructed projection at the 
intersection of knowledges, powers, and subjectivities. This thesis examines only a 
small part of those numerous imaginations, in which a different set of questions of 
space, knowledge, and power in world politics is addressed.   
 
The State as a Thick Signifier 
As Quentin Skinner (1969) points out, we only discern the unknown in terms of the 
known. This indicates a potential misunderstanding in knowledge circulation. Texts, 
the sole source for identifying and understanding a theory, can be modified to such an 
extent that it does not resemble to the original in the process of constant classification, 
interpretation and re-interpretation ‘in terms of the familiar’ (Skinner, 1969: 5). As 
Robert Cox (2002: 61) reminds us, ‘knowledge is reflexive, it knows itself in relation 
to its specific historical experience’. Thus, in inter-regional contexts, what Huysmans 
(1998) calls ‘thick signifier’ becomes even thicker. An investigation into the global 
distribution of knowledge has to be expanded to not only the meaning but also its 
genesis (Maruyama, 1987).  
     This thickness encompasses cognitive gaps among multiple actors. These gaps are 
often unnoticed not only by the author who created the knowledge, but also by the 
interpreter herself because the conversion, at least in its initial stage, is instigated 
contextually and reflexively from a different analytical space. These neglected gaps 
can be further widened in social science theories, as they were guided by a strife for 
‘logic and abstraction’ (Maruyama, 1961: 68) and the results were supposed to be 
applicable to different contexts. The various cognitions, which developed in different 
analytical spaces, cannot be presumed to constitute parts of the same entity, since the 
assumed cognitive object and the tangible cognitions do not hold a one-on-one 
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relation, even if a cursory assessment initially indicates similarity (Maruyama, 1978). 
It requires a micro-move of analytical focus, which signifies first a shift in the field of 
investigation from boundaries to unconscious sites of meaning-making, the latter 
better assumed to be existing within each bounded space. The examination of 
boundaries and therefore conscious interactions among actors only comes as a second 
step. 
     As mentioned, the concept explored in the present thesis is the state as a living 
organism in classical geopolitics. The thesis confined the scope of investigation on 
how the Japanese interpreted the theory. The texts examined are scholarly works on 
geopolitics published between 1925 and 1945. In addition, works in related fields, 
relevant popular literature, and related policy documents are considered. Chapter 5 
provides a detailed data. Originally proposed by Ratzel, the concept has been at the 
heart of geopolitics as it rationalises the expansion of the state as a Lebensraum. In the 
context of critical geopolitics and the history of the two World Wars, it is considered 
to be a justification of environmental determinism and Social Darwinism as it helped 
fortify the rule of the Europeans. However, it was also this concept that enabled 
Japanese scholars to argue for the supremacy of Japan even over European countries. 
In Japanese geopolitical imagination, the state as a living organism was envisaged as 
a fundamentally inclusive world whose boundary could be expanded to the entire 
globe, uniting it into one, where the Japanese would replace the Europeans as the 
leading race. It is this different, but neither abnormal nor exceptional, geopolitical 
imagination that this thesis explicates.
 
Chapter Structure 
     Chapters 1 and 2 provide a theoretical mapping of how political theory travels inter-
regionally by examining existing research. The aim of this investigation is to clarify 
how local micro-politics affects the travelling of theory in an unnoticeable way. The 
first chapter looks at Western academic literature in terms of how theory travels 
temporally. It investigates existing approaches of global knowledge dissemination in 
relation to the recipient’s agency. This chapter argues that in addition to the 
contextualism that is influencing the rising literature on international intellectual 
history, the literature of geography of knowledge identifies a tacit but important role 
of geography in the act of knowing, which then calls for further microanalyses. 
Chapter 2 examines related research in Japan in order to expand the consideration of 
  22 
this spatial dimension of global knowledge dissemination. Using the example of 
international law, the chapter studies a curious inquiry that took place in Japan in the 
first half of the twentieth century around the state’s appropriation of said notion. By 
revisiting this discussion, the thesis aims to explicate how Japanese scholars deepened 
the inquiry on the relation between knowledge and space.  
     Chapter 3 develops an analytical framework by addressing three remaining 
questions. The first question is about the epistemology and power in Japan during this 
period. The second question is how the local community and territory of knowledge 
are conceptualised avoiding the pitfall of determinism. The last question is concerned 
with how to envisage multiple spaces in which exotic knowledge is interpreted 
relationally. The discussion will revolve around the thought of Nishida Kitarō, a 
Japanese philosopher who developed a theory of place. It demonstrates that the 
epistemology in Japan during the period essentially had a subjectivist character that 
opposes Cartesian objectivism, the product of a context-dependent tradition stemming 
from an imported Confucianism. Chapter 4 is a bridging chapter to the case study. The 
first half of the chapter discusses the literature of critical geopolitics in relation to 
Japan. In the latter half, the historical development of Japan’s geopolitical imagination 
will be explored.  
     Finally, chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to the analysis of Japanese geopolitics. The 
appropriation of geopolitical theories is analysed diachronically by establishing two 
time frames that correspond to the historical events of the periods: from 1925 to the 
mid-1930s, and from the mid-1930s to 1945. The initial application of classical 
geopolitics in Japan can be dated back to 1925, when a geographer rebuffed the 
increasing white supremacism in the Pacific with an empirical study on US immigrants 
in the region. Chapter 5 will revisit also the history of the concept of the state as a 
living organism from Ratzel to German geopolitics during the Weimar Period; this is 
in order to calibrate the mutation of the concept made by Japanese scholars. Chapter 
6 explicates the Daitōa Chiseigaku (Geopolitics for the Greater East Asia), a Japanese 
geopolitics that aimed at creating a world order of regions in which the modern state 
system had to become obsolete in order to make the world literally one, supported by 
popular imagination.   
 
  
  23 
1! Contextualising Traveling Theory 
 
At the bottom, despite the differences 
in epochs and objectives, the 
representation of power has remained 
under the spell of monarchy. In 
political thought and analysis, we still 
have not cut off the head of the king. 
 
—Michel Foucault, The History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1 
  (1976: 88-89) 
 
1.1. Introduction  
The question addressed in the present thesis is how locals interpret foreign political 
theory given the physical, and if applicable, intellectual, distances. Its main concern is 
in how indigenous political spatialisation exerts influence on an imported theory, 
questioning why and how is knowledge making the world apparently as one, despite 
the difference. This is an inquiry into collective subjectivity and power, one that 
questions a seemingly self-evident assumption in studies of world politics in general 
and in critical geopolitics in particular: that the diffusion of geographical knowledge 
is accompanied by the power of its author. The author is in most cases in the modern 
periods considered to be from ‘the West’. The aspiration of the present study is to take 
an approach ‘from within’ (Jenco, 2007), examining how theories are domesticated in 
a particular analytical space and identifying cognitive gaps between the so-called 
‘original’ space. In this sense, it is a comparative study. In doing so, it strives to offer 
a framework for analysing global traveling theory. It thoroughly considers what 
‘context’ means for traveling theory, interested more in the often overlooked micro-
alterations than in visible transformations. Where and when does interpretation take 
place? Who is the subject of the action? What is being explained by the theory? Why 
and how is it done? By addressing these questions, the following two chapters provide 
a theoretical mapping of how political theory travels inter-regionally.  
     This chapter focuses mainly on Western academic literature. Edward Said (1982, 
2001), who proposes the term ‘traveling theory’, stresses on the one hand the 
importance of origin and accordingly discounts the plurality of contexts through which 
theory travels, and on the other hand rightly notes the open-endedness of the evolution. 
Consequently, he does not take into sufficient account the question of context. A 
successful account of traveling political theory has to be approached as a product of 
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intertwining agencies across multiple times and spaces, taking both conscious and 
unconscious contextualisation into consideration. In order to disentangle the 
complexity, contexts must be cautiously reconstructed.   
     Classical geopolitics is a body of political theories that has influenced on studies 
of international politics (Ó Tuathail, 1996b; Ashworth, 2014; Buzan and Lawson, 
2015). It is assumed to enlighten people with ‘scientific’ ways of envisioning the 
world. Despite its usefulness in considering the meaning of geography in the question 
of how political theory travels in the age of accelerated globalisation since the end of 
the nineteenth century, studies on this topic are still limited. In 2000, David Atkinson 
and Klaus Dodds published an edited volume on geopolitics as a traveling theory, 
focusing on both diversity and the ‘faint but identifiable traditions’ of geopolitical 
ideas (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000: xv) Despite the disciplinary concern that critical 
geopolitics has ended up to limit its inquiry largely within the West (Hepple, 2001; 
Dodds et al., 2013: 8), scholarly research in the geographical diversity has been far 
from enough (cf. Slater, 1993, 1994; Wusten and Dijkink. 2002; Sharp, 2013). 
Concentrating on the discourses of the Great Powers and hence following the premise 
of geographical knowledge as power (Ó Tuathail, 1996b; Agnew, 2003; Dalby, 2010; 
Dodds et al. 2013; Agnew, 2013; cf. Müller, 2008, 2013; Moisio, 2015), most 
contributions to the field have unwittingly neglected the question of subjectification 
in the global migration of knowledge, and accordingly tend to place more emphasis 
on the common geopolitical tradition among the Great Powers than the diversities.  
     By contrast, what this study is interested in is, when a political thought travels 
globally, what happens to power and subjectivity and how the political thought inflects 
the theory itself. Itis concerned with the vital role of locality in the intellectual map 
of global knowledge dissemination and production. This locality will be addressed 
from three aspects: in terms of contexts, in terms of collective subjectivity and power 
structure, and in relation to globality. Judging from how the Japanese state has been 
largely seen as a fervent borrower of Western knowledge to become the first non-
Western modern state, arguments could, in fact, potentially be made against my view, 
which sees Japan as a creative interpreter of Western knowledge instead. However, as 
I will argue later, this borrowing can be attained only when foreign knowledge is 
properly but implicitly or involuntarily amended by the vernacular, even though such 
amendment may have been indiscernible from the outside. This unseen evolution of 
traveling theory is the focus of this thesis.  
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     The methodological inquiry has been relatively marginalised in Anglophone 
studies on geopolitics save a few notable exceptions (Bassin, 1987a, 1987b, 2004, 
2007; Murphy, 1997; Atkinson and Dodds, 2000; Wusten et al., 2002; Dijkink, 1996). 
Therefore, I look for insights from debates emerged in the last two decades on 
geography of knowledge in the subfields of political and economic geography as well 
as international intellectual history in IR. This choice, I argue, is not a far-fetched one 
because critical geopolitics was originally inspired by ‘dissident’ scholars in IR (Ó 
Tuathail, 1996b; Buzan and Little, 2001). In addition, the forgotten legacy of classical 
geopolitics has been conversely revisited in the discipline of IR (Ó Tuathail, 1996b; 
Ashworth, 2010, 2014; Buzan and Lawson, 2015). Equally important is the fact that 
the two tracks—critical geopolitics and international intellectual history—share 
certain research interests, since they originated from the discontents with the 
predominantly positivist, ahistorical and Eurocentric approaches to world politics in 
the last century. In any case, one can say that inquiries on international intellectual 
history that extends beyond Europe and North America has just begun. Accordingly, 
in chapters 2 and 3, I will examine the debate on the importation of knowledge into 
Japan in the first half of the twentieth century.  
This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section identifies the questions of 
inter-regional migration of political theory. It suggests that the present study 
approaches a neglected gap between the general theory and local micro-political 
practices which in turn facilitate the localisation of theory. The next section elucidates 
on the relevance of twentieth-century Japan as a sample destination of traveling 
theory. It explains, in terms of power and subjectivity of traveling knowledge, modern 
Japan’s paradox in being the best student of Western learning. The analytical approach 
of this thesis is then discussed in the third part. The final section investigates existing 
approaches concerning the agency of the recipient, discussed in terms of local 
decontextualisation and recontextualisation of knowledge from two pairs of aspects: 
temporal and spatial, conscious and unconscious. In doing so, I highlight the 
importance of spatial contextualisation which takes place automatically at the early 
stage of the process. 
 
1.2. Political Theory as an Oxymoron 
The diffusion of modern political theory is generally understood in an oxymoronic 
way. While it is an artefact of a particular culture—European, to be precise—it has 
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been claimed to hold universal character. This prevailing view contends that any 
global diffusion of scientific theories, not only political theories, is fundamentally a 
one-way development from the West to the rest of the world, affirming the cultural 
and political superiority of the West. This view has only begun to be questioned by 
English-speaking scholars recently, who argue that a large number of powerful ideas 
and inventions that have enabled Western civilisation to claim its universality actually 
arrived from all over the world (Hobson, 2004, 2012a, 2012b). Among those ideas, 
political theory, whose origin was considered to be Greco-Roman and therefore 
‘Western’ (Gress, 1998), still holds a special position with the copyright of the West, 
and its universal applicability is yet to be questioned more thoroughly. However, as 
Adriana Cavarero (2002) notes, the term political theory itself is an oxymoron because 
‘theory’ denotes something universal whereas ‘politics’ requires continuous action. A 
corollary of this must be twofold: theory can be continuously interpreted through 
different practices; amendments in the course of interpretation are more practical and 
subtle, and less formal and evident. In order to clarify the subtle conversions, a 
comparative approach is needed, not in a conventional sense, but in the sense to which 
Fred Dallmayr (2004) alludes: that is, in search for universality in difference.   
 
A Cognitive Gap? 
For this approach, the issue is not only what to learn but also how to enact the learning 
at each local site. This ‘how’ can gradually change the theory itself, engendering a 
neglected cognitive gap in traveling theories. Even if, as Anssi Paasi (2009: 222) 
states, theorising is ‘the human intellect to explain or understand phenomena by 
rational means’, the rationality can be context-dependent. Inoguchi Takashi (2007: 
369) defines theory as ‘an amalgam of proposition, paradigm, perspective, and ism’. 
A crucial question follows: whose theory, or theory for whom, as this can differ among 
societies. Nevertheless, this potential antilogy between theory, practice, and context 
in relation to political subjectivity has received relatively little attention in the studies 
of international politics. Because an essential premise of international politics is the 
embrace of the modern European state system by diverse cultures (Qin, 2016: 11), it 
sees the European state as the subject. Such a view renders political theory highly 
rigid. John Agnew (1999, 2003, 2015, 2016) calls such dominant assumption a 
‘territorial trap’, whereby the state is considered to exert exclusive power within its 
bounded territory. Whilst the insistence is insightful, there is however another way of 
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questioning this preoccupation: has the trap been active everywhere in the world as a 
spaceless and timeless ‘conception of statehood as the unique font of power in the 
modern world’ (Agnew, 1999: 176)1, even when the concept has moved to a society 
that has a different way of organising space? This is not to merely argue that there 
have been different international systems (Ringmar, 2012; Qin, 2016). My question is 
whether the expansive implementation of the apparently identical concept can really 
be equalised as the expansion of the very system that gave birth to the concept. A 
system can become divergent only if ‘different types of relationships’, and not 
necessarily different constituent units, are acknowledged (Qin, 2016: 12). Even in the 
West, as Stuart Elden (2009: xxv-xxvii) has pointed out, boundary, which forms 
territory, is a relatively new notion that ‘only become[s] possible in their modern sense 
through a notion of space’. The modern European state as the standard may then 
merely nominal as the concept travels globally, since spatiality when perceived 
differently can generate indispensable differences.   
     In a 2001 paper, Barry Buzan and Richard Little pose a challenging question to the 
discipline of IR: Why has the concept of ‘international systems’ ‘failed to travel 
beyond disciplinary boundaries and address popular debates’ (Buzan and Little, 2001: 
26; see also Wilkinson, 2007)? A more pressing question is: Did the European 
international system, together with the concept of the state, really reach beyond 
regional boundaries, replacing and expunging indigenous political practices as well as 
formal institutions in other regions? Do theory and politics always go hand in hand 
even when it is transplanted into a new site that has been organised around different 
political values and systems? More than a decade later, Buzan, together with George 
Lawson, ask also to what extent the analytical tools developed in contemporary 
Western academic world are applicable to other times and places (Buzan and Lawson, 
2015: 378; see also Kang, 2003). The modern diffusion of political knowledge from 
Europe is often considered to be a source of Western domination in world politics. 
This view has been enhanced further by the fact that even in non-Western scholarship, 
the gap between local practices and theories of foreign origin tends to be neglected in 
the name of the universal applicability of (Western) science (Nakamura, 1971). 
Critical perspectives, notably post-colonial studies, has attempted to unearth this 
                                                
1 Elden (2013: 3) makes the interesting observation that while Agnew’s claim is insightful, it has 
unfortunately led to ‘an avoidance of the topic altogether’. 
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tendency as power-knowledge relations, in which the subject of the action is invariably 
the West. Although this is certainly an important aspect in postcolonial settings, my 
attempt here is to re-examine this unexamined premise of asymmetric power and 
knowledge by thoroughly interrogating why and how knowledge has been applied by 
locals. As Foucault suggests, ‘to begin the analysis with a “how” is to suggest that 
power as such does not exist’ (1982b: 786). The appropriation of Western knowledge 
is readily seen as having influenced a systemic transformation of the non-Western 
world. However, for the recipient community, the application was a necessary evil to 
sustain their own community (Maruyama, 1986, 47-56).  
     As Leigh Jenco (2007, 2015) notes, contemporary critical and cross-cultural 
investigations on political theory tend to take a dialogical path, largely motivated by 
scholars’ aspiration to expose the parochial nature of Western universal claims. 
Although this in itself is a necessary exercise, it tends to facilitate another parochialism 
which may induce a ‘danger of congealment’ (Dallmyr, 2004: 254). As it often stresses 
the passivity of locals (most ironically), it is likely to ignore the question of enactment 
of the theory in the end. Yet, ‘theory is itself constituted by the process of generalising 
from one particular context to another’ for any culture (Jenco, 2015: 19). Another 
constructive question has to be asked, then: What helps the locals recontextualise as 
well as decontextualise, enabling the generalisation of a particular theory from 
elsewhere notwithstanding the possible contradictions? Here, at the heart of the 
inquiry is locality, which is understood as ‘uniqueness in plural’ (Cavarero, 2002: 514; 
see also Massey, 1993). The dialogical path does not account sufficiently for this 
question of locality, because it focuses largely on inter-cultural negotiations by 
treating knowledge, rather than locality, as an object, hastily premising on not only 
the asymmetric power relations, but also on common awareness and ways of thinking 
that often aspire for universality (which is ultimately inherent in modernity). 
Accordingly, investigations under this dialogical approach only propose the 
alternative, and tend to be trapped by logocentrism without paying sufficient attention 
to divergent methods of inquiry developed by the local community over the course of 
time (Jenco, 2007). By contrast, this thesis is interested in the diverse ways of 
recontextualisation by the locals—which is an issue of where, who, what and how—
questioning the efficacy of the alternative. This interrogation highlights ‘knowing’ as 
a process. It is an inquiry into power and subjectivity. It aims to portray the internal 
logic of a community and explicates the ‘uniqueness in plural’ of interpretation that 
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arises in the gap between the analytical space of original theory and that of local 
politics. 
 
Localisation of Theory 
Indeed, this gap can be facilitative and productive, linking up the old and the new in 
the process of knowledge dissemination. In IR, major concepts such as the state and 
region are geographical. However, as James Sidaway (1997) has already pointed out 
some time ago, the contribution of indigenous knowledge to these ideas is still 
habitually out of sight, despite the growing concern on Euro-centrism. In Japan, the 
notion of the state (kokka) itself was first imported from China, having localised into 
an administrative term during the Edo Period (1603-1868) before being re-imported 
from the West (Ogawa, 1928a). The term ‘the state’ was not newly created, but was 
doubly translated into an indigenous term. Moreover, other related concepts, such as 
nation, state, and nation-state, tend to be interpreted into this one word, reflecting the 
alleged homogeneity in its usage.2  
     As can be seen, imported ideas are in many cases accepted by the indigenous 
community through unique interpretations, negotiations and domestications. The 
reception of foreign knowledge therefore has to be understood not only as a 
vindication of change but also a proof of its continuity. It indicates that in an imported 
concept, such as ‘the state’, conflictual ideas can stand abreast. As Nigel Thrift (1999: 
304) argues, concepts are indefinite. It is open-ended, not just temporally but also 
spatially. Despite this argument, local readings rarely come to the surface, except a 
few notable investigations to date (e.g. Ringmar, 2012). The historical experiences of 
Japan as the first non-Western modern nation-state may offer scholars of world politics 
some nuanced and comprehensive insights on this conundrum. 
 
1.3. Japan as a Destination of Traveling Theory  
Before proceeding, I shall briefly mention how this thesis frames the collective as an 
analytical object. For now, the collective studied in this thesis is called ‘Japan’, 
although this will be further examined in chapter 3. To use the term ‘Japan’ is not to 
reduce it to the state, but to denote a geographically confined political community 
whose members are in flux. The same goes for other geographical monikers such as 
                                                
2 The notion of kokka will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
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‘the West’, ‘Europe’, ‘Germany’, or ‘China’. The travelling of theory is 
conceptualised as inter-regional rather than inter-cultural, because the main concern 
of this study is how spatiality makes difference, rather than the manifest role of 
cultural difference (cf. Qin, 2016).    
     Japan is a distinctive case for examining the role of a recipient community in the 
course of worldwide dissemination of political knowledge for three reasons. First, 
Japan has a relatively lucid history of assimilating foreign knowledge chiefly due to 
its geo-historical and socio-cultural confinement. Being an archipelago located at the 
edge of the Eurasian continent, the community has, in the course of history, selectively 
assimilated as well as precluded external knowledge in an effort to sustain the 
community (Hasegawa, 1942: Maruyama, 1984; Hobson, 2004; Hirakawa, 2006a, 
2006b). The government has employed political theories from abroad since the 
seventh century, when the country experienced a major political reform by importing 
the Chinese systems of governance.3 The Meiji Restoration started in the mid-1860s 
relied on Western political systems, seemingly abandoning the long-standing tradition 
of political system borrowed from China. This expansive transformation, modelling 
itself to be a modern Western-style state, was accomplished by assertive assimilation 
policies known as honyaku shugi (translationism) (Maruyama and Kato, 1998). In 
total, a staggering 14,643 titles of books were translated into Japanese from 1868 to 
1944 (Nichigai Associates, 2007).4 The Japanese government sent many students to 
Europe and the United States, most of whom later became politicians or educators. 
Nonetheless, despite these efforts, Japan kept great intellectual and physical distances 
from Europe, the source of those knowledge, as it avoided explicit territorial 
colonisation. In addition, its language is very different from European languages, a 
point that will be elaborated in chapter 3. Moreover, the isolationist policy known as 
sakoku5 that had lasted for two centuries prior to the Meiji Restoration generated an 
enormous intellectual gap with Europe. Despite the assimilation policy, Japan had 
been neither controlled nor colonised fully, unlike many other non-Western countries.  
                                                
3 It is known as Taika no Kaishin 
4 This number does not specify original languages, however most of them are European languages. 
5 Recent studies question the existence of sakoku as an established policy and argue that sakoku itself 
is myth after the Meiji Restoration. According to Narita (2012: 36), the term sakoku itself was a 
translation from a book written by Engelbert Kaempfer. See for example Arano (2003). For a discussion 
in English, see Hobson (2004: chapter 4). 
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     Second, it was a sense of urgency to avoid the crisis of colonisation that turned 
Japan into a volitional and creative assimilator of Western knowledge. This alludes to 
the possibility that Japan creatively ‘localized’ (Acharya, 2014; Devetak, 2015) the 
external body of knowledge, rather than simply introducing Western wisdom, in an 
effort to sustain, rather than to transform, the indigenous society.  
     Finally, during the first half of the twentieth century, Japan took advantage of the 
assimilated Western knowledge and became the sole non-Western imperialist power. 
It proves that the power brought by Western political theory was useful even for non-
Western, non-white countries for their own interest. Moreover, given the first two 
points, it can be inferred that political theory could be modified for its utility. Thus, 
these conditions render Japan a perfect experimental ground for the inquiry of why 
and how political theory is interpreted and performed in a foreign community 
particularly in terms of power and practices. 
 
The Japanese Paradox: Power and Subjectivity    
The last point also implies a grave but unexamined paradox in modern international 
history especially in terms of the discourse of Western domination, and highlights the 
importance of Japan as a case in particular relation to the contemporary discussion on 
Global IR (cf. Acharya, 2014). Becoming the sole non-Western power, Japan was said 
to have fought the Second World War as a struggle among imperial powers (Agnew, 
2003). However, this perspective misses the point that the Pacific War was an 
international racial war unprecedented in history, particularly from a Japanese point 
of view (cf. Dower, 1986). In addition, as this thesis will show, Japan in its war 
discourse strived for a new world order based on their traditional geopolitics. It was 
the righteousness of the new order, not the imperialist order, that Japanese scholars 
supported, however paradoxically by employing European geopolitics. This fact is 
little discussed in the studies of international politics. Even in historical studies, 
Japan’s aspiration for a new world order is more often seen as a militarist propaganda 
and rarely treated as a decent reason for which the country fought the war (Dower, 
2010: 438). However, as this thesis will demonstrate, the discourse was widely and 
even passionately supported in Japanese society. Moreover, there is still an intensive 
controversy within Japan to date on why Japan fought the war despite the clear 
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realisation that they would not able to win it at least militarily.6 Meanwhile, the main 
components of geopolitical theories were racism and geographical determinism which 
underpinned European supremacism (Ó Tuathail, 1996b). Given the above, how 
geopolitics in Japan supported the racial Pacific War is a question worth reconsidering. 
     The somewhat inconsistent trajectory of Japan sits uneasily either in common 
postcolonial discussions or in discussions concerning imperial powers. Consequently, 
scholars are likely to draw an image of Japan as an exception in world politics 
(Campbell, 1992; Hagström, 2015; Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 203; Agnew, 2017). The 
fact that such inconsistency has been simultaneously treated as evidence to the 
righteousness of Eurocentric assumptions on human progress (Rostow, 1990; cf. 
Hobson, 2004) deepens this confusion. This logical discrepancy casts an intriguing 
question for contemporary debates on power and knowledge in international relations. 
It is in this context that modern Japan’s assimilation of knowledge contains potential 
to unearth the assertive role of the locals.   
  
1.4. Assemblage as a Global Significance 
Critical constructivist approaches of IR in general, and critical geopolitics in 
particular, have tried to uncover the social construction of ‘Western’ foreign policy 
discourse as a meaning-making practice. They argue that ‘scientific’ geopolitical 
knowledge is often abused in such a construction (for a recent example, see Mead, 
2014). For critical writers, it is discourse that creates boundaries between the self and 
the other (Dalby, 1990; Doty, 1996; Campbell, 1997; Hansen, 2006), often 
suppressing the subjectivity of non-Western countries. However, a neglected but 
equally important inquiry is ‘who is the self’ and ‘who is the other’. This question is 
important because it defines the context of discourse. As Ó Tuathail (1996b: 72) has 
argued, geopolitics is ‘best studied in its messy con-textuality’. Although this plea has 
warned against the reductionist account of classical geopolitics, it has also missed the 
exact messy con-textuality and multiplicity of classical geopolitics per se as it 
invariably posits the self in a geopolitical discourse as the West and the other as non-
West. Consequently, the answer to the question ‘Who is universal?’, i.e., ‘who is the 
                                                
6 In Japan, one of the biggest national debates since the end of the war has been why the state had fought 
the war in the first place. For a recent discussion, see for example Ōsugi (2007) and Itō (2011).   
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self?’ in a comparative study (Dallmayr, 2004: 253) is likely to be, not surprisingly, 
the West again.    
     When the point of view is displaced from Europe to other regions, however, the 
need to clarify ‘whose context’, rather than ‘which context’, comes to the fore. In the 
example of Japan and democracy, despite George W. Bush’s claiming Japan as a 
vindication of American promotion of democracy (see introduction), to what extent 
and by whom Japan has been democratised, Westernised, and even modernised is still 
an unresolved question particularly in the United States (for example, Zakaria, 2008; 
see also Inoguchi, 2000). The irony is that the discourse of the exact Japanese has 
superficially followed the American discourse. To illustrate, the Japanese wish for 
normalisation of their country, famously declared in a book written by the Japanese 
politician Ozawa Ichiro (1993), has not been accomplished so far. Recent 
contributions even insist that Japan is actually normal (Hook et al., 2005; Samuels, 
2007). However, as Katzenstein and Okawara (2001: 34) have aptly argued, ‘[n]o 
polity remains frozen in time, and none returns to its “natural”, historical origin’. In 
other words, the aspiration of Japan’s normalisation is never attained not (only) 
because Japan has yet to change, but rather because the analytical standpoint always 
stays the same, namely the contemporary West which has neither historicity nor 
spatiality. 
     By contrast, once the same question is addressed in terms of subjectivity and 
context, the persistent discourse disappears as the question highlighted becomes by 
whom Japan is perceived as normal or abnormal. Ido Oren’s study (1995) is a case in 
point as it unearths how history changes subjectivity and therefore such criteria. He 
demonstrates how Japan had already been well democratised according to nineteenth-
century American standard. Likewise, John Dower’s critical analysis (2010) indicates 
how meaningless the standard itself can be; he points out the curious similarities 
between Japan’s authoritative imperialism and the Bush presidency, both of which 
were willing to violate existing laws. In this way, both of the states have been 
undemocratic and racially discriminatory (cf. Campbell, 1992).  
     In addition to these arguments, I want to stress the performative aspect of 
knowledge and subjectivity among multiple actors, which are always in flux and 
negotiable. The question of analytical space must be addressed in this study, through 
analysing the discourse of abnormality as a co-construction among different subjects 
in respectively different spaces. Oren’s study on the standard of democracy is limited 
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to the American point of view, but as his study implies, each actor living in each 
historical space may come up with a different usage for the same word, even though 
they are all Americans. Moreover, as Dower’s study demonstrates, the supposedly 
unchanging concept is continuously evolving in multiple spaces in parallel, not uni-
linear, fashion. Also, a particular meaning is crystallised in between the spaces, 
realising an occasional encounter in these spaces that often transcends geography and 
even history. Martin Müller (2008: 328) proposes that as subjects are ‘positioned at 
the intersection of different discourses’ through these complex developments, [their] 
subjectivity may be articulated differently’ in different analytical spaces. Here, what 
is important is not so much the contents of democracy as a standardised concept, but 
the way in which it performs in each space for a particular subject as an amorphous 
idea (Allen, 1999; Ringmar, 2012, 2016). 
     In essence, these articulations are unintentional and contingent acts. Power and 
subjectivity in the dominant discourse emerge out of the horizon where multiple 
projections incidentally meet. As different standpoints articulate different 
subjectivities and present different aspects of an allegedly identical object, the object 
comes to be amorphous when it is observed as a whole from a wider scope. In the 
discourse of Japan as an abnormal state, the perception of abnormality can differ 
among actors and is in constant flux. Moreover, the perception can vary even for an 
actor as her subjectivity shifts occasionally. Nonetheless, these multiple subjectivities 
bespeak Japan’s abnormality in unison. In essence, the discourse is a co-construction 
without a direct consent between multiple subjects who hold different subjectivities in 
different analytical spaces. The ‘emergent capabilities’ for subjectivities and both 
bottom-up and top-down power (Acuto and Curtis, 2014: 8) can be detected among 
these multiple subjects. This neglected plurality can be unearthed only when each of 
the social capacities is calibrated ‘in the creative action of concrete actors involved in 
concrete situation’ (Jackson, 2009: 657). This plurality of analytical spaces can be 
discerned only as an assemblage of manifold discourses. Here, a context in a macro 
perspective serves as actual contexts for micro perspectives. As such, in international 
politics, concepts like the state, democracy, and modernity have developed without 
formal consensus as products of these multiple perspectives in plural spaces. It is this 
convoluted multiplicity of global grammar that in practice constitutes the perceived 
representative grammar in world politics. The issue is how power in knowledge is 
imagined by multiple actors, rather than who holds such power. In order to unearth 
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this hidden multiplicity, the questions of power, territory, and epistemology need to 
be clarified, through a careful reconstruction of micro contexts. 
 
Power 
Although the discourse of abnormal Japan may be seen as a dominating, major 
standpoint, it is in fact supported by multiple minor standpoints in practice. The minor 
standpoints are not necessarily in harmony with each other, but they only seemingly 
and vaguely support the dominant image. In this ephemeral and ostensible co-
construction, it is the ‘local capacities’ (Haugaard and Groverde, 2009: 192), rather 
than the globalising knowledge per se, that provide each subject a subjectivity to 
envisage a specific interpretation. Japan is perceived as the abnormal state not only 
because of American elitist discourse, but because the Japanese found a way to make 
sense of the discourse in their own context. In this respect, the sense in which Japan is 
abnormal can vary despite the superficial agreement.   
     In order to understand this intricate relationality of subjectivities and knowledge, 
different ‘modes of power’7 have to be taken into consideration, relying on a term 
recently introduced by Buzan and Lawson (2015), though with a slightly different 
nuance. The instrumental mode of power perpetuated by the strong is what has been 
predominantly employed in international politics research. However, this monolithic 
understanding of power could end up misinterpreting knowledge dissemination. 
Following Hannah Arendt, power has to be distinguished from violence, strength, 
force, or authority. Power ‘needs no justification but legitimacy’ (Arendt, 1970: 42-
55). I propose three categories of modes of power: power to, power over, power from 
below. John Allen (2003) argues that the conventional mode of power in international 
politics is assumed to exercise over others. Whilst the former talks about domination 
and is presumed to work within a territory, the latter is about the ‘potential for 
empowerment’ (Allen, 2003). Drawing on John L. Austin’s term, Habermas (1977) 
points out that this power has an illocutionary aspect and therefore its territory is 
defined by power. As Müller (2008) argues, critical geopolitics and critical 
constructivist scholarship tend to employ the ‘agency concept’ of discourse, since they 
are designed as an ‘interpretive-explanatory’ research. This particular conception of 
                                                
7 This term refers to ‘the material and ideational relations that they are generative of both actors and the 
ways in which power is exercised’ (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 23). 
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discourse gives agency power over space. It is this agency concept that has allowed 
research in critical geopolitics to claim that geopolitical practices by the Great Powers, 
particularly by the United States, are a-geographical, since those practices obliterate 
the complexity of real geography (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). However, the pitfall 
of this analysis is that, despite the idea that power is spatially confined, it is assumed 
in these research that knowledge diffusion can expunge this limit. That is, discourse 
in the United States is automatically assumed to be effective outside of the US 
territory. Because of this unexamined assumption, the analysis ‘inevitably [leads] on 
to a Eurocentric story’ (Hobson, 2003: 295) as it automatically endows power to the 
West. Meanwhile, as Jason Dittmer and Nicholas Gray (2010) have pointed out, the 
most notable recent development of critical geopolitics is popular geopolitics, in 
which the agency-centric concept is about to be abandoned (see also Dittmer, 2014). 
This development also suggests the neglected roles of power ‘from below’ and power 
‘to’, which are in knowledge, rather than of knowledge, in geopolitical discourse. 
 
Territory  
Whilst this power in knowledge is mobile, it needs to be interpreted before being 
actualised by a local mode of power when it is transplanted into another territory. This 
territory, in Saskia Sassen’s (2013) usage, is not confined within a state, but is a terrain 
where a context is shared to make a new knowledge intelligible to the people living 
within it in terms of its specific power. Its boundary is indistinct because the common 
ground exists as a matter of degree. The territory is continuously assembled and 
disassembled as power is negotiated and renegotiated within it (Allen and Cochrane, 
2010). As Allen (1999: 207) suggests, power can be ‘mobilised at different sites and 
locations on a network’; it ‘mutates and is arguably constituted through the 
combination of different modes employed and their interaction’. Likewise, Neil Smith 
(2005: 51) states that ‘[p]ower is never de-territorialized; it is always specific to 
particular places’ (see also Elden, 2009: xxvii).  
     Following Maruyama Masao, power without coercion is how ideology as power 
fundamentally works in a space. He insists that any worldview contains both fiction 
and reality, apart from its value. Therefore, the choice is not ‘between a “fictitious” 
environment and a “real” one’, but that which sounds better to a specific group of 
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people (Maruyama, 19698: 344: Maruyama 1964). This complexity is hard to be 
captured because ‘we never went any further than to see it as a combination of power 
and ideology. We have not investigated the problem deeply from the standpoint of the 
daily feelings of the people who lived in that world’ (Maruyama, 1964: 343, 1969). 
Ideology is inextricably linked to our everyday realm, and therefore its power is 
essentially site-specific. The mechanism in which it works can be meticulously 
observed only by experiencing the particular space. It neither comes out of thin air nor 
simply comes down from above, but has its own epistemological constructs rooted in 
a community of people who are caught by the power. To become power, as Václav 
Havel (1985) states, it must be supported by ‘the thousands of details that guarantee 
him a relatively tranquil life “in harmony with society”’. Relying on his example, the 
slogan ‘Workers of the world, unite!’ is in a greengrocer’s shop window neither 
because the shop owner wishes for it nor because everyone would read it, but ‘simply 
because it has been done that way for years, because everyone does it, and because 
that is the way it has to be’. Thus, power works because it is a part of our landscape. 
Ideology is but ‘an excuse that everyone can use’ (Havel, 1985: 27-29) backed by a 
particular landscape. Power in its territory does not necessarily need to be enforced 
but only to be understood as such.  
 
Epistemology 
Here, a question to be asked is: who has the defining capabilities of the territory 
(Sassen, 2013: 39)? Barry Barnes (1988) posits a similar question to consider power 
and society. For him, social power is defined as ‘the capacity of action in a society’. 
This capacity is known by the members of that society ‘as their routine practices and 
competences’. A society is ‘a self-referring distribution of knowledge’ which has to 
be learnt by its members. This learning is for Barnes twofold (1988: 58-59). The 
referent and use of knowledge has to become well informed, and the referent is 
continuously constituted and reconstituted. The knowledge is performative, self-
referring, and self-validating. It is a ‘shared episteme’ that gives actors the ‘capacity 
for action which enables us to do things which we could not do otherwise’ (Haugaard, 
2008). If power ‘corresponds to the human ability not just to act but act in concert’, as 
Arendt (1970: 44) states, it has to be based on episteme. Putative power in knowledge 
                                                
8 It is the English version of Maruyama (1964). 
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becomes intelligible only when it is supported by a particular episteme (Haugaard, 
2008: 122), which however can change even abruptly (Barnes, 1988).  
     Thus, knowledge and society is mutually constitutive. It is knowledge supported 
by episteme that defines the compass of a society. For Barnes, a powerful person is 
powerful because she is surrounded by a ring of reference and not because she is 
intrinsically powerful. The powerful is socially framed through a shared system of 
knowledge. Power is supposed to work essentially within a territory where the 
epistemology is commonly shared. In Barnes’ framework, the strategic agents are, 
strictly speaking, not humans, but rather the ‘discretion in the direction of social 
action’ (Barnes, 1988: 58) distributed among actors.  
 
The Same as the Universal 
Therefore, the socio-political power expressed in a particular text does not read in the 
same way outside of its original territory, where epistemology is different. In addition, 
when geographical concepts are appropriated by non-Western states, a local society 
demands the knowledge an intricate set of power ‘over’ and power ‘to’. This is 
because the motivation to espouse the geographical knowledge, for example, the state, 
contains dual aims: locals need the power to act together internationally, whilst state 
power is needed to govern people simultaneously. Yet, the essence of the modern 
democratic state is theoretically ‘power to’ and ‘power from below’. In the meantime, 
it is possible that some kind of canonical function of the theory is retained through the 
voyage. Furthermore, in most cases, the theory is comprehended in terms of local 
knowledge as mentioned above. Analogous references do not necessarily generate the 
same framing as the subject of the text is replaced in the course of interpretation. The 
congruence of collective epistemologies between the original and the new subjects is 
never guaranteed in inter-regional contexts. Hence, whilst a reference is seemingly 
identical as text, how to read it and what to get from it must be different. 
     To be sure, the modern state system has been spread and copied all over the world, 
ostensibly expanding the territoriality of international society from Europe to the 
whole globe. This observation has allowed students of critical geopolitics and 
international politics in general to prefer ‘power over’ as an analytical tool, which 
consequently made them focus on what a text is. By contrast, the question for the 
present study is what locals do to the text, however unwittingly. If the recipients of 
knowledge do not share the same episteme, their acceptance of the theory in question 
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primarily depends on how they read texts, rather than what the author of the text says. 
Therefore, the logocentricity in the analysis of knowledge transfer must be rectified. 
Local people employ exotic theories primarily because through their readings, the 
theoretical texts are adopted in such a way that provide a form of power in the local 
territory, and not because the West deployed the coercive power of discourse. In the 
context of the modern state system, the appropriation has been largely done in order 
to attain state independence. The apparent consolidation of an international society 
based on the European model should rather be understood as a fallout.  
     As Rosa Vasilaki (2012: 20) notes, the real question for post-Western political 
theory has to begin from how locals have identified ‘the Same’9 that indicates the 
universal in foreign theory in order to domesticate it. Even if it is read by an actor who 
holds a different epistemology, there must remain something in common in the text in 
order for it to be accepted. The clue to understanding the Same and its complexity lies 
less in the contents but more in how it is read; less about agreements, but the ‘will 
towards the same’ in Sakai Naoki’s words (Sakai, 2000: 5), which however contains 
antagonism. When being read differently by multiple actors in each analytical space, 
the Same plays a remarkable role in the process of knowledge localisation. It is this 
something, superficially common but substantially uncommon, that makes the 
unfamiliar familiar. Texts, symbols, and ideas certainly play a crucial role, not because 
they are understood in an identical way, but precisely in a different way. The signifier 
becomes ‘thicker’ in an inter-regional context, as a result of this complex relation of 
sameness and difference (Huysmans, 1998). If Western political theory has been 
traveling all over the world despite its oxymoronic nature, the Same—the universal 
applicability supported by diverse local practices—is what makes this travel possible. 
The Same is espoused paradoxically by difference as it is interpreted and deployed by 
different practices. Here, then, the source of the Japanese paradox becomes 
intelligible: the paradox originates from distinctive Japanese political practices that 
advocated foreign knowledge. A difference that accepted the Same simultaneously—
this was what made Japan the putative first non-Western follower of the West.  
                                                
9 Here Vasilaki (2012) follows the usage of Alain Badiou. 
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Universal as a Node without Consent 
This idea of ‘the Same supported by difference’ is significant because it can build up 
a constellation that supports allegedly hegemonic power through a joint capacity of 
action without consent in the global arena. By focusing on the unexplored will of the 
locals, I do not mean to argue for agency over structure. I am neither arguing merely 
for performativity. Rather, by taking an anti-structural approach relying on the concept 
of assemblage (Marcus and Saka, 2006), my intention is to examine the travel of 
theory as an intertwining evolution that traverses different structures. Here, the key to 
understand the Same lies in local practice and articulations of subjectivities. As Agnew 
(2009: 431) insists, ‘sets of often “doubtful particularism” are turned into universal 
truth to justify this or that action without much immediate connection to the time and 
place to which the particular metaphor or analogy is being applied’. What has to be 
pinned down is the ‘strangely familiar character of analogy’ in a specific knowledge 
that activates the knowledge.  
     The intertwining relation between the same and difference alludes to the idea that 
the term ‘universal’ can have two distinctive meanings: ‘universal history’ and 
‘universal significance and validity’ (Collier and Ong, 2005: 10-11). The term ‘global’ 
is better understood in the latter meaning, since what makes global phenomena 
‘global’ is their ‘distinctive capacity’ to be applicable to diverse spheres of life. This 
significance enables texts to be decontextualised and recontextualised across diverse 
social and cultural situations traversing territory and context.10 What is global, hence, 
is a superficially identical reference with substantially different framings. What we 
need is an investigation ‘at the point where the global is inserted and translated into 
the local’ (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009). Despite the prominence, an assemblage 
that embodies the global is rather ephemeral, since it is supported by multiple factors. 
     It is this nodal point—ephemeral but lacking a formal consensus—that generates 
localisation and domestication of foreign knowledge in a particular space, connecting 
the exogenous to the indigenous, making the world apparently as one. Seen in the 
global space, however, the elements do not form a coherent whole. Instead, the 
relations between those elements carry an ‘emergent thingness’ that ‘set[s] themselves 
                                                
10 Cox (2002: 46), relying on Vico, introduces a similar concept of ‘imaginative universals’. According 
to Cox, Vico, thought that at the primitive stage of language creation, people, not being capable of 
abstraction but perceiving everything as concrete and particular, imagined ‘the name of a god or of a 
hero that express certain qualities’. Vico considered that it contained the ‘germ of’ concepts ‘with the 
dawn of reason’.    
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up as internal relations and, on that basis, claim[s] prior knowledge of what the powers 
of a particular object or entity can necessarily do’ (Allen, 2012: 191). This may sound 
like a claim of ‘relative autonomy’ for the component parts (Anderson et al., 2012), 
but labelling it as simply ‘autonomy’ is a misnomer because it is a largely unconscious 
procedure and the conditions are always evolving through actions, as will be explained 
later. Paradoxically, the subject’s subjectivity automatically makes the subject choose 
the law to which it is subject to, turning it into a docile body (Alcoff, 2000). It is this 
significant but evanescent (and therefore often neglected) assemblage that the 
Japanese experiences can demonstrate. 
     To date, most critical perspectives in international politics have focused on 
asymmetric power-knowledge relations between non-Western and Western, 
especially Anglo-American, countries, aiming to make the silenced voices of the non-
West heard by discarding universal claims of Western knowledge. However, this 
insistence serves the purpose of ameliorating the agency of the locals as they 
hypothesise the repression without sufficient verification. It has not sufficiently 
examined the contexts of the putative other but focusing on solely that of the self. 
What is needed here is the recognition of a ‘situated epistemology’ (Thrift, 1999: 303). 
It ‘recognises very strong limits on what can be known and how we can know it 
because the way human subjects are embodied as beings in time-space, because of 
their interconnected position in multiple social relations, and because there are 
numerous perspectives on, and metaphors of, what counts as knowledge, or more 
precisely, knowledges’. Rather than speaking for local voices, local practices ‘[need] 
to be valued for themselves as the somatic legacy we all live by, with and for’ (Thrift, 
1999: 300). Any point of view is equally susceptible to limitations for any actor, and 
no view starts from nowhere. In addition, rather than attempting to envisage the 
different views in order to compose the whole, the congruity of the object itself has to 
be questioned in an inter-regional context (Maruyama, 1978). To paraphrase, the 
supposedly partial knowledge does not necessarily indicate the existence of only one 
whole (see also Jenco, 2007: 743). What an investigation into the inside of ‘the other’ 
unveils is not just a missing piece of intact knowledge, but the fundamental diversity 
of knowledges. However, emphasising differences would only miss the duality of the 
global. In order to make the world apparently as one, there must still exist a ‘sameness’ 
that actualises hegemonic power. Stressing only on differences could leave us too 
blind to acknowledge the essential sameness that causes global phenomena. Rather 
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than aspiring for the truth and the alternative, therefore, we should start from 
acknowledging the limitation of any epistemologies and the fundamental uncertainty 
of knowledge (Takeuchi, 1959). Only by acknowledging this fundamental cognitive 
difference can we begin inter-regional dialogue in a more pragmatic sense. 
 
1.5. Contextualising International Political Theory 
Recent scholarship has started to engage with the question of non-Western agency in 
search of more egalitarian relationships in world politics (Jenco, 2007; Vasilaki, 2012; 
Acharya, 2014). In contrast to colonial efforts which transplanted knowledge from one 
particular region to another, locals have begun to import political knowledge based on 
their own needs, which may even result in a lopsided knowledge diffusion to the 
opposite side. The relation between actors and audience in this process is not simply 
dialogical. What is often missed is that the locals employ exogenous political theory 
to enhance their own territory, in which they have their own audience. In the case of 
Japan, its assimilation of knowledge was from the outset based on its own will, which 
however contained contradictions. It imported Western political theories not to 
transcend its geographical border and become part of the Western world, but to 
enhance its own society to be a thoroughly Japanese one (Maruyama, 1986). For 
Japan, transcending the border simultaneously meant enhancing the border.  
     In the post-colonial world, the recognised creator of knowledge, namely the West, 
can no longer be assumed as an imposer. In each community, modern knowledge, 
regardless of its origin, evolves in unique ways despite superficial similarities. As 
such, the quasi autonomy of the locals has significantly increased more than ever, 
rendering insufficient both the theatrical (e.g. Ringmar, 2012) and the dialogical 
perspective, which tend to divide the world into two for international-level analysis. 
This is because the outcome is not only the product of dialogue, but also a contingent 
outcome of multiple and convoluted interpretations and transactions, which cannot be 
depicted by simple dichotomies such as the West and the Rest, the imposer and the 
imposed, or domestic and international.  
     My aim, by charting the theoretical debate of traveling theory, is to examine how 
the Same is supported by diverged local practices in the seemingly unified global 
space. ‘The Same’ here refers to theory’s applicability in diverse contexts—an 
applicability that cannot be attributed to the content of theory per se—while difference 
refers to local practices. My argument does not affirm the universal claim of theory; 
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rather, it suggests that the universality of theory is only universally supported by 
multiple actors with different practices for different contexts. Investigating how the 
Same is substantiated by difference in the course of global migration of political theory 
calls for a conception that sees knowledge as a verb rather than a noun (Livingstone, 
2005; Ibert, 2007). In other words, I am concerned with how locals read texts as a two-
way process of decontextualisation and recontextualisation of foreign knowledge. 
Like a case of deductive reasoning, this study identifies an apparent commensurability 
which actually contains the possibility for a diverged framing. Through this process, 
the subject of knowledge is replaced, and power accordingly is understood in a 
different way. In the following, I will chart the theoretical debate by thinking through 
two axes: time and space on the one hand, conscious and unconscious on the other. 
 
In Terms of Time 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, IR has experienced a historiographical 
turn (Bell, 2001). Following David Armitage (2004), this turn has been facilitated as 
disciplinary discontents on its previously ahistorical perspectives became evident. 
Together with a post-positivist turn as well as a linguistic turn within the discipline, 
what Armitage calls ‘international intellectual history’ has come to be a promising 
field of study (Armitage, 2004, 2012: introduction and chapter 1). A notable 
development in line with the inquiry of this chapter is the textual turn, in which texts 
are understood as ‘extremely complex historical objects’ (Bell, 2001: 116), drawing 
on contextualism of the Cambridge school of history (Armitage, 2004; Devetak, 
2014). It is no surprise that this move has also triggered a revival of realism, the central 
tenet of IR. Here, two developments are of importance for the present study. First, 
recent IR studies have identified a diversity in the realist tradition that has 
predominated the discipline, indicating that what ‘realism’ means is highly subjective 
to contexts (Jones, 1997; Bell, 2001; Armitage, 2004; Molloy, 2006; Ashworth, 2010, 
2014; Rösch, 2015). Consequently, realism has come to be understood as a ‘mode of 
thought’ (Molloy, 2006; Ashworth, 2010) shared in a collective. In other words, 
instances where the codification of theory has unsuspectingly undermined the 
intention of the original authors have surfaced, highlighting the roles of the reader and 
her social environment. These findings are equally significant to geopolitics, because 
geopolitics is considered a realist perspective of international politics (Guzzini, 2012; 
see also Ó Tuathail, 1996: 169).  
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     According to Molloy, it was only in the 1950s and 1960s when realism came to be 
recognised as a ‘scientific theory’ (Molloy, 2006). In other words, it was during the 
period of escalation of the Cold War and the arms race that made American IR scholars 
strong adherents of science. Analysing Hans Morgenthau’s life and his works, Felix 
Rösch (2015) states that the misinterpretations of his works by later generations are 
largely due to the negligence of Morgenthau’s original context. In fact, Morgenthau’s 
realism is neither Cartesian nor positive empiricism. Rather, he was ‘aware that there 
exist factualities about the world and its penetrating principles that are mind-
independent, but that those “facts” and principles, however, adopt different empirical 
meanings throughout history and cultures’ (Behr and Rösch, 2012: 33-34, emphasis 
in original). According to Behr and Kirke (2014: 28), Morgenthau, who was born in 
Germany and immigrated to the United States in his early thirties, was ‘trapped in 
linguistic complexities and their divergent cultural connotations’. Morgenthau’s usage 
of ‘objectivity’ in ‘Six Principles on Political Realism’ rests on the Nietzschenian 
tradition of ‘an analysis based upon explicitly formulated conceptual distinctions in 
order to identify and analyse features and qualities of an object in question’. The 
misunderstanding, however, is not attributable to Morgenthau himself. On the 
contrary, as Rösch (2015: 99) notes, he tried to be as meticulous about his word choice 
as possible in his new environment.  
     If this is true, then Morgenthau’s works had to be misunderstood in order to become 
the IR theory during that period in the United States, despite his efforts. Here, what is 
at work is the involuntary decontextualisation and recontextualisation by multiple 
readers in a community in order to explain different objects. During the period of arms 
race, the reality was perceived as measurable, and therefore evident. On the other 
hand, recent developments in the diversification of power-structure (Buzan and 
Lawson, 2015) has let IR theorists realise the manifold reality indicated by 
Morgenthau’s oeuvre originally. Despite of the factual incongruity, these different 
understandings on the same text have nonetheless allowed readers in various situations 
to transcend time and gather under the banner of ‘realism’. To put it differently, 
because of its universal character, Morgenthau’s realism is usefully decontextualised 
and applied to a new context, engendering new interpretations. This universality points 
not to a fact, but to a malleable factuality subject to interpretation. Moreover, the 
misinterpretations are not conscious, but rather involuntary, and are therefore likely to 
be forgotten as the context evolves. For this reason, Morgenthau’s texts became not 
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of his own, but something that belonged to a society in need of constructing a reality 
at a particular time.  
     As Pierre Bourdieu (1991: 637) notes, here we can detect an ‘intricate relation 
between objective structures and subjective constructions, which is located beyond the 
usual alternatives of objectivism and subjectivism’. Realism had to be misread and 
simplified in order to become the theory of IR at that particular point of history. The 
theory has been prominent not because it had something innovative to offer, but 
because it provided suitable explanations for various phenomena for diverse groups of 
people living in various contexts, accounting for a ubiquitous actuality rather than 
transcendental truth. Likewise, the recent re-examinations of realism can be 
understood as a production of the time. In this way, a text can be interpreted 
differently. Any knowledge is incessantly revised when its subject and social 
circumstances transform. Hence, adding on to previous theories or ideas ‘does not 
happen as a so-called “additive synthesis”, but as an adjustment of the way of looking 
at a problem’ (Maruyama, 1978). Any interpretation contains both fallacy and veracity 
in varying degrees. Still, as Maruyama (1978) pointed out, this aspect in the history of 
thought tends to be neglected because of the researcher’s teleological motivation to 
search for an alternative and to attest the fallacy of a certain point of view in support 
of another point of view (see also Huysmans, 2002). 
     Thus, the nature of intellectual history indicates a fundamental impracticability of 
identifying the truth of knowledge. This point is particularly telling when knowledge 
travels in time and space. Since any theory is a product of a particular time and space 
configuration, realism, and in fact any critical theory, should be reconsidered anew 
(Agnew, 2009). Richard Devetak’s call for critical IR scholarship to take ‘a historical 
mode’ derives from this concern. The danger to which he calls attention is that critical 
scholarship could create another ahistorical tradition, as it is prone to giving ‘the 
impression that theory is the provenance of philosophy’ (Devetak, 2014: 418) often 
due to the researcher’s teleological view identified by Maruyama (1978), like how 
terms such as ‘real’ and ‘critical’ are difficult to define without ample 
contextualisation. To consider why people employed a specific path, we need to 
identify ‘historically located mode[s] of intellectual inquiry’ following David 
Livingstone (1995: 420). In doing so, we can excavate not only how concepts are 
created and developed, but ‘what has been lost from historical view’ (Devetak, 2014: 
447). 
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In Terms of Space 
As the term ‘international’ indicates, International Relations is a geographical product, 
although this fact has been much neglected in the discipline until recently (Buzan and 
Lawson, 2015). However, spatial contextuality is arguably more complex than 
temporal contextuality. Agnew (2007: 146) claims that knowledge, by circulating 
among communities globally, can ‘generate distinctive readings in different places 
thus creating different perspectives’. He further states that realism in IR was in the 
first place a traveling theory from Europe to North America accompanied by European 
émigré scholars like Morgenthau or Herz, before being reinterpreted locally by ‘more 
Americanized’ theorists such as Waltz and Gilpin. Conversely, whereas IR is certainly 
an American social science (Hoffman, 1977), it was established with a European 
origin (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 169). Armitage (2012: 22) calls attention to how knowledge 
travels, what kind of transaction it enables at a specific place, and how it is 
domesticated. However, because the ‘international’ in this modern context is 
historically confined within Europe and later refers to transatlantic relations, the 
geographicalisation of knowledge has been investigated with limited effort. In human 
geography, by contrast, the geography of knowledge has been subject to an intensive 
debate. What is important is that the focus on geography frees an enquirer from the 
fetters of interpretive correctness, as it gives a collective, rather than individual, 
account. This enables researchers to thoroughly reconsider the genesis of knowledge 
in world politics, by perceiving it as plural evolutions rather than a singular universal 
history and making an international thought literally inter-national. It also invites us 
to conduct micro-level analyses in addition to, not instead of, a macro-historical view.  
     Livingstone’s study (2005: 392, emphasis in original) focuses on this ‘significance 
of location in hermeneutic encounters’. Being interested in where and how scientific 
texts are read by locals, he emphasises the ‘fundamental instability in scientific 
meaning’ (ibid., 391). For him, knowledge is what is generated through moments of 
textual encounter which take place in specific spaces. Analysing how Darwin’s theory 
of evolution was differently translated in three distanced spaces, he sees the process 
as a knowledge circulation among collectives, in which there is no clear distinction 
between production and consumption, and therefore neither authenticity nor 
misreading. It is a ‘positioned conversation’ between texts and reader, not even 
between cultures strictly speaking, hence ‘located hermeneutics’ (ibid.: 395).  
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    Oliver Ibert (2007) likewise sees the agency of a recipient as crucial, but further 
stresses its contingency and collectivity. Noting the elusiveness of the term 
‘knowledge’, he suggests distinguishing between two theoretical perspectives: ‘the 
rationalistic approach’ of knowledge as ‘a factual object’ on the one hand, and ‘the 
performative concept of “knowing” in practice’ on the other (ibid., 104). Importantly, 
Ibert envisages the two as mutually constitutive. The premise underlying the former 
perspective is that knowledge is something knowable as an object. By contrast, the 
latter implies that knowledge ‘only becomes meaningful in relation to a distinct social 
practice’ (ibid., 105). Therefore, there is no absolute truth, only relational reality. 
Whilst the former is essentially individualistic and largely rational, the latter points 
towards the collective and therefore more often than not the irrational nature of 
knowing. Because of its embeddedness in social practice, Ibert argues, knowledge as 
action cannot be transferred at face value across time and space. Rather, ‘elements of 
knowledgeability derived from different practices or cultures only inconsistently fit 
together and partly may even rest on contradictory assumptions’ (ibid.: 106). To 
explain further, Ibert introduces the Polanyian separation of ‘tacit knowledge’ and 
‘codified knowledge’. While codified knowledge, referred as ‘public good’, is 
transferable, tacit knowledge, often existing ‘in the background of our consciousness’, 
sticks to a space where collective memories are contained and difficult to be shared 
with other collectives as far as there is no mutual trust between those collectives. What 
is crucial is that tacit knowing11  is the necessary base of all knowledge. Hence, 
knowing means to discover ‘something pre-existing’, and is an on-going process 
(ibid., 105-106).  
     The performative conception of knowing (see also Thrift, 1999) is more often 
applied from the perspective of the recipient, while the rationalistic assumption of 
knowledge tends to be embraced by its putative author. In addition, there are a few 
methodological points to be considered. First, whereas the act of knowing plays an 
important role at the nascent stage of the process, the rational conception of knowledge 
is more suitable for analysing the later stage. This duality differs on the scale of 
analysis. Whereas an analysis of the performative aspect of knowing requires a micro-
scale focus, that of the rationalistic aspect is observed in a meso- or macro-scale. 
                                                
11 According to Ibert (2007), Polanyi’s original wording is ‘knowing’, not ‘knowledge’, although 
nowadays ‘tacit knowledge’ is more widely referred. 
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Moreover, while knowing is essentially autopoietic12 and simultaneously social (since 
it is launched automatically in a collective), the donor of knowledge is likely to see 
the development as a dialogical interaction over the object, because the knowledge is 
perceived as an already established fact. Finally, we need to anticipate cognitive voids 
between the knower and the putative author. Thus, the mutation of traveling theory 
can be appropriately observed only when the two aspects are fully taken into 
consideration.  
     Nonetheless, knowing as a verb is not just an issue for the learner. As Karl 
Mannheim (1985) argues, the social construction of knowledge has to be investigated 
in terms of ‘how thinking functions in public’ (ibid.: 1), since knowledge has to have 
rootedness ‘in the social texture’ of its recipient’s community. In this context, any 
knowledge production is an essentially emotive, intuitive, and unconscious process 
which he calls the ‘collective unconscious[ness]’. Knowledge, he contends, ‘is from 
the very beginning a co-operative process of group life, in which everyone unfolds his 
knowledge within the framework of common fate, a common activity, and the 
overcoming common difficulties’. It is essentially social because there exists a social 
nexus ‘in which every particular individual experience and perception in the group is 
nourished and developed’. Human thought develops not out of ‘a contemplative 
impulse’; it is instead ‘a volitional and emotional-unconscious undercurrent to assure 
the continuous operation for knowledge in group life’. Hence, any knowledge 
presupposes ‘the community of knowing’, which ‘grows primarily out of a community 
of experiencing prepared for in the subconscious’. This unconsciousness is ‘the 
irrational foundation of rational knowledge’ (ibid.: 29-33). Any knowledge essentially 
contains a collective unthought in itself, and no community is free from their own 
aesthetics (Bleiker, 2001). Therefore, the two perspectives are not simply mutually 
constitutive as Ibert (2007) has argued. Knowing as a verb is more fundamental than 
knowledge as a noun. This highlights the importance of space where the act takes 
place (Agnew, 2011). It indicates the productivity of knowledge dissemination 
particularly in terms of space, and simultaneously questions the uni-linear conception 
of knowledge evolution that presupposes the unequivocalness of its genesis.  
                                                
12 By the term ‘autopoiesis’ I mean ‘a recursive process where the system produces its own elements 
and integrates them in its own network’ (Arnoldi, 2006). 
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To sum up, time and space have respectively distinctive but mutually constitutive 
roles in this reciprocally expanding web of global knowledge production and 
dissemination. To streamline the argument, time largely endorses physical reasons for 
comprehending knowledge, whilst space automatically provides a foundation for the 
act of knowing. The act is embedded in geography. Whereas the former highlights 
chiefly the development of a continuous process that can generate transactions 
between donor and recipient, the latter primarily influences the nascent moment of the 
process of knowing for each actor, which is fundamentally collective, involuntary and 
autopoietic. In contrast to the former, which becomes a more relevant factor in an 
individualist account, the latter is indispensable to a collective account. Whereas the 
former can be analysed on meso- or macro-levels, the latter requires a micro and 
ethnographic approach. Finally, whilst the former is easier to discern, the latter is not. 
However, this elusiveness does not mean that the latter is only episodic. Instead, it is 
the latter that plays a principal role, which can generate grave influence to the whole 
process.  
 
1.6. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed what context means for traveling theory. In order to do so, it 
first identified the contradictory nature of political theory, the universality of which is 
supported by particularity. By considering the questions of interpretation, it 
highlighted the possible existence of a cognitive gap among analytical spaces that can 
be generated in the course of localisation of knowledge. As most notably represented 
in Walt Rostow’s modernisation theory, Japan is considered the best student of 
Western learning. On the other hand, it has also been treated also as an abnormal 
(European) state. This chapter argued that in this contradictory appraisal of Japan, we 
can see the pluralistic character of knowledge dissemination, which becomes 
intelligible only by conceiving of the analytical space as plural.  
     Knowledge forms society, and vice versa. As it carries certain power within it, a 
knowledge has to be reinterpreted by its unique power structure when imported from 
a foreign society. Through the process, knowledge comes to contain a different 
spatiality. To examine this complex process, the present thesis employs assemblage 
thinking. As this chapter has shown, assemblage thinking enables the researcher to 
make a comprehensive, wholesale consideration of the intricate relations (rather than 
oppositions) between subject and object, sameness and difference, continuity and 
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change, and the local and the global, all of which undergo changes inter-spatially at 
the same time.  
     The chapter reviewed existing literature written in English on contextualisation. 
Different accounts of international intellectual history were examined in relation to 
historical contextualisation. Literature on the geography of knowledge was studied in 
connection with the spatial aspect. Whilst the historical aspect has been relatively well 
addressed as evidenced in the recent rise of classical realism in IR, how geographical 
difference affects the evolution of knowledge has been less often researched in 
comparison. Nonetheless, existing researches have demonstrated that spatial 
difference can possibly influence the process of knowing more significantly than 
temporal difference. More importantly, existing studies have highlighted that the 
impact of geographical difference can largely be considered as a product of the act of 
knowing in practice, and is therefore collective and performative, while historical 
difference can be largely analysed by an individualist-rationalistic account in which 
knowledge is understood as an object. These two aspects of knowing underscore the 
importance of micro and ethnographic analysis, which is however still significantly 
underdeveloped in Anglophone scholarship of both international intellectual history 
and geography of knowledge, with almost no empirical work focusing on the 
West/non-West nexus in this regard. 
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2   Inside the Territory of Knowledge 
 
I cannot resist the thought 
that…instead of making ourselves 
slaves of the concepts of international 
law and morality, [if] we would 
confine these concepts to the 
unobtrusive, almost feminine, 
function of the gentle civilizer of 
national interest in which they find 
their true value…in our dealings with 
the peoples of the East,…posterity 
might look back upon our efforts with 
fewer and less troubled questions. 
—! George Kennan, ‘America and 
the Orient’  
(1951: 53-54) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider how to make visible the cognitive gap behind 
the putative consent that facilitates the acceptance of theory. It argues that to unearth 
the cognitive gap, the analytical space has to be envisaged as spaces. This is important 
because in each space, traveling theory is interpreted differently in reference to each 
prior knowledge experiences, in which the value of theory is differently understood. 
This chapter investigates Japanese literature to develop an approach from within the 
community under investigation, by treating it as much a source of theoretical 
implications as an empirical resource (Jenco, 2007, 2012, 2015; Acharya, 2014). In 
doing so, it completes the theoretical mapping of the debate on traveling theory by 
linking the theoretical literature in the origin with that in the destination.  
       In critical geopolitics, the space between origin and destination is considered 
unified, as it asserts that foreign policy discourse is a boundary-making practice 
shaped by powerful states and has dominated world politics. In this perspective, 
political practice is assumed to be inter-culturally transmittable as theory migrates. It 
states that classical geopolitics is a ‘science’ that disseminates geo-power (Ó Tuathail, 
1996b) among the Great Powers, subsequently forming the modern world politics of 
territorial states (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992; Agnew, 2003; see also Thrift, 2000; 
Dittmer and Gray, 2010). By contrast, this study argues that political theory travels 
among multiple spaces and not through a unified space. Even if a state employs a 
political theory of European origin, it does not mean that it follows its political 
practices as well. Instead, the theory is recontextualised and reproduced in the local 
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context, which can be very different from the original one in which the theory is born, 
even if the original is allowed to remain in some superficial ways. The process 
engenders the crucial cognitive gap. Therefore, connecting the two literatures by going 
beyond the division of the empirical and the theoretical is crucial to excavating the 
complex evolution of inter-regional traveling theory.  
     This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section discusses the debate on 
international law so as to explicate a historical example of how a creative gap 
facilitated knowledge dissemination. This inquiry will also question the subject of a 
knowledge as well as the identity of the knowledge as an object. The second section 
introduces the concept of basso ostinato elaborated by the Japanese intellectual 
historian Maruyama Masao. Maruyama developed this concept in an effort to 
understand Japan’s recurring historical ‘misinterpretations’ of exogenous political 
theories. Next, I recalibrate this concept in line with contemporary debates in our 
world today and introduce my own tuned version to frame the cognitive gap identified 
by Maruyama: the unsynthesisable. In the final section, studies by Japanese scholars 
are recontextualised into recent discussions in the English-speaking world on 
knowledge dissemination and Japan’s entry into European international society. 
 
2.2. International Law as ‘Universal’ 
For Japanese intellectuals in the first half of the last century, the question of knowledge 
production and geography was already an enormous one. Under the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, Japan pursued a unique isolationist policy since the first half of the 1600s. 
In 1720, the government lifted the ban of importing foreign books, with the exception 
of Christian-related writings. Most of the books imported were then in Dutch, as the 
Shogunate kept a long relation with the Netherlands even during the nominal isolation. 
It was however only after the Meiji Restoration from the late 1860s that Japan began 
to import European books at a larger scale.1 According to Maruyama and Kato (1998), 
there were many mistranslations, some of which were primarily due to insufficient 
language skills. One interesting example is the book Social Statics by Herbert Spencer, 
published under the title Shakai Heikenron which can be understood as ‘on the right 
to live in peace’. It was this unintentionally twisted title that made it a best-selling 
                                                
1  There are some notable tendencies in these publications. First, many of these books discussed 
historical topics. Second, some books on politics, for example those by John Hobbes and Edmund 
Burke, were translated by the government (Maruyama and Kato, 1998). 
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book among the activists of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement in the Taisho 
Period (Maruyama and Kato, 1998: 111). It is no surprise that many of the key ideas 
in European social theory did not exist in the Japanese language. To give a specific 
example, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most influential Enlightenment thinker, translated 
‘society’ as ‘ningen kōsai (relationship among humans)’ (Kimura, 2009), which was 
replaced by another translation later. Put simply, improper, idiomatic and even 
arbitrary translations were commonly found (see Maruyama, 1986: 42).  
     In the process, however, people started to doubt the rapid assimilation of 
knowledge. In the resulting debates, Japanese scholars particularly focused on the role 
of geography and that of the everyday (Nishida, 1926: Tosaka, 1977[1935]). Recent 
contributions have started to examine how the notion of international law has been 
disseminated globally (cf. Armitage, 2012: 28), but such investigation has been done 
in a Japanese context by Yoshino Sakuzō in 1927. Analysing the political self-
realisation of Japanese people when the country became a modern nation-state in the 
late nineteenth century,2 he stated that what fuelled the Japanese people’s political 
consciousness was a notion of universal law (kōhō), which was both based on the 
Confucian ‘dō’ (way)3 and linked to the concept of international law. This sudden 
awakening was indubitably phenomenal, given the long peace the country had enjoyed 
since the establishment of the Edo Shogunate at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century.  
     The concept of international law was officially introduced into Japan in November 
1857 by Townsend Harris, the first United States Consul General, in order to persuade 
Japan to enter an unequal trade treaty. Around the same time, Henry Wheaton’s book, 
Elements of International Law (1836), was translated into Japanese in 1865 through a 
Chinese translation published a year earlier.4 The ‘international law’ qua universal 
law, being read in the context of the Confucian tradition, came to be understood by 
Japanese people as a ‘metaphysical entity’ to rule the world.5 Yoshino (1927) stated 
that not only politicians but literally everyone came to enthusiastically use the term in 
everyday language. Thanks in no small part to this fascination, not only Tokugawa 
                                                
2 According to Yoshino (1927: 419), they ‘all of a sudden’ recognised that ‘politics was our job’. 
3 In Chinese, the pronunciation is tao. The word itself signifies ‘way’ or ‘path’. As a concept, it loosely 
means ‘nature’, ‘principle’, ‘truth’, and so on. 
4 This first Chinese version was not a literal translation, but a free translation based on Wheaton’s 
original book (Shū, 2011). 
5 Confucianism was employed by the Edo Shogunate as a principle for governing the people. 
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Shogunate but also the new government which tried to oust foreigners from the 
country dramatically changed their attitude as the opening of the country was now 
enforced. Indeed, in order to legitimise this significant policy u-turn, the new 
government conversely relied on this notion of international law qua dō (Yoshino, 
1927). Hence, dō and its power was abused not only by the Americans, but also by 
Japanese government officials and people attaining a paradoxical and episodic but 
broad discursive coalition (Hajer, 1995), which was however not recognised as such 
among the actors.  
     This is not to argue that the government accepted the concept of international law 
because they misunderstood it. On the contrary, Yoshino pointed out that international 
law was widely studied by Japanese scholars and understood as meticulously as 
possible among the policy circles. Nevertheless, he stressed, it was the pragmatist 
understanding of international affairs among Japanese people, rather than the scholarly 
effort, that aroused a curious fascination. In other words, what actually supported the 
formal acceptance of the concept was a popular sensation caused by the apparent 
misunderstanding. Yoshino (1927) stated that no Japanese at that time believed that 
states could have peaceful relations. China and Great Britain fought the First Opium 
War (1839-1842) and Japan witnessed the devastating results this war had brought to 
China. Even though the American officials explained to their Japanese counterparts 
the tragedy of China as a corollary of the latter’s reluctance to follow those laws, they 
were well aware that the claims of equality and universality were but superficial and 
limited (Suzuki, 2011; Buzan, 2012). Moreover, following Maruyama and Kato 
(1998), in the Chinese translation of Wheaton’s book, the phrase ‘all civilised nations’ 
was translated as ‘all Christian nations’ (see also Suzuki, 2011: 20).6 This could have 
discouraged the widespread acceptance of this notion as Christianity had been banned 
for centuries in Japan. According to Yoshino (1927), Japan during the Edo Period 
perceived the West as ‘barbaric’ (yi) following the Chinese centripetal world order. 
Indeed, for these reasons, studies on European law and politics were delayed compared 
to other disciplines (Yoshino, 1927: 431-433). These facts illustrate that Japanese 
people were neither simply attracted to the superiority of Western culture, nor awed 
by it (see also Aydin, 2007: 25; Suzuki, 2011).  
                                                
6 This was because William Martin, the translator of the first Chinese version of Wheaton’s work, was 
a missionary, and he translated the book in an effort to spread Christian teachings to Chinese people. 
Sato also mentions that the work was supported by US government officials (Satō, 1977).  
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     This notwithstanding, Yoshino’s account did not provide a sufficient explanation 
to the reasons the Japanese became fascinated by the idea. Instead, he made an 
interesting comparison between Japan and China. He pointed out that the acceptance 
was not observed in China, despite the fact that the notion of dō originated from a 
Chinese context. He concluded that it was a contingent encounter that gave the 
Japanese the unusual passion for the political movement, pointing out how the public 
notion of bankoku kōhō, a translation of ‘international law’ during the period,7 was 
far-fetched from how international law was understood in Yoshino’s era (see also 
Maruyama, 1949). Nonetheless, the miscomprehension in the popular imagination 
undeniably helped Japan accept the notion both in name and in reality. Accordingly, 
the state ‘entered’ the Western international society ahead of China.8 
     Yoshino’s work gives us an important insight into how knowledge travels globally; 
knowledge and power do not travel hand in hand necessarily, and it is indigenous 
interpretation that endows knowledge with power. Moreover, indigenous 
interpretation questions the identity of the object of knowledge. Knowledge needs an 
indigenous receptor to be accepted in an exotic space; hence what is important is how 
knowledge is understood, instead of what it is. Content here seems to be neglected not 
because it is unimportant, but because the idea itself is automatically replaced by an 
indigenous idea. Put bluntly, knowledge has to be misunderstood for it to be accepted. 
In this case, international law was replaced by dō, and it was an essential step for the 
ultimate appropriation. The process generated a cognitive void which ironically 
facilitated the understanding of knowledge. However, the adaptation was later 
forgotten since it was involuntary. The role of the receptor and the void in global 
knowledge dissemination—only vaguely detected by Yoshino—was further clarified 
by another Japanese scholar almost forty years younger than him: Maruyama Masao. 
 
2.3. Basso Ostinato:9 A Question of Power and Subjectivity 
For Maruyama, who began his academic career in the late 1930s, this cognitive gap 
was perceived as an imminent problem for Japan to develop as a ‘normal’ modern 
                                                
7 It was later re-translated as kokusai hō. 
8 According to Aydin (2007: 26), Japanese intellectuals also translated ‘civilisation’ using a Confucian 
term.     
9 In Japan, this concept is better known as kosō (old layers). However, the present thesis employs the 
term basso ostinato as it conveys the idea and nuance of the concept best as Maruyama (1984) himself 
has claimed. 
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state rather than a curious object of research. Japan tried to establish an ‘independence 
of national awareness’ in the Taisho Period (1912-1926)10, during which Yoshino 
spent most of his academic career (Mitani, 1974: 7). By contrast, in the Showa Period 
which began in 1926, Japan experienced an ‘identity crisis’ as a result of three wars—
the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War—and 
the resulting economic depression despite having won all these wars. As a 
consequence of this social confusion, German sociology of knowledge became a 
popular field of study in the 1930s and 1940s because it was hoped that it could help 
explain the meaning of Japan’s rapid assimilation of knowledge so as to transcend the 
cultural crisis that affected Japan.  
     In Japan in the late 1930s to 1940s, modernity, which in turn came to be seen as 
tantamount to the West, was seen as a remarkable ideology. Intense intellectual 
debates followed in order to ‘overcome modernity’ (Nishitani et al. 1979[1942]), 
which continued throughout the Second World War and has been repeatedly revived 
ever since. As the Pacific War escalated, overcoming modernity came to mean going 
back to Japan’s own traditions, resulting in a powerful revisionist movement. This 
divided intellectuals into two opposing camps. Maruyama was one of those scholars 
who were critical of this movement. Employing Karl Mannheim’s sociology of 
knowledge method, Maruyama attempted to uncover what Mannheim called ‘aspect-
structure (Aspectstructur)’11 in Japan. There has to be ‘something’ (Maruyama, 1984) 
that generates ‘multi-productive misunderstanding’ (Maruyama, 1960) in the process 
of cross-regional knowledge transfer. By elaborating on aspect-structure, Maruyama 
approached what I call the unsynthesisable cognitive void (see below for more on the 
unsynthesisable).  
     With basso ostinato, a concept inspired by Mannheim’s ‘thought-style’, Maruyama 
argued that any political thought in Japan, be it Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, 
Liberalism, and Marxism, originated from a foreign context. If the imported thoughts 
are carefully analysed, a certain subtle mutation that is never fully integrated into the 
original is detected. Basso ostinato is a specific ‘pattern of thinking’ that subtly 
changes the original. These ideologies were gradually and almost unconsciously 
                                                
10 Modern Japanese era names (nengō) are Taisho (1912-1926), Showa (1926-1989), and Heisei (1989-
), respectively. 
11 This term is translated as ‘perspective’ in the English edition (Mannheim, 1985). By contrast, for 
Maruyama, who read most of Mannheim’s work in German, it is understood as an aspect as a result of 
a constitutive penetration of his social standpoint into his thinking (Maruyama, 1978: 334).     
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Japanised as if underlying bass notes slightly makes melody listened differently 
(Maruyama, 1972, 1976b, 1979, 1984, 1985, 1988). This ‘unconscious 
consciousness’, to paraphrase Mannheim (1985), is tacitly shared in a largely 
geographically defined community. Thus, any imported political idea retains an 
imperceptible otherness, as heterogeneous ideas evolve alongside each other and 
cannot be fully integrated (Maruyama, 1972). Basso ostinato helps scholars identify 
the crucial cognitive gap that arises in the process of knowledge transfer implied in 
Yoshino’s study. On the other hand, however, it is remained as a difficult concept to 
grasp, and has been harshly criticised as deterministic and regressive (cf. Koyasu, 
1986; Kan, 1999; Yamaguchi, 2000; Kimura, 2014), perhaps because it took spatiality 
into consideration seriously. However, as I will demonstrate later, it was criticised 
because, it nailed down the kernel of intellectual history in Japan, particularly in terms 
of appropriation of foreign knowledge.    
     To get a more nuanced picture of this concept, we must consider Maruyama’s 
borrowing of this term from musicology. As a musical term, basso ostinato connotes 
‘a recurrent pattern of bass notes’ which is ‘an underlying motif that is independent 
from the treble part and, if the main theme appears in the treble part, is bound to 
undergo some modifications’ (Maruyama, 1988: 27). His intention was to trace basso 
ostinato from three fields: history, politics, and ethics (Maruyama, 1976b: 178-179). 
However, his ambitions remained unfinished, as he did not complete the latter two. 
Still, he managed to identify three pivotal terms in history: ‘become’ (naru), ‘next’ 
(tsugi), and ‘momentum’ (ikioi). In terms of ethical consciousness, he focused on a 
pair of binary concepts—pure mind (kiyoki kokoro) and dirty mind (kitanaki 
kokoro)—and extracted a series of concepts related to governmental affairs 
(matsurigoto) for politics. Having listed them for a better understanding, however, it 
suffices to note that basso ostinato identifies ‘something’ in everyday life that subtly 
and unconsciously localises knowledge in order for it to be accepted in a foreign 
community. As will be further explored later, his attempts to reify basso ostinato as 
textual form ended up in failure.  
     During the interwar period, Japanese scholarship heavily debated whether world 
history could be conceived as a singular or plural process. This was of importance as 
the former would imply acknowledgment of Western superiority. In fact, many 
scholars began to argue for the latter due to the need to justify the anticipated Second 
World War. Until then, the Japanese government had been aiming to escape from Asia 
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in its effort to avoid colonisation, and in doing so had become part of the ‘civilised’ 
world as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1933) famously maintained. Thereby, Japanese 
intellectuals embraced a ‘pluralistic Eurocentric institutionalism’ as outlined by 
Martin Hall and John Hobson (2010: 217-218), meaning that they acted as a wilful 
follower of the West by affirming the (Western) universality of its political trajectory 
to establish a modern nation-state.  
     In the attempt to turn Japan into a European state, Japanese people believed that 
their state had gained the status of a great power after defeating Russia in 1905, but 
soon thereafter they came to realise that Western states were not going to accept Japan 
on equal ground. Becoming suspicious of Western claims of universalism, Japanese 
politicians and scholars began to emphasise their nation’s historical uniqueness as well 
as superiority, and saw a necessity in overcoming modernity as an equivalent to the 
West (Maruyama, 1974: xxx). Although Japanese historiography still often neglects 
this point, the dominant discourse during the first half of the twentieth century asserted 
that world history had to be conceived in plurality (cf. Nishida, 1982[1940]; Kōyama, 
1940; Shimizu, 2015). Within this discourse, it was insisted that there is not one world 
history, but many world histories. This rhetoric, helping Japanese intellectuals argue 
for equality and later even superiority over the West, served as a justification for 
pursuing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and eventually ideologised the 
entire Japanese society, regardless of political inclination (Tosaka, 1935; Takeuchi, 
1959; Maruyama, 1961; Samuels, 2007). 
 
Two Syntheses 
Maruyama critically reflected on this ‘overcoming modernity’ debate via intellectual 
history. He was puzzled at the fact that, despite the importation of Western 
nationalism, Japan had developed into a different type of modern nation-state, and he 
assessed this problem in terms of political subjectivity. Despite Japan’s claim of being 
a modern democratic state with a constitutional monarchy, the actual political situation 
was far from it, as the ‘formation of free subjects (jiyu naru shutai)’ (Maruyama, 1964: 
20) was hampered through the aspect-structure of the kokutai,12 eventually leading to 
the abolishment of the political sphere altogether. The kokutai argued that the Emperor 
                                                
12 This term has been translated as national polity. Though controversial, during the first half of the last 
century, it was understood as a synonym of the Emperor family’s rule which was thought to have 
persisted from the beginning of the country’s establishment in 660 BC.  
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is a direct descendant of the sun-goddess Amaterasu, and this divine ancestry put the 
Japanese emperor at the centre of a hierarchical society based around concentric 
circles. This discouraged the public from critically questioning political decisions. By 
a priori determining the Emperor’s rule as virtuous, Maruyama argued, ‘a system of 
irresponsibility’ was established, which allowed Japanese rulers to justify their 
political decisions as elements of inevitable, pre-determined historical processes 
(Maruyama, 1964, 1969). As a consequence, ‘societal intolerance’ (Maruyama, 1971: 
16) existed in Japan towards dissenting voices, eventually rendering the country 
internally inclusive but externally ‘closed’ (Maruyama, 1959: 196).  
     It was this discomfort with the depoliticisation of Japanese society that encouraged 
Maruyama to work on the investigation of cross-regional intellectual history, which 
started as a series of studies on Edo Confucianism. In addition, he had an ‘extra-
academic motive’ (Maruyama, 1974: xxxii). Strongly objecting to the dominant 
discourses of overcoming modernity qua the West, he was eager to demonstrate the 
universality of human history by stressing Japan’s contribution to it. During the 
period, a Marxist conceptualisation of uni-linear history dominated Japanese 
intellectual climate. In this conceptualisation, he tried to elucidate the process of 
Confucianism’s internal collapse, which had provided Tokugawa Japan with its most 
salient source of social cohesiveness, as the advent of modernity. These two motives 
can be translated into two syntheses, which Maruyama tried to accomplish in his work. 
The first synthesis, corresponding to the former motive, was a methodological task. 
Maruyama’s (1978: 334) ambition was to investigate ‘how to synthesise the internal 
continuity within the category of thinking and the consecutive transformation of 
meaning within the same category’. For him, continuity appeared to be what played a 
crucial role in this transformation. Given Japan’s exceptional homogeneity, its modern 
intellectual history was a demonstration of this paradox. The latter aspiration aimed to 
synthesise foreign theory and local practice. By determining the kokutai as aspect-
structure, he aimed to uncover a more comprehensive picture of modernity in the 
history of human progress. In doing so, he tried to attest that Western political theory 
was still applicable to Japan. Initially he had hoped that Mannheim’s methodology, 
specifically the concepts of aspect-structure and conditionality of knowledge, would 
provide an epistemological tool to simultaneously establish the two syntheses. 
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An Awareness towards Plurality 
Nevertheless, his hope proved to be ill-founded in the end. Instead, Maruyama 
discovered a site of ‘multi-productive misunderstanding’ (Maruyama, 1960) where an 
idea becomes meaningful through textual appraisal by the locals. At this site, 
comprehensions of the same idea are never fully integrated but remain different among 
multiple actors below the level of consciousness. With this site of creation, he was 
compelled to change his concept of modernity from that in singular to that in plural. 
Eager to argue for a universal history, Maruyama was caught by the seemingly 
different natures of political power among cultures, which he primarily recognised as 
the difference between Japan and China. Despite the fact that Japan had borrowed its 
political system from China, power in Japanese politics actually diverged from the 
Chinese understanding (Maruyama, 1974). At first glance, the Meiji Restoration 
replaced the Chinese-inspired traditional political system with the Western modern 
state-system. However, Maruyama’s finding indicated the other way round: the 
unchanged power structure implied that the imported system was internally converted 
by the existing indigenous system. As he dug deeper, Maruyama gradually became 
aware that despite the ostensibly radical systemic transformations, the essential power 
structure in Japan had remained almost unchanged. In other words, institutional 
transformations did not connote a structural change. Rather, foreign ideas were 
substantially replaced by Japanese ideas in the course of nominal transformations. In 
his earlier work on Edo Confucianism, published during the Second World War, 
Maruyama did not study the difference between Japan and China seriously 
(Maruyama, 1952, 1974). This proved to be a crucial mistake (Maruyama, 1974) 
because the internal alterations might be repetitive in nature but unrecognisable in 
superficial analyses. In other words, Chinese ideas, like European knowledge, were 
already replaced by indigenous ideas at the core in the course of importation. Yet 
questions remain: How were the transubstantiations actualised? Could political power 
in an allegedly identical political system be different when transplanted into a foreign 
society? Again, these questions draw links to Yoshino’s study on the different 
appreciations of the concept of international law between China and Japan.             
     Tsuda Sokichi’s study (1938) on Japanese importation of Chinese thought, which 
could be traced back to the seventh century, gave us clues to this conundrum. He 
argued that due to inadequate language proficiency, the Japanese paradoxically 
developed what might be called a textualism, which accepted foreign texts at face 
  61 
value. However, this does not at all indicate that they valued the literal meaning of the 
texts based on a strict interpretation. On the contrary, it was the fundamental lack of 
language proficiency that made them value the original text in their own reading. From 
Tsuda’s study, two notable traditions of Japanese textualism can be identified.  
     First, it cultivated a unique symbolism, as the learners were prone to gain rather 
fragmentary knowledge than thought in toto. This tendency was enhanced by Chinese 
ideograms, also imported into Japan. At the same time, a paucity of linguistic skill was 
likely to be compensated by analogical reasoning in reference to what they had already 
known. Tsuda argued that the Confucian tradition per se contributed to reinforcing 
this disposition. Because its raison d’être was to justify the reign of the Chinese 
Emperor, Confucianism was largely philological, practical, and hence, fragmentary, 
in which various, even contested, concepts were connected by association.  
     Second, setting aside the question of accuracy, learning itself was valued more than 
further critical examining and thinking. Accordingly, the gap widened between 
intellectuals who read foreign texts and ordinary people who did not read them. These 
tendencies formed an overall inclination of Japanese intellectual culture, in which 
knowledge lost touch with quotidian life, and which had led the Japanese to 
paradoxically rebel against the authority of knowledge, be it China, their own 
government, or the West, over the course of history repeatedly. Tsuda concluded his 
study with the remark that it was not until Japan started to import Western knowledge 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century that its people began to doubt the 
contradiction between their everyday politics and Confucianism (Tsuda, 1933). 
Therefore, the Confucianism in Japan had already been transformed throughout the 
long process of interpretation. The gap between theory and practice was rarely 
acknowledged, however; the theory was blindly worshiped despite the mutation. 
     The experience of a group of medical doctors who translated a Dutch book, itself 
a translation of a German book, in the late eighteenth century endorsed Tsuda’s 
arguments. The experience was later published during the Meiji Restoration under the 
title Rangaku Kotohajime (Launching Western Learning) (Sugita, 1890). Until then, 
medical knowledge in Japan came predominantly from China. The doctors did not 
speak Dutch when they acquired the book, so they had to confirm the book’s 
information on the anatomy of the human body by comparing the figures in the book 
with a corpse they obtained from an execution ground near Edo (Tokyo) and dissected. 
Since the anatomical charts in the book were significantly different from their 
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conventional expertise, they were ‘astonished’ with the accuracy of European 
knowledge as the charts in the Dutch book ‘had no mistake’. This sensational 
experience made them regret their lack of medical expertise in the human body, and 
they decided to translate the whole book into Japanese, despite their linguistic 
inability. In the early stage of the project, they could only work on one short sentence 
‘from dawn to dusk’. The whole enterprise, which took four years, was like ‘a boat 
without helm sailing in the ocean’ (Sugita, 1890: 33). Nevertheless, they concluded, 
it was such an intensive experience, and the ‘will of heaven’ was what enabled them 
to complete the translation (ibid.: 39). Here, a few commonalities can be observed 
between the three stories of international law, of Japanese textualism, and of the 
medical doctors. First, the act of knowing is primarily a closed procedure involving 
the locals. Second, in the consciousness of the recipients there was a curious absence 
of the authors of knowledge. Instead, something like the ‘will of heaven’ was adored. 
Third, and consequently, there existed an analogous mode of power, which can be 
described as ‘power to’ as it had no possessor and could serve everyone.  
     Maruyama (1961: 12-15) termed this particular power structure in Japan 
‘unstructured tradition’. He argued that this unique tradition developed in Japan as a 
result of tireless importations of different traditions of thought, in which people did 
not consider the gap between theory and practice. It was in this unstructured structure 
that imported knowledge was modified to an extent that could no longer be equated to 
the original through constant classification, interpretation and re-interpretation in 
terms of what was familiar to the locals instead of what was correct. For Maruyama, 
it was this vacuum of unconsciousness that assisted Japanese people to continuously 
miscomprehend foreign knowledge. The resulting gap widened as the misunderstood 
knowledge was abstracted from social science discourses (Maruyama, 1971: 68) 
which were supposed to be applicable to other contexts. This way, knowledge was 
adjusted to fit a different epistemological tradition, and in the process, the object of 
knowledge in fact switched to an analogous but substantially different indigenous 
idea. Hence, the various cognitions, which developed in different social contexts, 
could not be presumed as parts of the same entity; the assumed cognitive object and 
the cognitions did not hold a one-on-one relation, even if a cursory assessment initially 
indicated so. What played a crucial role in this subtle mutation in the process of 
assimilating foreign knowledge was not only an ‘adjustment of the way of looking at 
a problem’ (Maruyama, 1978), but also a different power structure.  
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     Analysing foreign theories from within the Japanese history of thought, Maruyama 
gradually became convinced that the failed emergence of free subjects in Japan was a 
fundamental structural issue rooted in everyday practices and experiences, and not 
only a question of perspective and conditionality of knowledge (see also Watsuji, 2011 
[1952]). Some may dispute whether this ‘unstructured structure’ is exclusively 
Japanese, since it is increasingly a common practice in the globalised world to apply 
a new context to knowledge exchange as well as abstraction in scientific procedure. 
This point will be addressed in the next section. Contrary to Maruyama’s earlier 
wartime conviction, then, modernity has to be reconsidered as modernities. 
Knowledge can only turn into power after it is localised within a unique local structure. 
Therefore, theory and practice cannot be synthesised inter-regionally, but only in the 
void between different practices. This void is where the capacity to accept a theory 
lies. Thus, the same knowledge cannot be equated to the original once it is imported 
to a foreign community. Maruyama (1978: 131) argued that the methodology of 
geopolitics in particular allows the geopolitical and geohistorical conditionalities of 
the society under scrutiny to be calibrated. These contingent encounters between 
foreign knowledge and local practice are spatial and repetitive in function, since the 
emergence of the intersection is considered to be deeply rooted in everyday practices. 
Hence, such practices composing basso ostinato are historically formed under a 
specific spatio-temporal condition (Maruyama, 1972, 1976b). With this concept, 
Maruyama tried to capture the site of creation where repeated nodes take place in 
constant flux. At this site, foreign knowledge gradually affects and is affected by local 
knowledge, thereby becoming embedded in a new geographical location. Once 
knowledge is attached to its new location, it develops into a new form irrespective of 
its origin. However, the two forms of knowledge—local and foreign—never 
amalgamate; they only synchronise at the site like how the main theme and the hardly-
noticeable bass notes chime with each other in a piece of music. 
 
An Inconclusive Concept? 
Still, however, the exact meaning of basso ostinato remains irrefutably obscure. 
According to Maruyama, it refers to a ‘pattern of thinking and description’ 
(Maruyama, 1992: 295) that a community of experience has historically nurtured 
while continuously incorporating foreign knowledge. For him, this pattern was what 
caused Japanese people to repeatedly mistranslate foreign ideas. Basso ostinato 
  64 
indicates a spatial and therefore popular dimension of aspect-structure. This dimension 
carries a repetitive and obstinate orientation since it belongs to the unconscious 
everyday realm, but it also contains transformative possibilities as geographical and 
social conditions change. It is not an ideology, because it can unite diverse traditions 
of thought in Japan.  
     Defining his task as ‘finding a clue to enquiring the style of thought that has been 
relentlessly streaming under the various modes of historical consciousness down to 
the modern era’, Maruyama (1972: 295-298) examined some of Japan’s oldest texts 
dating back to the eighth and ninth centuries, and extracted the banal terms mentioned 
at the beginning of this section as key words in order to identify the ‘category as 
substratum’. This approach was a ‘sort of circular argument’ because he had already 
identified the bass notes in contemporary discourses a priori before projecting them 
into the past (Maruyama, 1972: 298). Clearly, a danger exists in this approach. In 
addition to the difficulty of unearthing something belonging to the unconscious realm, 
any attempt to reify this ‘something’ or ‘somethings’ in textual form may create 
stereotypes and hence be criticised as historical and geographical determinism. As 
Charls Taylor (in Thrift, 1996: 9) argues, ‘to situate our understanding in practice is 
to see it as implicit in our activity’. Pinning down this implicitness can result in 
mistreating subjects (and objects) — the result of a discourses—as a producer of 
discourses (Müller, 2008). Consequently, ‘the role of language in shaping experience’ 
(Nelson, 1992) is eliminated. The process can breed stereotypes by mistaking it as 
reality (Bhabha, 1983: 23).  
     Maruyama anticipated these accusations, and had a response to them. He argued 
that Japan’s ‘exceptional homogeneity’ was based on its unique geography, but these 
conditions do not make the motif stable. Rather, the motif was bound to change since 
the conditions were continuously transforming (Maruyama, 1996c). Having said that, 
he extracted the terms from the old texts. However, the terms did not help us to 
understand basso ostinato better. On the contrary, the motif itself contained a danger 
of justifying Japan’s perpetual uniqueness as a state by making the subject the 
producer of discourse. This perhaps was what wartime propagandist did (Koyasu, 
1986). For these reasons, despite Maruyama’s exceptional reputation, basso ostinato 
remains a difficult concept to date, being employed by only a few scholars. 
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2.4. The Unsynthesisable and Modes of Power 
To recapitulate, the creative cognitive gap initially hinted by Yoshino was more 
intensively scrutinised by the musicological concept of basso ostinato as ‘something’ 
that generates the gap (Maruyama, 1984). In order to employ this concept in my own 
framework, this ‘something’ however must be more succinctly explained and must 
eschew the danger of determinism. In what follows, I argue that basso ostinato is better 
conceived as a manifestation of everyday relations in a geographically defined 
community. It identifies both the power relations in a particular society in which 
subjects are articulated, as well as the law which they are subject to. The relations are 
formed through experiences in ‘our relation to nature, other human beings and the self’ 
(Huysmans, 1998: 228). Basso ostinato is important because, supporting a particular 
mode of power, it can change the substantial mechanics of an established system, 
albeit without changing the components of the system per se (Qin, 2016: 12). 
Therefore, it can change the whole structure of an imported concept without being 
noticed, rendering the adaptation merely nominal. In order to detect this hidden 
inflection, however, the concept must be employed as a heuristic device that ‘allows 
us to see how ideas located in different times and regions diverge from the style of 
thought we have created on the basis of materials drawn from a particular time and 
space’ and not as a hypothesis (Nelson, 1992: 38-40). This is similar to how Friedrichs 
and Kratochwil (2009) call abduction as a pragmatic research strategy. 
 
Two Insights 
Based on the discussion above, I identify two crucial insights the concept of basso 
ostinato brought to Maruyama. First, when intellectual history is understood with a 
thorough contextualisation, it dissolves the either-or question between ‘true’ and 
‘false’ consciousness, and accordingly enables a researcher to focus on the difference 
itself, rather than the validity of interpretation. Any standpoint, being constrained by 
each conditionality of knowledge, projects as well as distorts reality to actualise a 
subjectivity. Even if different standpoints seemingly refer to and explain an analogous 
object, there is always the possibility that they are pointing to factually different 
objects. When the question of truth is thus abandoned, it becomes possible to consider 
each misunderstanding in a more productive way by conceiving of knowledge as 
‘knowledges’ (Thrift, 1999: 303). As Mannheim (1985: 168) remarks, ‘a 
Weltanschauung [worldview] is not of necessity a source of error, but often gives 
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access to spheres of knowledge otherwise closed’ (cf. Massey, 1999: 285). To be 
accepted in a foreign territory, knowledge requires a receptor which has its own 
history. By finding a place for acceptance, knowledge begins its unique development 
in a new space. The product of the knowing process may look identical to the original, 
but in practice it contains an unsynthesisable cognitive void. This highlights the 
neglected role of space in the act of knowing, while simultaneously denying a linear 
developmental model of intellectual history in the inter-regional context.  
     As for the second insight, provided that it is the cognitive void that enables the 
assimilation of foreign knowledge, the void must also be the site where people develop 
their subjectivity. Hence, the void is a necessary condition of appropriation. It was a 
bewildering conclusion for Maruyama, who had intended to reduce the mistranslation 
of foreign knowledge. Having the aspiration for the second synthesis in mind, his 
research has, from the beginning, held a politicised assumption (cf. Huysmans, 2002: 
43). Thus, his orientation contained the evident danger of altering the analytical device 
for a teleological reasoning, accordingly restraining him to get more into the issue of 
space. Maruyama believed that it was aspect-structure, represented as kokutai in 
Japanese society, that hampered the correct comprehension of imported thoughts, 
consequently impeding the formation of free subjects in Japan. In order to expose the 
falsity of kokutai, he chose to elaborate on basso ostinato. However, as Huysmans 
(2002: 51) points out, theorisation is ‘the performative work of language and its 
generic dimension is embedded in “underlying” social processes that could explain 
the specific ways in which security language arranges social relations in contemporary 
societies’. Therefore, the first question of analysis must be a ‘heuristic one of how to 
understand what is happening’ (Huysmans, 2002: 52), since the theory, because of its 
embeddedness, cannot establish the falsity. Maruyama’s observation indicated that it 
was kokutai that generated the inchoate (mis)understanding which in turn facilitated 
the whole process of comprehension of the unknown knowledge. Thus, it was this 
falsity that had enabled Japan to establish its subjectivity as the first non-Western 
modern nation-state, allowing the country to join an allegedly universal history. It was 
this very indigenous idea, which is kokutai, that helped empower and politicise 
Japanese people, allowing them to imagine their nation as part of the globe.  
     Therefore, no foreign knowledge can be understood completely, and it is only 
accepted when it has gained a meaning in reference to already existing ideas and the 
indigenous power structure. In Japan’s case, it was the feudalistic and pre-modern idea 
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of kokutai that underpinned the concept of the modern state. Thus, on the one hand, 
Maruyama’s second synthesis—of universal theory and local practice—proved to be 
a failure. Rather, Japan’s experience implied that knowledge can only be appropriately 
localised by a radical but automatic adjustment. On the other hand, it was the first 
synthesis—of continuity and change in the analysis of intellectual history—that could 
be explained by basso ostinato. It was kokutai that provided the basis for the 
(mis)comprehension of foreign knowledge which paradoxically could induce social 
transformations. Thus, knowledge can be activated in the entangled relations that is 
‘as much internal as they are external’ (Allen, 2012). The subjects that appropriate the 
knowledge are not what is called an autonomous subject, because the relations are 
essentially uncontrollable for the subject herself. Rather, it automatically defines the 
law the subjectivity follows. The assemblage is not only made up of this internality, 
but rather an internality in relation to externality; the linkage between internality and 
externality is actualised in the unsynthesisable cognitive void albeit in an unnoticeable 
way. 
     Through a thorough contextualisation with a special focus on space, Maruyama 
scrutinised the process as a collective and active affair that was however largely 
governed by an unconscious realm. War induces a collective fascination which unites 
a community and eradicates ideological differences. For Maruyama, this unification 
in the context of Japan evidently indicated the miscomprehension of Western ideas. 
Eager to rectify this mistake, however, he was haunted by the cognitive void. His 
lifelong aspiration for cosmopolitanism and modernism, and for establishing a 
‘healthy’ political subjectivity in Japan, led him to a bewildering conclusion. Despite 
the fact that this gap rests on irreconcilability, it links local people to a putatively 
universal theory. At the same time, it is from this incongruence that the condition of 
possibility to accept the knowledge emerges for the locals. In this way, knowledge is 
diffused globally while engulfing differences superficially.  
     Thus, foreign knowledge gains a universal character as it is linked to the local in 
an incongruous way. The unification is a product of multiple relations, but has ‘an 
emergent “thingness”’ (Allen, 2012). Knowledge is decontextualised and 
recontextualised across diverse social and cultural situations which actualise 
assemblages (Collier and Ong, 2005). Basso ostinato indicates that this linkage can be 
attained because it does not negotiate about the contents; rather, the contents link up 
various ways of thinking. The system can become different not because the 
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components are replaced, but because the system is read differently. For these reasons, 
the conversion is not visible especially from the outside, feigning a superficial 
integration. Even after a deepened mutual understanding, this cognitive gap can still 
remain as a void due to its autopoietic character. This is what I call the 
unsynthesisable. 
     This partly explains why the modern state system in Japan has helped restore 
monarchy, which contains feudalistic elements. This is not to argue that an exotic 
theory conveniently justified the rule of the Emperor as a power-holder. Rather, I 
argue that the theory of the nation-state, which is of foreign origin, made sense in 
Japan as the power in the concept was translated through the local mode of political 
power most remarkably represented by the Emperor system.13 This obviously does not 
mean that the power of the Emperor was actually modern. What is crucial here is not 
the power of the Emperor per se, but a particular mode of power represented by the 
Emperor. Evidently, the power the Japanese read in the concept of the modern state 
was not analogous to the power of that in Europe. Likewise, in the example of 
international law, the morphed power by the Japanese did not imply the Emperor per 
se, but pointed to something that was ubiquitous and could potentially serve for 
everyone like the power of Emperor did. Relying on Watsuji Tetsurō (1948), the power 
of the Emperor was mostly understood as ‘the symbol of [a] nation’s consensus’ even 
throughout the reign of the samurai, which was fairly different from the master-
servant relationship in bushidō.14 In this context, the Emperor was the manifestation 
of the dynamic that people experienced mundanely. The Emperor came to be the 
signifier of the modern state power without any contradiction, as Japanese people 
comprehended the unknown in reference to the known. In this particular power 
structure, who held the power was not really important. What played a remarkable role 
was the local mode of power during the conversion of knowledge.  
     Japan, where a homogeneous way of thinking has been developed in this 
geographically confined community, underwent a drastic transformation induced by 
                                                
13 When the Meiji Government brought back the Emperor to the throne, their intention was that his 
existence could become a lynchpin of society, which, according to Ito Hirofumi’s understanding, is 
analogous to Christianity and not to constitutional monarchy (Kenpō Chōsakai Jimukyoku, 2003). 
However, the understanding of kokutai was not monolithic. For example, Fukuzawa (1875[1995]) 
argued that kokutai simply meant the independence of the state. 
14 Ishii (2011) argues that the most remarkable tradition of Japan’s emperor system is that historically 
the emperor rarely rules directly (Fushinsei) and that for this reason the system has sustained almost 
1800 years.  
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foreign knowledge, because the people creatively interpreted the knowledge in 
relation to their everyday practices and environment. It was the entangled relation 
between the internal and the external, actualised in the unsynthesisable cognitive void, 
that generated knowledge conversion. An exotic knowledge can be localised when it 
is understood in reference to the local modality of power.  
 
2.5. Recent Debates and Basso Ostinato 
The contribution of basso ostinato is that it unearths this multiplicity of space. When 
it is used as a Weberian ideal type (Nelson, 1992), transversal dissemination of 
knowledge can be analysed more succinctly. The concept is comprehensive because 
it focuses on people’s everyday practices which form a site-specific mode of power. 
It is a concept of assemblage thinking. However, as Maruyama (1978) later admitted, 
he had reservations on getting deeper into the issue of space, despite the fact that it 
was an inevitable corollary as he conceived of modernity as modernities. This 
hesitation was due to his initial aspiration to attest universal humanity and the 
criticisms of his method. This evidently contained a danger of altering the analytical 
device to suit a teleological reasoning. Criticisms against his method were mainly on 
its deterministic connotation which could be applied to any geographical concept. This 
line of criticism was especially vital in post-war Japan, because of the bitter memory 
of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which justified Japan’s imperial 
expansion, provoking the antipathy of neighbouring countries. Above all, even in the 
West it is only until recently that studies of space have experienced a constructivist 
turn (Haugaard and Grovade, 2009). While acknowledging such danger, it is this 
spatial aspect—the territory of knowledge—that the present thesis aims to develop 
further. This section attests to the need by re-situating basso ostinato in recent debates. 
 
Generalisability of Basso Ostinato 
At first glance, the system of conversion basso ostinato indicates is seemingly 
cultural-specific. In fact, Maruyama himself mentions that it is applicable only to 
Japan since it is an exceptionally homogeneous society in the world (Maruyama, 
1976b). However, I argue for its generalisability by stressing that basso ostinato is 
rather regional- or temporal-specific, as the defining factor can be more quickly 
transformed than cultural factors are assumed to be. Particularly when its geographical 
aspect is emphasised, basso ostinato ‘may and indeed do endure in many respects, but 
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that is not the same as saying that there is a fixed, unchangeable essence to them’ 
(Allen, 2012: 192). Because it is composed by mundane elements as if any piece of 
music is an aggregation of the same twelve notes (Maruyama, 1984), basso ostinato 
is hard be reified as a textual form. Indeed because of this intrinsic mundaneness, it 
easily escapes our attention, and is therefore obstinate but simultaneously 
transformable.   
     Basso ostinato is evidenced in Morgenthau’s case mentioned in the last chapter. 
What happened was an analogous conversion of the mode of power in the realist 
theory. According to Behr and Rösch (2015: 47-49; see also Rösch, 2014a), for 
Morgenthau, who was an immigrant in the US from Europe, power was understood as 
‘a psychogenic condition’ resting on intersubjective relations. By deploying the term 
‘realism’, Morgenthau tried to draw attention to the situation from which people were 
subliminally eschewing in order to recognise the reality as real, and also to encourage 
them to overcome the situation by exerting the power with which people could 
cooperate. Nevertheless, his insistence was instead interpreted as a legitimatisation to 
use their ‘power over’ as a means of domination in line with the Hobbesian tradition, 
diverging from his intention. In the case of Morgenthau, it was despite the alleged 
cultural affinity between Europe and the United States as ‘the West’.  
 
Unstructured Structure in World Politics? 
Thus, examining the spatial difference identified by basso ostinato enables us to see 
world politics, particularly in terms of difference, in a fresh way. The possible 
existence of divergent modes of power suggests that different geographical 
communities do not share a territory of knowledge. Power becomes power when it is 
collectively and empirically imagined in a specific mode among the members of a 
community. The alleged cultural affinity of transatlantic relations in Morgenthau’s 
case suggests that this mode is performative, in which the temporal-spatial context 
(especially the latter), rather than culture, plays an important role. The recent rise of 
classical realism and the clash between ‘Mars and Venus’ (Kegan, 2003) both show 
that this divergence is transformable despite the deterministic connotation of 
geography. They also indicate that, in the limited sense of Barnes and his power 
discussed in the previous chapter, there was no ‘international society’ even within the 
transatlantic relations, at least in a few decades after the Second World War. Power 
was envisaged differently in the two communities, and therefore the interpretations of 
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analogous knowledge vary in relation to each mode of power, generating unique 
meanings in each milieu. Hence, the international can be understood as an unstructured 
sphere, if not anarchical, without a shared mode of power in particular. Knowledge 
transfers took place despite the unnoticed difference. For sure, the ‘interaction’ itself 
might contribute to the construction of a new and apparent common mode of power 
which could change the whole structure of global politics later (Buzan and Lawson, 
2005). However, the initial gap would remain as long as the void is left unperceived 
as evidenced in the recent rise of classical realism. 
 
Agency, Structure, or Performance? 
Basso ostinato helps illuminate key differences in world politics in relation to space, 
and can shed new light on recent debates on international history of political thought. 
As stated in the last chapter, malleability and rigidity in terms of learning lie at the 
heart of modern Japan’s paradox in the assimilation of Western knowledge and its 
entry into international society. Yoshino’s account suggests that the reason for the 
latter was neither because the Japanese were attracted by the West’s prosperity and 
became convinced by its universal claim, nor because they were simply forced to do 
so. Rather, it was an apparently conscious choice of the community that enabled the 
state’s assertive assimilation of knowledge. Because this choice made by the 
community is a collective instinctive procedure, as Yoshino has suggested, the 
mutation of knowledge in an exotic space becomes inevitable but superficially 
intractable, and tends to be forgotten even inside the community as time passes 
(Yoshino, 1927). Thus, foreign knowledge is automatically given an initial appraisal 
in the local power structure, but what enables the appropriation is this subtle change. 
Basso ostinato radically counters Eurocentric accounts of the history of knowledge 
diffusion. It disputes the centre-periphery accounts of world system as it sees the 
subjectivity of locals as an equally necessary condition for the appropriation of foreign 
knowledge.  
     In the English-speaking world, only a few recent studies have started to question 
the Eurocentric bias of international intellectual history. Arnulf Lorca (2015) depicts 
how the use of international law in peripheral societies including Japan, where people 
see the world differently, has modified the notion itself. However, envisaging the 
world as a monolithic, centre-periphery, and hierarchical structure, his framework 
does not fully capture the locals’ creativity involved. By contrast, Shogo Suzuki 
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(2011) has argued that Japan joined the European international society with a strategic 
choice that emphasised the socialisation processes. However, this agency-centred 
view falls short of explaining not only the excitement in popular imagination towards 
the acceptance of international law, but also the difference between China and Japan 
as Suzuki sees the structure no less monolithic than Lorca does. In fact, Suzuki argues 
that newly independent states have no choice but to enter the Eurocentric international 
society, paradoxically emphasising the monolithic world structure.  
     Different from Lorca and Suzuki, Erik Ringmar’s comparative study employs a 
theatrical perspective using the metaphor of performance. His research provides a 
noteworthy explanation to the structural plurality of international society, while 
simultaneously diminishing the danger of prioritising a specific region. His focus is 
on ‘how meanings mean’ among agents (Ringmar, 2012: 2, emphasis in original). For 
Ringmar, performance is a dynamic dialogue between the social actors and the 
audience. It is facilitated by ‘pragmatics of discourse’, rendering a specific meaning 
meaningful only among actors who are active in a theatre. To explain how 
performance works in international politics, Ringmar compares the different spatial 
organisations between China, Japan, and Europe. He observes that space was 
relational for the centripetal order of China’s Qing Dynasty. In Westphalian Europe, 
space was territorial. Tokugawa Japan held an eclectic conception of the two. For this 
reason, Tokugawa Japan came to take part in the dialogue at the ‘European theatre’ by 
continuously realigning its framing, whereas China did not become an active audience 
of this particular theatre (Ringmar, 2012).  
     Ringmar concentrates on the representations and interactions of official politics 
caught in the territorial trap, and while this less structural account points to the 
significant role of regional cognitive difference and proximity (Agnew, 2003, 2015; 
see chapter 1 of this thesis), it misses the function of the productive misunderstandings 
in a micro scale that was identified by Japanese scholars (See also Ringmar, 2016). 
This is because Ringmar analyses the whole procedure by premising on only the 
absolute and unified space, but neglecting the relational spaces for each actor (Harvey, 
2006, 2007). Accordingly, his focus stays on official boundaries. Borrowing from 
Ringmar, however, we can ask: where did the performance take place? The issue 
unresolved in his comparative account is an incongruence in which the superficial 
concord was in fact supported by substantial differences in the micro scale and not 
simply by the identifiable sameness in the meso-scale.  
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     On the other hand, Chih-yu Shih’s (2012) discussion seems to clarify the difference 
between the two states in a similar manner to Ringmar, but by taking a structural 
approach. However, he equally sees the segmentalised structure in a unified space. He 
argues that modern China and Japan have struggled with the problem of ‘self-image’ 
and not ‘self-identity’(ibid.: 26). In contrast to the Western self-other framing, he 
suggests a ‘centre-periphery frame’ where identity is ‘about moral responsibility, and 
not about difference’. The difference between the Chinese idea of ‘under-heaven’ and 
Japanese Shinto is, he notes, that Shinto has a ‘strategic othering’. Because of Japan’s 
history of continuous importation of foreign knowledge, the other ‘have served as 
associates of the Shinto identity, which is stable, unambiguous, undeniable, absolute, 
and yet inexpressive and amorphous’. Therefore, Japan’s invasion into other Asian 
countries was ‘not an Othering act psychologically, but an act of self-rectification’ 
(ibid.: 29-30: see also Browning, 2010). 
     Although I have reservations about his ‘absolute’ claim on Shinto identity,15 Shih’s 
contention points to a more fundamental epistemic difference than Ringmar’s. 
Nevertheless, Shih’s view still does not answer the question of collective thought, as 
he stresses the strategic aspect and the role of Japanese elites. For sure, the centre-
periphery frame is a better explanation for Japan’s and China’s identity constructions 
than the self-other frame. However, this individualist-rationalist account also falls 
short of explaining the smaller details that make a difference in unconscious realm, 
and this shortcoming occurs because Shih sees the space of analysis as a uniform one, 
and accordingly stabilises the subjects without considering their subjectivities. 
Accordingly, despite the fact that he notes the difference between China and Japan, he 
does not fully elaborate the crucial difference in how each state imagine the self 
differently. 
     This difference is clearly seen in the dissimilar notions of territory between the two 
countries. Yano Jin’ichi argued in 1921 that Chinese people had ‘not only no border 
but also no state’ (the ‘state’ here refers to the Western notion, not the traditional 
Chinese one). Whereas the state is an outcome of struggles over borders, Yano stated 
that it was ‘theoretically evident’ that there had been no borders in China, because 
China saw itself as the world and as the ‘Universal Empire’ that could not possibly 
                                                
15 For example, Yasumaru (2007[1992]) points out that Japanese religious consciousness in the early 
modern period was a congruity of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shinto, and he further asserts that 
Shinto was a modern ideological construction to unite Japanese society. See also Watsuji (1948).  
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have border disputes. In this context, the foreign settlements during Qing China not 
were the results of defeat, but a way to insulate uncivilised Europeans (Yano, 1940: 
1-8).16 Likewise, the cession of Hong Kong to Britain was, for China, never the result 
of the resignation (Sun, 2007: 14) but a product of their way of ordering space better. 
Likewise, Sato Shin’ich argues that in the course of modernisation China came to 
acknowledge that it had to transform to a state from the Empire (see also Ringmar, 
2013).  
     There then exists an indisputable contrast between China and Japan, in which the 
latter first tried to drive out Westerners and then later accepted them by a sudden turn. 
Historically Japan was an island state with a natural border, even though its existence 
was rarely acknowledged. This spatial order was more a natural endowment than a 
social construction. When the border was invaded, Japan reacted more aggressively 
than China, not because Japan had acquired the notion of territory from the West, but 
because the geography and history endowed Japan with a more concrete notion of 
border. In addition, Japan at least had a sense that it was a state. Despite having 
imported political thoughts from China, Japan’s way of ordering space was 
nonetheless different from China, partly because of the experiences of the Japanese in 
their particular environment. Without taking this difference into consideration, Shih’s 
evasive account is Japan’s strategic othering, which does not explain the popular 
fascination of Japan.  
      By contrast, Sun Ge’s analysis of the centre-periphery framing explicates the 
important chasm between Japan and China, especially in terms of mode of power, 
resonating with Maruyama’s and Yoshino’s arguments. She argues that in the 
Japanese version of hua yi order developed during the Edo Period, the relation between 
the centre (hua) and its peripheries (yi) were interchangeable, while in the original 
Chinese version they were basically fixed. In this Japanese tradition, ‘a premise 
foreign to Chinese thinking was instituted, i.e. so-called cultural identification and the 
provenance of that culture can obtain a relation of relative autonomy from one another’ 
(Sun, 2007: 15). Consequently, Meiji Japan accepted the West as the new centre by 
stretching the hua yi metamorphosis, separating the sign (centre) from its physical 
                                                
16 Miwa (1981) claims that this theory of ‘China as no-state’ is a fallacy. My claim here is to not argue 
for China as an exception, but that the understanding of the concept of the state can be different in each 
community. 
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referent (China) (Sun, 2007; see also Hamashita, 1999; Bonnett, 2010). This twist 
clearly points to diverged modes of power between Japan and China.17 
 
Multiple Structures? 
With these accounts, however, the question yet unexplored is the enthusiastic 
acceptance of ‘the international’ (Armitage, 2014) by Japanese people. The epigraph 
of this chapter, taken from a lecture by George Kennan, discusses the possible source 
of fascination as ‘the gentle civilizer of national interest in which they find their true 
value’ (Kennan, 1951: 53-54). In Yoshino’s explication, the sort of power introduced 
by the Americans with the intention to persuade Japanese people ended up serving for 
all people paradoxically, Japanese government officials and their people alike, who 
equally abused the term in their everyday contexts. At the same time, it automatically 
helped the Japanese samurai, most of whom had initially supported sonnō jōi (revere 
the emperor, expel the barbarians), change their mind drastically towards opening the 
country. For certain, this supported America’s national interest in its demand of 
opening up Japan superficially, dovetailing with its rhetoric of America’s hegemony. 
However, for the Japanese at least during the period, the power of international law 
did not represent solely that of the United States. On the contrary, the power of 
international law qua universal law served for all people, not only the Americans or 
Christians. Japanese people acknowledged international law as a technology of 
civilisation, not the possession of the West but of humanity in general, whilst the 
Americans saw it as their possession invented by Western wisdom (Fukuzawa, 
1995[1875]; see also Yamamuro, 2001: 605).   
     This contradiction of international law as a gentle civiliser on the one hand and as 
a rigorous power executor on the other brings out the question of agreement between 
the signifier and the signified among various actors. There are two points of contention 
here. First, as already discussed, the concept of international law was replaced in 
practice after its importation. Second, as argued by Sun (2007) above, the centre of 
authority is transformable for Japanese people, and this idea of interchangeable power 
centre obviously helped them accept exotic notions. Since the Japanese read the notion 
in reference to their unique site-specific mode of power, even the apparent obedience 
                                                
17 Satō argues that in China, though it was later than in Japan, the centre was replaced from the self not 
to the West but to the universal standard of civilization (Satō, 1977: 238).  
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to the law would make sense for them. This indicates firstly that the same idea can be 
understood differently when modes of power become different, since they also change 
the perception of the relation among actors even when the contents are apparently 
identical. Second, and therefore in accordance with the mode of power in Japan, the 
apparent obedience was not to the Americans but to the law itself, which however was 
interpreted into an indigenous law. Without acknowledging this ‘self-interest’, as 
pointed out by Kennan, it would be doubtful whether Japan compromised in the formal 
international negotiations on the unequal treaties.  
     Basso ostinato as a manifestation of everyday relations in a geographically defined 
yet ever-changing community explains this external-internal entanglement, 
identifying the unsynthesisable cognitive gap that allowed the Japanese in the end to 
accept the power brought by the United States. While the identical components are 
supported by various cognitions, the cognitive gap goes unnoticed because the 
agreement is ‘attained’ in between the analytical spaces. The respective spaces do not 
dictate that the elites or the powerful are necessarily the actors and the people are the 
audience; the theatre is much more interactive with stages everywhere, and everyone 
can be a performer as well as the audience, thereby connecting the spaces in their 
respective imaginations. Despite their outwardly autopoietic character, the spaces are 
associated and related to each other through topological proximity (Allen, 2012). 
Therefore, the reason Japan accepted the Westphalian state system was not just 
because it was familiar to them as Ringmar (2012) suggests, but also because they 
(mis)interpreted the exotic power structure in reference to their own power structure.  
     Throughout the process, formal negotiations and agreements played a secondary 
role. The Japanese delegates were probably influenced by popular fascination on, and 
the domestic ‘misuse’ of, the notion, and this might have changed the negotiation and 
consequent events in the international sphere, which in turn might have affected 
popular opinion. Needless to say, the government officials were members of the 
collective. Negotiation and representation in formal politics are thus illuminated by 
mundane practices in local sites that are ignored from a perspective focusing on formal 
and dialogical processes in the international sphere. This is not to argue that inter-
cultural dialogue is unimportant, but that the observable determinant essentially 
requires a hidden premise. In order to understand the dialogue, we first need to 
acknowledge this hidden spatiality. What accelerates the contingent transmittance of 
knowledge is primarily the site-specific mode of power and the resulting cognitive gap 
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between communities. The locals accept exotic ideas thanks to the misunderstandings 
backed by everyday practices. This hidden spatiality is neither noticed nor corrected 
through the dialogue despite its importance, as it is engendered in each local space 
automatically but not in the international sphere.  
     Nonetheless, exactly due to the negligence, the unsynthesisable gap ensures, rather 
than impedes, the occurrence and acceptance of ‘the promiscuous entanglements of 
global and local logics’ that crystallised ‘different conditions of possibility’ in 
different places (Ong, 2007: 5). The gap is ‘not structural hierarchy but an oblique 
point of entry into the asymmetrical unfolding of emerging milieus’ (Ong, 2007: 5). It 
is facilitative precisely because it is not negotiated, and it is not negotiated because the 
void falls behind the spaces. International law certainly functioned as ‘universal’ law. 
However, the universal in the unified space becomes apparent only when it is 
embraced by diverged local modes of power in each space. In this way, 
misunderstanding(s) become productive, paradoxically enabling the local to support 
the global albeit unwittingly. Because the misunderstanding(s) change not the contents 
but only the power relations, they tend to be neglected from the outside and forgotten 
later even by the inside community. The interpretive-explanatory analyses introduced 
above cannot cogently explicate these different intelligibilities because, seeing the 
space as unified, they presuppose the identity of the subject as well as the object of 
knowledge. Basso ostinato by contrast allows us to observe the difference itself 
without presuppositions. It indicates that what makes an analogous concept 
substantially different in different spaces is the diverged modes of power that define 
the power relations presented by the concept. The cognitive gap implies that the modes 
of power are not shared among territories, making the international sphere 
unstructured. In each milieu, power in one text can be activated only when it makes 
sense in each imagination. Thus, the local mode of power can mutate the connotation 
of a concept without changing its appearance. 
     Knowledge becomes global when each site-specific power happens to project an 
approximate version based on their different comprehensions, such that it attains an 
ostensible agreement in this unstructured structure. However, this does not ensure 
mutual intelligibility among territories. As Foucault points out, knowledge is about a 
space ‘in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which 
he deals in discourse’ (Foucault, 1982a: 182). Yet the identity of the objects per se 
must also be scrutinised in an inter-regional context. In the case of international law, 
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the power of knowledge seemingly widened its sphere of influence and helped 
Japanese people understand the notion in their own making, without a direct conflict 
with the American understanding of power despite a significant difference between 
the two. For sure, the popular fascination in Japan fell beyond the jurisdiction of the 
United States, but it is nonetheless an integral part of the big picture despite the 
apparent closed nature of each milieu. For the Japanese, international law was meant 
for empowerment; for the Americans, it was their possession and the vindication of 
their wisdom, which hindered them from fully understanding the Japanese acceptance 
of the law. The Japanese’s image of the international was different from the 
Americans’ because it was based on their imagination backed by their history and 
geography. Nonetheless, the US and Japan reached an official agreement as the gap 
automatically gave them margin to frame the notion in each particular way, 
paradoxically projecting the seemingly analogous images into an actual global space 
(Collier and Ong, 2005).  
     This could make the perception of power in the international sphere more complex 
than it appears. In the dissemination of international law in Japan, the 
misunderstanding played a decisive role. It was less a product of interaction but more 
of unnoticed lack of communication behind the superficial consent. As explicated 
above, we see only ephemeral assemblages of different imaginations and actions, 
which may be observed as an act in concert when seen only from a generalised macro 
perspective. What composes the assemblage is in fact a ‘hesitant set of practices’ 
(Thrift, 2000). These practices are ‘a series of facts that “may seem insignificant” but 
that may open up, once put together in a meaningful way, “a complex reality that is 
not directly experiential” or that may remain opaque without them’ (Guillaume, 2013: 
110). The formal, official negotiations are the outcome of the assemblages. Without 
the micro practices, the big picture can never take shape. Without the hidden 
disagreement, the formal agreement will never be attained. Therefore, the space for 
analysing cross-regional knowledge dissemination has to be envisaged as relational 
and plural, that is, as spaces. By doing so, the space can be conceived as something 
that bridges the seemingly incongruent elements. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter examined mainly critical literature written in Japanese on intellectual 
history, especially those surrounding the questions of how, by whom, and where 
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traveling knowledge is interpreted. It deepened the inquiry into the issue of context by 
focusing on the cognitive gaps between analytical spaces in which locals 
decontextualise and recontextualise foreign knowledge. There are three important 
findings. First, it is the cognitive void in between the territories that actually facilitates 
the assimilation of knowledge. Second, exotic knowledge is appropriated only when 
it makes sense through a comprehension in relation to available knowledge and the 
local modality of power. In the process, the object of knowledge can even be replaced. 
Third, it is difficult to presuppose an integrated world structure as a unified space of 
analysis. Therefore, the space of knowledge dissemination has to be analysed as 
spaces, in which power is imagined in many different ways. This way, all the relevant 
elements—space and time, past and present, domestic and international, sameness and 
difference, local and global, reason and affect, continuity and change, and even theory 
and practice—can be considered in correlational rather than oppositional terms. Basso 
ostinato indicates that the relation is not just it but there must be an emergent 
‘thingness’ (Allen, 2012) that ephemerally stabilises those relations at a specific 
spatio-temporal frame.   
     Maruyama’s synthesis presents clearly the challenge of international intellectual 
history in the case where physical and intellectual distances are present: theory and 
practice on the one hand, continuity and change on the other. These seemingly 
paradoxical pairs have to be understood as correlational. When political theory travels 
cross-regionally, its subject is doomed to be replaced on the locals’ part. Accordingly, 
the same text is read differently and the object of knowledge is also replaced 
unnoticeably. The replacements are therefore facilitated by a site-specific mode of 
power, and in short, theory is interpreted differently by a new subject who holds 
different practices. It is this rudimentary procedure at the nascent stage of the process 
of knowing that enables theory to be generalised and abstracted in order to be 
successfully localised. The next step is interaction and negotiation that ultimately 
transforms the text in a visible way. Thus, theory is transubstantiated by a local mode 
of power, its acceptance contingently conditioned by different practices. In this 
respect, the misunderstanding of theory and knowledge is necessary and productive, 
because it is in these misunderstandings where local political subjectivities arise. 
Hence, continuous local practices play a part in social changes induced by the 
importation of exotic knowledge. Modern Japan experienced radical transformations 
because of, not despite, the homogeneity. Because of this homogeneity, basso 
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ostinato, as a system of conversion governed by a site-specific mode of power that 
paradoxically supported new knowledge, is widely shared in the community over a 
long duration. Through elaborating on basso ostinato, Maruyama aspired to pin down 
the root cause of historically continuous misinterpretations of exogenous knowledge 
by the Japanese. However, the conclusion he reached suggests that the 
misunderstanding was in fact a necessary evil for the assimilation of new knowledge, 
since the cognitive void ultimately generated the subjectivity of the Japanese.  
     Hence, Japan became a modern state because of, not despite, the misinterpretations. 
In this respect, it was a thoroughly Japanese state looking like a European modern 
state. International law was accepted in Japan in precisely this fashion; that is, by being 
interpreted into a substantially different notion, but simultaneously enabling the 
Japanese to envisage an idea of the international, and ultimately allowing the Japanese 
state to become the first member of European international society despite the physical 
and intellectual distance. To put it in another way, Japan accepted the domination of 
Western knowledge on the surface, paradoxically because they belonged to a territory 
of knowledge well distinguished from Europe. This conundrum can be understood 
only when space and structure are envisaged as multiple and relational.       
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  3 Analytical Framework 
Doesn’t it turn your stomach to think 
that America is east and Japan west [of 
the Pacific]? This doesn’t make sense. 
For me Japan must be regarded as the 
Land of the Rising Sun and as Toa 
[East Asia]. What an unpleasant thing 
it is to say that Japan is not Toa! 
Surely there is a way to make sure 
Japan stays as the east and America as 
the west! 
—Dazai Osamu, ‘8th 
December’ (1942) 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter further investigates the inside of a recipient community, aiming to 
develop an analytical framework for analysing traveling theory. It proceeds in 
accordance with the three questions that newly arose hitherto. The first question is: 
What was the epistemology and power in Japan in the first half of the twentieth 
century? In the previous chapter, I studied the role of cognitive gap and proposed to 
envisage analytical space as spaces, arguing that as people in different communities 
conceive of power relations differently, even the same text can be read in diverged 
ways. What the chapter did not thoroughly clarify were in what sense this relation in 
Japan was different from that of the West in the first half of the twentieth century. The 
second question is how to conceptualise this local community as a territory of 
knowledge. The final question is how to envisage multiple spaces in which foreign 
knowledge is interpreted relationally, particularly in the context of existing literature.  
     These questions will be addressed mainly by relying on the works of Nishida 
Kitarō, a Japanese philosopher who devoted his life to the inquiry of place (basho) 
and was famous for being the leading scholar of the Kyoto School. His thought is 
given weight here not only as an empirical evidence that demonstrates Japan’s 
particular epistemology, but also as a theoretical resource. As will be explicated later 
in the chapter, Nishida’s approach contested Kantian philosophy. However, Nishida 
did not make a complete objection, only an attempt to fill in the gaps he identified in 
Western philosophy. As he was living in Japan, a distant space from Europe with 
particular geographical traits, where people imported European knowledge, his 
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contestations of Kant embodied a specific way of comprehending spatiality in terms 
of knowledge production. Briefly put, conceiving place, not space, as the substratum 
and therefore universal instead of subject, in Nishida’s epistemology, all are seemingly 
inverted. My inquiry here is neither to emphasise the uniqueness of Japanese thought 
nor to attest its validity. Rather, it aims to construe, with an approach from within, a 
particular (if not unique) way of seeing that was shared in the community called 
‘Japan’ during the period. It is an attempt to draw a part of the world map of knowledge 
dissemination by providing another standpoint. The question here is how, that is, the 
method of inquiry (and must be understood strictly in this way), not the description of 
the interpretations per se. Therefore, the map of knowledge dissemination looks more 
topological than topographical, in which relations between the points are maintained 
but the scales, the distances, and the directions are all subject to change. For this 
purpose, I attempt to elucidate as carefully as possible the specific epistemic 
community I have been calling ‘Japan’ so far. I consider international intellectual 
history not as a uni-linear process, but rather as a web-like concurrent development 
without prioritising any region. By focusing on the points on the map, my aspiration 
is to excavate substantial differences that have been overlooked in conventional 
comparative approaches, which tend to focus on boundaries and inter-cultural 
dialogues.  
     This chapter proceeds in two sections. In the first section, I address the first 
question by explicating Nishida’s theory, particularly his epistemology developed as 
a rebuttal to Kantian epistemology, and highlighting the typical mode of power behind 
the theorisation. In doing so, it aims to demonstrate how spatial difference can be 
fundamental. In the next section, firstly I address the question of multiple space by 
linking Nishida’s thought to current debates on how to analyse space, in an effort to 
find a common ground of analysis between regions nonetheless. Based on these 
arguments, next, will re-conceptualise Japan as a territory of knowledge and later a 
community of experience. Finally, I will establish and explain the analytical 
framework for this thesis. 
 
3.2. Epistemology and Power in Japan 
One of the pitfalls of employing geography in constructing an analytical framework is 
the risk of falling into determinism by emphasising spatial or cultural differences, by 
drawing boundaries arbitrarily, or by treating state borders as given. To avoid such 
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danger, this section considers the question inversely, by carefully examining how 
space and knowledge were conceived by members of the community of Japan. It 
demonstrates that this particular community perceived space and boundary differently 
from European communities. Nishida, frequently referred to as the country’s one and 
only philosopher (Nakamura, 1983; Kosaka, 2002), is perhaps the best person to 
consult for this geo-historical inquiry into Japan. 1  Contrasting Maruyama who 
conducted a critical investigation into how foreign knowledge was localised, Nishida’s 
lifelong inquiry was about how knowledge became knowledge in a particular space. 
Maruyama, who had an aspiration for universal humanism, pursued the question of 
subjectivity and knowledge; Nishida, on the other hand, was obsessed with the 
question of space and knowledge. Whereas for Maruyama, spatial difference was 
something that had to be overcome, it was only the starting point of inquiry for 
Nishida. Finally, Nishida overall supported the Greater East Asia War (the Pacific 
War) as a war of justice, while Maruyama did not.  
     However, I disagree with the simplistic opinion that Nishida was a Zen thinker who 
relied on Eastern philosophy to challenge Western philosophy (cf. Abe, 1990; Nakano, 
2011). On the contrary, as John Krummel (2012: 50) argues, Nishida’s philosophy is 
‘well grounded in both Western philosophy and the Eastern traditions’. As Nishida 
himself stated, what he wanted to do ‘is neither to deny Eastern culture with Western 
culture, nor the other way round. Nor is it to contain one within the other. Rather, it is 
to find a deeper and larger common ground of the two, considering both of them in a 
new light’ (Nishida, 1982[1940]: 146-147). For him, a creative particularity has to 
contain a universality in itself, not vice versa. A particularity that only asserts its 
particularity by relying on others is a mere ‘other particularity’ (Nishida, 1982[1940]: 
145). Thus, Nishida and Maruyama, even though they took almost opposite 
approaches, shared an aspiration for finding ‘true’ universality with Japan’s 
experience beyond the superficial universality.  
     My interest in Nishida’s thought lies in the concept of space in his theory of place 
(basho no ronri). I believe that the theory can fill a gap Maruyama left untouched due 
to his reservation about considering spatiality in his analysis. The gap is filled by 
                                                
1  In IR literature, Inoguchi (2007: 379-382) refers to Nishida as an ‘innate constructivist’ who 
‘developed quite robust theoretical arguments’. Inoguchi, following Ong (2004), identifies Nishida’s 
life-long question, i.e. that of restoring Japanese historical consciousness in relation to the inferiority it 
felt throughout its encounter with the West. 
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Nishida in two ways, namely by answering how geography can affect people’s way of 
thinking, and how the space of traveling theory can be conceived as spaces. On the 
other hand, while Nishida’s theory unearthed the ways in which spatiality haunts us 
however ephemerally, Maruyama’s critical approach complements the danger of 
determinism in Nishida’s research. By combining the two seemingly opposing 
thoughts, therefore, Japan as a territory of knowledge can be elucidated more 
comprehensively. 
 
A Theory of Place (Basho) 
As Nakamura Yūjirō states, Nishida’s inquiry stemmed from an acute recurrent 
question that is even relevant today in modern Japan’s intellectual community: 
whether there exists a so-called Eastern philosophy. The philosopher Miyake Sesturei 
(1860-1945) lamented that Eastern philosophy, understood largely in the Confucian 
tradition and remaining at the level of annotating the verbatim arguments and 
discussions of Confucius, ‘existed for nothing’, whereas Western philosophy had the 
capability to explain any complex debate. In order to be called ‘philosophy’, Miyake 
asserted, Eastern philosophy had to ‘be objectified’ (Nakamura, 1983: 8-14). 
Nakamura construes this Japanese self-criticism by introducing two general aspects of 
philosophy: knowledge and worldview. While Western philosophy has its strength in 
the first aspect, which has allowed it to search for truth and accordingly universal 
claims, the Confucian tradition has a stronger commitment to the second, making its 
existence context-dependent. In an effort to address the question of Eastern 
philosophy, Nakamura points out, Japanese intellectuals trained in the Confucian 
tradition had already started to doubt the logocentrism of Western philosophy during 
the Meiji Period (1868-1912) when Japan vigorously imported Western thought. 
However, the context-dependency of ‘Eastern thought’ made it difficult to provide an 
alternative. The sense of imperfection among the Japanese intellectuals pushed some 
of them to philosophically investigate human capability and self-consciousness from 
a materialist perspective, which considers the living body as the only reality 
(Nakamura, 1983: 8-20; see Tosaka, 1977[1935] for another example). 
     Nishida’s philosophy was a culmination of this tradition, which might be called 
Japanese voluntarism (Nakamura, 1983). Nishida, in his foreword to the new edition 
of his seminal An Inquiry into the Good (1911, 1990: xxxiii), wrote: ‘I do not know 
what influenced me, but since long ago I have had an idea that true reality must be 
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actuality just as it is and the so-called material world is something conceptualised and 
abstracted out of it’.2 Starting from this fundamental inquiry, Nishida questioned the 
objectivity of knowledge in relation to space. In his essay ‘The Unresolved Issue of 
Consciousness’ (Nishida, 1927: 53), 3  he argued, ‘[b]ecause Kantian philosophy 
begins with the premise that there is knowledge and takes as its issue the problem of 
how its objectivity is possible, it automatically does not take consciousness qua 
knowledge to be the issue’. Nishida’s philosophy is best known for two concepts: pure 
experience, and place (basho). What drove him to develop these concepts were his 
obsession with reality and ‘the issue of knowing qua consciousness’ (Nishida, 1927: 
52).  
     In order to thoroughly understand the process of cognition, he first developed the 
concept of pure experience, which became the basis of his philosophy. He borrowed 
the term ‘pure’ from William James’ radical empiricism, and tried to capture with this 
term the very inception of the cognitive process. He claimed: ‘[t]o experience means 
to know facts just as they are, to know in accordance with facts by completely 
relinquishing one’s own fabrications’ (Nishida, 1990: 3). It contains no knowledge, 
no thought, no judgment, only the physicality of body. At the moment of pure, or 
direct, experience, ‘[t]here is not yet a subject or an object, and knowing and its object 
are completely unified’. This union is, as Nishida stated, like the consciousness of a 
new-born baby. Another example he provided was a proficient artist practicing her 
skills intuitively and reflexively. The pure experience is the beginning of all of 
consciousness, the fact ‘just as they are’ (Nishida, 1990: 3-4). This subject-object 
union in the pure experience is disrupted when past consciousness enters to gain 
conscious of the present experience to generate judgments and meanings. This process 
is essentially immanent as it is caused by its own past consciousness. For Nishida, 
consciousness is based on the relational comprehension of past and present by the self. 
At this moment, objectification takes place, in which the distinction between subject 
and object is engendered. When any past consciousness is invoked at the present 
moment in this way, it generates meanings and judgements, which is a moment of 
disunity, in contrast to the unity of pure experience (Nishida, 1990).    
                                                
2 Quoted from M. Abe and C. Ives’ English translation (1990). 
3 John Krummel translated this essay into English in 2012. The ensuing quote is from Krummel’s 
translation. 
  86 
     As evidenced in Krummel and the quote mentioned earlier, Nishida’s pure 
experience stemmed from his discomfort with the dualism in Kantian philosophy. 
Nishida argued, by presupposing the objectivity of knowledge, that Kantian 
philosophy ‘comes to relate to consciousness for its reconstitution as an object of 
knowledge’, transcending consciousness. However, bracketing a determining process, 
it comes to be a mere ‘dichotomization of reality into the realm of a priori conditions 
serving as forms of determination on the one hand, the realm of the matter of 
determination, in itself unformed, objectively undetermined’ (Krummel, 2012: 45). 
‘Epistemology is a discourse on the constitution of the cognitive object and a 
clarification of the objectivity of knowledge’ (Nishida, 1927: 52). By contrast, for 
Nishida, an ‘act is not immediately consciousness’ (ibid.: 52). ‘It is not that the fact 
that we are living is known to us through thinking. It is that because we live, we think’ 
(Nishida, 1936, in Nakamura, 1983: 45). His philosophy was to line up all ‘things’ 
(mono),4 the subject and the object, the knower and the being known, literally in the 
same field without prioritising one over the other, in an effort to consider how 
perception begins (Nishida, 1926, 1927). In so doing, he tried to ‘shed light upon the 
very consciousness that escapes objectification’ (Krummel, 2012: 48).  
     Nishida believed that the process of knowing, which belongs to the ‘space of 
consciousness’, has to be thoroughly reconsidered in order not to presuppose any 
objectivity (Nishida, 1926: 74). At the same time, how these ‘things’ are mutually 
related to compose the whole system of consciousness has to be carefully 
conceptualised. This must be done without assuming the transcendental entry of the 
object into consciousness, or privileging the subject. In order to avoid the ‘hidden 
premise behind modern epistemology’, that is, the ‘conception of cognition as a 
relationship between objectified beings’ (Krummel, 2012: 46), Nishida had to 
scrutinise the issue of ‘consciousness that is conscious’ seriously, which even 
Husserl’s phenomenology had failed to take up as an issue (Nishida, 1926: 127, 1927). 
To this end, Nishida developed the concept of pure experience, the moment when the 
object and the subject simultaneously emerge, without prioritising either of them. 
However, this inevitably deprived him of a logical foundation where the 
consciousness emerges in relation to the object. For him, the logical foundation was 
                                                
4 Here Nishida uses the Chinese character ‘	 ’, which in itself means ‘person’. However, the sound 
mono in Japanese also means ‘thing’. This is why mono should be better understood as things in general, 
not just humans. 
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‘mere logos’ (Nishida, 1927: 53) in modern epistemology. Instead, he needed a link 
to connect between things, and eventually employed the idea of ‘place that is itself 
transcendent’ and used it to envelope all of the subjects and objects (Nisida, 1926: 69). 
This was how he came to conceive basho as the substratum, which is ‘behind every 
objectifying act’ (Krummel, 2012). 
 
Copernican Revolution? 
Nakamura (1983: 92) claims that this move of Nishida’s is an epistemological 
‘Copernican revolution’. By turning his attention to place, which is a contrastive 
position concealing both the subject and the object, Nishida abandoned the 
grammatical subject altogether, which is a common premise in Western philosophy. 
Instead, he picked the predicate (jutsugo) as the basis of judgment. Krummel (2012: 
46) likewise points out that in doing so Nishida departed from ‘Aristotelian 
substantialism, which views reality reductively under the lens of Indo-European 
grammar in terms of the grammatical subject’. In the essay ‘Place’, Nishida (1926: 74) 
says, ‘I would like to think of knowing as an act that belongs to conscious space’. To 
this end, his exploration began from a ‘consciousness of self reflection within the self’, 
then further making a distinction between a ‘consciousness that one is conscious of’ 
and a ‘consciousness that is conscious’ (Nishida, 1927: 54). For him, the ‘fundamental 
meaning of knowing’ is about ‘knowing the self [and] knowing others’, not simply 
knowing others with the self. Such a process begins as a pure experience. Because 
basho envelopes the entire system (see below), Nishida asserted, it has to be 
transcendent, objective, and therefore ‘absolute nothingness’ so that it defines every 
existence. Space is not in contrast to being, but rather the whole background of being 
(Nishida, 1926: 70-77). Therefore, this nothingness must contain the entire system of 
possibility. Basho has to be established in such a way that it is transcendent and never 
objectified. The field in which we project what we think, which Nishida called the 
‘field of consciousness’, relying on Husserl’s terminology, is also contained in this 
basho (Nishida, 1926: 69-70).  
     However, in the purview of this thesis, i.e. how spatial difference can be manifest 
in global knowledge dissemination, the important question is in what sense Nishida’s 
view was revolutionary. Did he, for example, really depart from Aristotelian 
subjectivism, as Nakamura (1983) has argued? Besides the plain facts that Nishida’s 
study relied on his profound knowledge in both Western and Eastern philosophies, 
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and that his aspiration was not to prioritise either of them, I will seek to point out a 
similarity, rather than a contrast, between Nishida and the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure.  
     Working with the question, ‘at what’5 does a “thing” exist? (Nishida, 1926: 84), 
Nishida observed that ‘the epistemologists today distinguish between consciousness 
and object, and think that the consciousness is immanent while the object is 
transcendent’ (ibid.: 70). Thus, ‘we are forced out of the field of consciousness’ (ibid.: 
70) in order to assume the existence of the object. By contrast, for Nishida, being 
conscious means to reflect the self into the field of consciousness. Therefore, the self 
cannot leave the field to acquire consciousness. Action is understood as a relation that 
appears between the reflected object and place. The object and the subject are 
inconceivable without being situated in the same field. As such, basho is what wraps 
up the whole system of consciousness, where everything—both subject and object 
alike—comes into being. It is a mirror-like place on which everything reflects itself 
(ibid.).  
     Nishida (ibid.: 77-78) illustrated all these with the example of the colour red. He 
argued that while ‘red’ is considered red within the general concept of colour, the 
general concept of colour itself is also an object and hence cannot be the base. He 
believed that everything needs an ultimate background in order to become itself. In 
other words, ‘red’ requires its place to become red. This field that defines ‘red’ must 
be something universal in which place also inheres. In other words, ‘red’ does not 
become red through being distinguished from other colours, but it does so when it 
reflects itself in the field of consciousness and is considered in relation to past 
experiences. That is, ‘I’ can be ‘I’, and ‘you’ can be ‘you’, only when this ‘I’ is 
embedded in the field of consciousness. These subjects cannot stand alone without 
space. Furthermore, since space in turn exists in relation to these subjects, ultimately 
it is a place, rather than a space.      
     In modern epistemology, which presumes the opposition between the knower and 
the known, it is the knower that is transcendent and imposes categories ‘upon the sense 
data received from the external world’ (Krummel, 2012: 45). By contrast, in Nishida’s 
world, because all things are equally located in a place, this opposition does not exist. 
                                                
5 In Nishida’s original, it is expressed as ‘nani ni oite’. The literal translation is ‘at what’, in which the 
emphasis is on ‘at’. Here, though oite usually express place or time, he probably used ‘what’ instead of 
‘where’ in order not to give basho any particular meaning, including spatiality.     
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Instead, there are only selves, and meaning is essentially autopoietically generated in 
their seemingly isolated relation but to place. Here, the relation with others, which is 
the main scope in Saussure’s theory, is only the next step. Approaching from this 
judgment, Nishida concluded that the category of consciousness exists in the predicate 
rather than in the subject. In other words, it is rather ‘the environmental situation’, i.e. 
place, that facilitates objectification (ibid.: 47). As such, Nishida called basho the 
‘transcendent predicate’, which never becomes the subject but always envelopes all 
things. At the same time, it is this predicate that encompasses them.  
    Nishida’s thought seemingly goes beyond Saussure’s relational and differential 
conception of language. However, it is likely that they were in fact caught up in the 
same question. In a scribble written by Saussure around 1907, he presented a very 
similar inquiry to Nishida’s. Saussure asked: How do concepts, like beef, sky, and red 
become discourse—at which moment, under what condition, and by what action?6 
Suenaga Akatane (1999) presumes that with this riddle-like note what Saussure tried 
to untangle was the possible indeterminacy of language as a social system which 
paradoxically supports its reproduction. It has been argued that structuralism, which 
originated from Saussure, insists that the identities of language is determined not ‘by 
reference to objects in the world, but by their internal differences’ (Howarth, 2000: 
20). However, the paradox of this conception is that ‘words stand for an idea, but also 
have to be related to other words in order to acquire their identity and meaning’ (ibid.: 
20). According to Howarth, in order to explain this inconsistency, Saussure employed 
the concept of ‘linguistic value’, with which he indicated the existence of a shared 
system of signs (ibid.: 18).  
     However, Suenaga, arguing that language as a system of difference possibly 
contradicts that as a symbolic system, both of which were Saussure’s main 
contributions to modern social science, points out that Saussure might actually have 
doubted the identity of language even among members of a community, analysing the 
scribble in detail. Even given the possible incommensurability, or despite it, Saussure 
might have believed that dialogue could be continued. The gap, existing outside 
discourse and therefore never ensured, automatically facilitates the dialogue (Suenaga, 
1999). Whether ‘red’ points to exactly the same colour for all of us is rarely confirmed 
                                                
6 The scribble continues a follows. However rich the images these concepts evoke, they might not 
bespeak someone the following: the other wants to convey something to him by uttering these concepts 
(Suenaga, 1999). It is re-translation from the Japanese by the author. 
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since it is posited as common sense. However, as Nishida states, each judgment of the 
object is in practice underpinned by individual experiences (see also Skinner, 1969: 
6). If this is true, then the further the distance—whether it is physical or mental—is 
between people, the more difficult it is to ensure any common ground. Yet this 
distance does not necessarily lead to an obstacle of dialogue. As seen in the discussion 
in the previous chapter on the notion of international law, this unacknowledged 
difference may on the contrary be what clandestinely helped people maintain 
interaction perpetually and tirelessly, ultimately facilitating knowledge dissemination. 
Difference, as much as shared values, can accelerate mutual understanding, even 
though this may be mere chance and rather superficial.  
     Thus, despite the similarity of their questions, the ways Nishida and Saussure 
addressed them were distinctively different. While Saussure tried to look for an answer 
in the uncertainty of the other’s mind, Nishida, recognising the uncertainty even in the 
self, dug deeper into the issue of space and knowledge, which can be paraphrased as 
the issue of context. Whereas for the former relations exist between signs, for the 
latter, relations between signs and place precede the relations between signs. Nishida’s 
complex conception here can be explained in two ways, one geo-historical and the 
other epistemic. First, modern Europe in which Saussure was living in produced 
knowledge largely within the region, but for Japan where Nishida lived, modern 
knowledge was imported from somewhere else.  
     Second, as Nakamura (1983) has claimed, the ‘freshness’ of Nishida’s ideas to the 
West in fact depended on several characteristics of the Japanese language system. 
First, in contrast to the European languages which tend to objectify a text, the Japanese 
language is more inclined towards recognising the hidden meaning in the text itself. 
This point brings us back Japanese textualism developed through the importation of 
Confucianism, mentioned in the last chapter. Second, the Japanese language is 
situational in nature, as discussed above. Finally, Japanese has a particular structure, 
in which the verb comes at the very end of a sentence. This fundamental structure 
makes the Japanese language more emotional and experiential, essentially blurring the 
subject-object relations (Nakamura, 1983: 93-102; see also Kato, 2007). In addition, 
in Japanese, subject ellipsis is used so often even in formal writing, and makes the 
language even more situational. Furthermore, the tense frequently wanders between 
the past and the present in one Japanese sentence (Kato, 2007: 48-53). Therefore, it is 
  91 
a natural corollary for Japanese speakers to frequently depreciate the subject given its 
lucidity, and to consider the context more seriously than European speakers do.  
     All the Japanese thinkers discussed so far—Nishida, Maruyama, Yoshino, and 
Tsuda— point to the same issue that has to do with knowing. Living in slightly 
different time periods,they tried to untangle the same question of space, knowledge, 
and the self from different approaches, given that they were members of the same 
community that had been a recipient of foreign knowledge for hundreds of years. All 
of them have noticed that in the course of globalisation, there was a certain cognitive 
gap between the self and the other, the receiver and the sender of the knowledge, which 
seemed difficult to be filled. As a receiver, they felt that the uncertainty was rather on 
their side. Accordingly, they all took the issue of context seriously, to the extent of 
even doubting the identity of the object between the self and the other. For some, like 
Nishida, who tried to find universality in particularity itself, the gap was something 
positive and creative, while for others like Maruyama, who wanted to believe in the 
universality of knowledge, it was an obstacle.  
     The difference between Japanese scholars and the Swiss linguist is thus evident. 
Whilst Nishida started his inquiry from place, the Swiss did so from the subject. While 
the former thought that ‘red’ as a sign could be differently perceived in a different 
(distanced) space, the latter doubted whether ‘red’ is perceived in an identical way by 
others. Whilst for the Japanese the other is someone living outside of their community, 
for the Swiss it is simply someone who is not the self. Consequently, whilst the former 
considered the environmental condition of the self prior to the interaction with the 
other, the latter focused on the interaction. Although both doubted the existence of 
common knowledge, the conclusions reached through their respective ways of 
thinking were certainly different due to the essential differences of their analytical 
spaces.    
     Japan’s long history of assimilating foreign knowledge on the one hand, and its 
isolated geography on the other, have strengthened a particular way of thinking that is 
fundamentally subjective and self-reflexive. For Japanese people, the owner of 
knowledge is imagined to exist largely outside of their community. However, in the 
first half of the last century, the increasing cross-cultural interactions in Japan made 
them realise the existence of a long unnoticed gap between the inside and the outside 
of the territory of knowledge. This vague but profound awareness provoked a question 
on their subjectivity in terms of the imported knowledge, bearing an impact so 
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significant that it caused a series of intensive debates labelled as ‘overcoming 
modernity’, with modernity being equated to the West. This encouraged Japanese 
scholars to examine the link between power, subjectivity, and knowledge. It was a 
question of where the Japanese stand in world history. In this intellectual atmosphere, 
which had already started to take on a revisionistic and even chauvinistic character by 
then, Nishida’s theory was welcomed by people’s popular imagination despite the 
abstrusity of his text, as people perhaps felt that it voiced their feeling by unearthing 
the role of place in their epistemology. Put differently, the particular way of thinking 
in Japan came to the surface as its risks were exposed by a different way of (Western) 
thinking.       
     Mannheim (1985: 45) states that the ‘principal propositions of the social sciences 
are neither mechanistically external nor formal, nor do they represent purely 
quantitative correlations but rather situational diagnoses in which we use, by and large, 
the same concrete concepts and thought-models which were created for activistic 
purposes in real life’. For Mannheim, the issue was more the ‘unconscious collective 
motivation’ than the political motive. Nishida’s theory was certainly a ‘situational 
diagnosis’ underlain by the embedded logic of a native language, from which none of 
us can completely escape. What is more, Nishida attempted to unearth this logic in 
order to justify it. But precisely for this reason, his theory spoke too well to people’s 
feeling, was doomed to be abused by political motives (cf. Kosaka, 2002). As the 
similarity to Saussure’s riddle suggests, however, Nishida’s question itself was 
nothing specifically Japanese. What is truly remarkable is that the different epistemic 
traditions nurtured in different historical and geographical conditions provided 
different starting points and therefore different conclusions. Thus, Nishida’s theory, 
like Saussure’s, evidently embodied the epistemology of the community to which each 
of them belonged respectively. What made Nishida’s theory distinctive is the more 
spatially defined elements, or the ‘how’, in addition to the historical factors which 
explain the ‘why’.  
 
Nishida as Another Assemblage Thinker? 
I have argued that Nishida’s ostensible epistemic shift was really not a ‘shift’ but a 
product of a particular epistemic tradition. In other words, he uncovered the hidden 
premise of Western philosophy by relying on his own hidden premise. The revolution 
is said to be revolutionary only because it is decontextualised from the Japanese 
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tradition and recontextualised into the ‘Western’ tradition. However, or rather for this 
reason, Nishida’s thought still contains a few important implications for contemporary 
scholarship, which still remains predominantly Western. Besides the fact that it 
represents the epistemology of the society I am examining (i.e. Japan), I want to argue 
that we can see the diverged views as complementary to each other, as Nishida has 
suggested indeed, in order to unearth the whole picture of global knowledge 
production.  
     The particular usefulness of Nishida’s theory in a Western context is that he freed 
the subject from the role of the sole judge, since he looked for answers to the question 
of judgement in the uncertainty of consciousness. There are two important corollaries 
here. First, it gives us a clue to understand what Allen (2012) calls ‘the emergent 
“thingness”’ that stabilises relations in an assemblage. It has been argued that in 
Nishida’s thought, any societal category is conceived as a dynamic construction 
(Jones, 2002: 234; see also Ong, 2004: 52), whilst Nishida emphasises particularity. 
This is because, by introducing place as a substratum, Nishida distinguished the 
‘consciousness that is conscious’ from the ‘consciousness that one is conscious of’ 
(Nishida, 1927: 54, emphasis in original). In this two-step understanding of 
consciousness, the first step is de facto uncontrollable, or deterministic, for the 
conscious is yet to be conscious of being determined. The result is that a causality will 
emerge processually, rather than a priori, through the historical actions of multiple 
actors alongside the will of the subject, and this causality plays a key part in social 
construction. In addition, the second step is still superficially deterministic, for it is a 
conscious co-construction between multiple actors, where pure contingency is 
highlighted concerning how and to whom the meaning performs. 
     Nishida does not assign any characteristic to basho given that he defines it as the 
background of everything, limitless and seemingly unique like the universe. This gives 
the impression of a monotonous conception by which the plurality cannot be ensured 
at first glance. However, for Nishida, place is nothingness because it contains 
everything, which means there is no oppositional concept. When the place is limited, 
by contrast, knowledge comes into existence (Nishida, 1926: 105). The consciousness 
in phenomenology is also within the range of this limited space of existence (Nishida, 
1926: 127). Basho is the ‘transcendent predicate’ that can never be a subject but 
envelopes everything. Place as substratum in itself thus has no character but only the 
absolute capacity yet to be materialised. A specific knowledge arises when we, based 
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on our past and present experiences, project our specific thought to a limited space. 
Only then does a subject arise accordingly. The production of knowledge in Nishida’s 
scheme of thought depends on how past experiences cut out a particular space from 
basho. Basho wraps up all those spaces. Any of our experiences are primarily 
perceived at a certain space, as we always live in a specific space. Judgements are 
made in relation to past experiences that might have happened in another space by 
automatically cutting out a certain space. The ‘consciousness that is conscious’ 
contains the past in itself, whilst the ‘consciousness that one is conscious of’ indicates 
the present, suggesting therefore that the past is embodied in the present through 
consciousness. It is the former (i.e. ‘consciousness that is conscious’) that brings about 
latter (‘consciousness that one is conscious of’), and Nishida calls the former ‘will’ 
(Nishida, 1926: 109-114), because it is this ‘consciousness that is conscious’ that 
defines the range of knowledge. Then it is this ‘will’ that gives a hint of what the 
‘thingness’ can be.   
     Then the second corollary is that, since all oppositions—say, between subject and 
object, same and different, self and other—are dissolved, Nishida’s thought allows us 
to understand difference not as binary but as multiple. Therefore, the question is not 
whether ‘what I am seeing is true’, but becomes ‘in what situation and for whom it 
can be true’.  
     In Saussure’s conception, because it is the internal difference that identifies things, 
making the subject-object relation essentially fixed. In Nishida’s thought, by contrast, 
this differentiation is only the second step. The site of determination is therefore 
multiple, also ensuring multiplicity of knowledge both in terms of the subject and the 
object. As such, in Nishida’s theory of place, the subject and the object can be 
connected in unanticipated ways depending on different contexts because of this 
comprehensiveness of place. Nishida states that ‘[n]ormally, the so-called self is 
considered unified as a subject with plural characteristics, but in fact it is unified as a 
predicate and not as a subject, not as a centre but as a circle, not as a thing but as a 
place. The self cannot know itself because the predicate cannot be the subject’ 
(Nishida, 1926, in Nakamura 1983: 90). Here, the question can be expressed in the 
form of ‘who I am at this particular place and moment’, since self-identification stands 
not only on ‘consciousness that one is conscious of’, but also on ‘consciousness that 
is conscious’ which is determined by place. Meanwhile, and also more importantly, 
this conception, which seems to be communal at first glance give that the subject is 
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embedded in space, is simultaneously individualistic, because judgement is a matter 
of each consciousness. The tandem approach enabled her to embed herself in a 
community without erasing individuality (cf. Maraldo, 2002). The individual self still 
holds autonomy but is simultaneously embedded in the structure. Accordingly, it is no 
longer viable to consider the self and the other, and also the self as an agent and the 
community as a structure, oppositional. Rather, structure is dissolved into the 
relationality. Hence, it is relation itself that holds agency (Nishida, 1928a: 73).  
     As I will show in later chapters, the ‘innate constructivist’ tendency in Japan 
(Inoguchi, 2007: 379) was not only applicable to Nishida, but also widely to Japanese 
academia including geopoliticians during the period. Needless to say, this goes against 
our prevailing understanding of the Japanese’s strong belief of their pure nationhood 
that is said to have existed and continued since the establishment of the state. The fact 
is that it was this ‘liberal’ and even seemingly ‘progressive’ idea that became one of 
the engines behind the state’s imperial expansion and therefore behind the 
employment of classical geopolitics. The paradox lies in the fact that this seemingly 
liberal idea was a product of the context-dependent tradition developed in Japan, 
which however had been affected by imported ideas: Liberalism in a Western context 
became its diametrically opposite—a ‘conservative’ and revisionist view—in the 
context of Japan in the first half of the last century, which went on to attract popular 
support in the era of uncertainty. Note that I am not simply arguing that Japan’s 
intellectual history was different from the West. Rather, this is to point out that an 
intellectual tradition can have entirely opposite connotations in different tempo-spatial 
contexts simply because we all have different experiences as we live in different 
spaces even if we are contemporaries. Moreover, the developments are still the 
products of the interactions between different geographical traditions. In this context, 
Nishida’s constructivism is neither ‘revolutionary’ nor ‘innate’ nor ‘mythic’, but 
merely a (still) rare product of ordinary intellectual life (Said, 1982: 195) in Japan. 
Such a view questions what can become ‘standard’ in global intellectual history. 
Following Edward Soja (1999), spatial difference deserves more attention than its 
currently marginalised status in critical social theory in general and in international 
politics studies in particular, since it is possibly even more fundamental than temporal 
differences. Yet, this is not to say historicity is unimportant; for as I have demonstrated 
in chapter 1, both aspects are complementary with, not oppositional to, each other, and 
this complexity can only be excavated by accounting for both aspects together.     
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Power in Japan  
I have so far explicated Nishida’s epistemology and explained how it differs from 
Kantian epistemology, with a view to understand how different an analytical space 
can be. As discussed in the previous chapter, this difference is crucial for considering 
the dissemination of knowledge, as it can yield diverse ways of reading power 
relations in a text. A particular mode of power shared in a community can change the 
substantial mechanics of an imported political system, even if the components of the 
system remain unchanged in the process. (Such power relation in the case of Japan 
was alluded to in the last chapter in the example of the term kokutai and the Emperor.) 
In this particular epistemic community, power is imagined as something that serves 
for everyone, rather than as someone’s possession. The epistemology elaborated by 
Nishida confirms the presence of this power structure in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  
     Here I wish to further clarify this point by using Maruyama’s works. In his earlier 
work on Edo Confucianism written during the Second World War, he compared 
Japan’s modes of power with those of China’s and Europe’s. He argued that the 
Chinese notion of heaven, in which the socio-political order was entrusted to Nature, 
was transformed in Tokugawa Japan to one that became an autonomous invention by 
humans; this transformation was compared to Europe’s transition from an organismic 
view of society to a functional view during the Medieval Ages. The Chinese 
organismic view was distinctive from the European one, since the former completely 
excluded any humanised divinities, seeing Nature itself as the order. On the other 
hand, in Medieval Europe, divinity ultimately became an ‘actuality who does not 
contain within himself any potentialities’ (Maruyama, 1974: 235) but invented the 
order and endorsed rulers. Meanwhile in Japan, the Chinese immanent natural order 
was modified into an autonomously invented order that had political rulers as the sage. 
In other words, the order was decided in Japan by the sage who was endorsed by 
nature. or better interpreted as environment, since it was assumed to change 
continuously. The political ruler had little value herself. Despite having a similar 
development to Europe, in Japan, where the concept of transcendental being did not 
exist and where there was no dominant monotheistic religion in its history, feudal 
power was entrusted to a particular personality only by chance, and not by the value 
held by the sage himself. It follows that once a new era came, another sage would take 
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charge and change the world order. Paradoxically, then, human invention was 
governed by environment. This unique political structure had continued to 
Maruyama’s time (Maruyama, 1952: 241-275), and to some extent even till today. The 
affinity of this power structure with Nishida’s thought, in which place is the 
environment and has discretion, is evident. As I will elaborate in later chapters, this 
power of nature qua a ‘personified’ environment was represented during the Pacific 
War in the term honzen no sei, an idea from Confucianism meaning the ‘pure and best 
nature inherent in any human as it is given as the universal intelligence’ (Kojien, 
1998). This good nature is however normally considered to be tarnished by a material 
life.            
     In this Japanese power structure, power generates as the Japanese imagine a design 
of the surrounding environment in relation to their situation. The authority decides the 
order with the power endowed only by chance and not by the materiality the power 
holds. In this understanding of power, any social institution is a construct, but it is 
powerful precisely because it is understood as a construct and acknowledged as an 
imagination by the members of the society. Crucially, the social institution has no 
clear boundaries, as it prioritises place over space. With no solid categorisation, the 
order is ostensibly egalitarian, although it contained a profound issue in terms of 
human equality, which I will discuss in detail in the next two chapters.  
     In the example of the appropriation of international law, Japanese people easily 
‘misunderstood’ the ‘novel’ concept of international law, in a way that was based on 
the notion of equality between states stemming from the supposedly egalitarian 
tradition of Japanese society. The Japanese recognised the falsity of the notion as a 
Western discursive construction (Suzuki, 2011), but this did not hamper their 
appreciation of the concept, because they understood that power was endowed to the 
West by chance. Thus, Westphalian sovereign equality was comprehended differently 
by the Japanese egalitarian tradition in which order was understood as an endowment 
by changing environment. This example shows how the commonsensical 
understanding of world politics can be supported by diverse topica, turning the 
composition of ‘common sense about world politics’ (Agnew, 2003: 9) into something 
profoundly complex and even contradictory, thereby potentially enabling the mode of 
power in world politics to be transformable.  
     As John Dower (2011: xx-xxi) proposes, what we are facing here is a challenge to 
understand ‘many cultures of modernity itself’. It is about understanding the actual 
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ubiquity of cultural characteristics that seems peculiar to a specific group but in fact 
transcends the borders of conventional categories of cultures. They happen temporally 
almost in conjunction but spatially in disparate ways. The composition of a seemingly 
unique cultural trait is in fact an aggregate of quotidian elements, as Maruyama’s 
musicological metaphor of basso ostinato implies (Maruyama, 1976a). However, 
these differences need to be unearthed because despite the ubiquity, or rather because 
of it, the differences are crucial. In this respect, any method of thinking is not a product 
of a particular culture per se, but a contingent product of space and time always 
doomed to change. 
 
3.3. An Analytical Framework  
This section develops an analytical framework for the rest of the thesis. The two 
previous chapters have attested that a proper account for the analysis of traveling 
theory has to be comprehensive, in which seemingly oppositional elements—such as 
continuity and change, time and space, local and global—can be considered in 
relational terms. The successful voyage of theory is a product of heterogeneous 
elements associated together through the assertive act of knowing by the locals in a 
particular historical and geographical context. An unknown idea is accepted only 
when they make sense in reference to the known, being interpreted by the local mode 
of power. Initiated almost unconsciously, the process generates a cognitive void 
between the spaces. It is this void that essentially facilitates local readings. Therefore, 
the localisation of theory is a contingent process that contains a form of causality. In 
the previous section, I explicated Nishida’s theory of basho, discussing how people in 
Japan envisaged space differently from people in the West. Because Nishida wanted 
to affirm the topica that he believed had to be shared in his community, his theory 
identified what was the apparent causality in performativity. This complex process in 
an inter-regional context can be analysed by positing the space of analysis as spaces 
that hold different structures but that are still in relation to each other. In addition, to 
avoid the pitfall of geographical and historical determinism, the spaces must be 
conceptualised not as readily confined spaces but as fundamentally fluid ones. In what 
follows, I will first reconsider Nishida’s basho in relation to Western literature, with 
a view to discover a common ground for both Japanese and Western epistemologies 
in developing a framework. Second, I will reconceptualise the territory of knowledge 
as a community of experience. Finally, I will explain the framework itself. 
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Multiplicity of Space 
Nakamura (1983: 78-85) states that Nishida’s theory of place is significant because it 
rediscovers the issue of place in a comprehensive way. Based on Nishida’s basho, 
Nakamura envisages place in four ways: place as a substratum, physical place, place 
as a symbolic space, and place as a hidden intellectual standpoint. The first place is 
where our self-consciousness is based upon, the place for ‘consciousness that is 
conscious’ (Nishida, 1927: 54). The second is where our body is located, where one 
is conscious of consciousness. The third space is a symbolic space represented as 
territory. The last space is an expansive re-conceptualisation of the Aristotelian topica. 
Nishida’s basho covers all of these four places, connecting spaces and places together. 
     The focus on hidden space is neither uniquely Nishida nor Japanese. Maruyama’s 
basso ostinato points to the same function, as does Mannheim’s ‘unconscious 
collective motivation’. Likewise, Gianbattista Vico (1990[1965]: 13, 1987: 26) writes, 
‘[i]t is a positive fact that, just as knowledge originates in truth and error in falsity, so 
common sense arises from perceptions based on verisimilitude. Probabilities stand, so 
to speak, midway between truth and falsity, since things which most of time are true, 
are only very seldom false.’ For Vico, while judgment is disciplined by critica, it is 
topica that leads our perception. Therefore, topica precedes critica. Topica helps us 
find topos, the hidden place of a debate. What composes the verisimilitude (which 
defines common sense) is our past experiences as already-known knowledge 
fundamentally nurtured in a particular space. This might be better represented as 
sensus communis in Aristotelian terminology (Nishida, 1926: 118; Vico, 1990[1965]: 
13; Nakamura, 1979). This verisimilitude, despite its profundity, affects our thoughts 
mostly unnoticeably. It is powerful because it has yet to reach the consciousness which 
one is conscious of, and this is where we can identify a commonality between Vico’s 
topica and Nishida’s ‘consciousness that is conscious’.  
     Any geographical community has its own first space. In Japan, for instance, the 
‘consciousness that is conscious’ tends to be governed by a context-dependent way of 
thinking, whilst in the West, it is governed by a logocentric tendency. Nishida here 
unearthed the Western topos relying on Eastern topos, and what is important now for 
analysing traveling theory is not to accuse the existence of a particular topos (as critical 
scholarship tends to do), but to acknowledge the differences between topoi.  
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     The idea of relationality and multiplicity of space is becoming a common important 
concern in recent debates in Western academia. Inspired by Henri Lefebvre, Soja 
(1999) suggests the term ‘Thirdspace’ as a lived space. David Harvey (2006, 2007, 
2009) proposes a tripartite taxonomy of absolute, relative, and relational spaces. 
Absolute space is the fixed space of Newton, Descartes, and Euclid. Relative space is 
the space of Einstein, and relativity is ‘in the double sense: that there are multiple 
geometries from which to choose and that the spatial frame depends crucially upon 
what it is that is being relativized and by whom’ (Harvey, 2006: 272). In this relative 
space, however, time is still fixed. Finally, relational space is associated with Leibniz, 
who ‘holds there is no such thing as space or time outside of the processes that define 
them…. Processes do not occur in space but define their own spatial frame. The 
concept of space is embedded in or internal to process’ (ibid.: 273), making space and 
time entangled. 7  This relational space indicates how ‘external influences get 
internalised in specific processes or things through time’. In this conception, identity 
becomes ‘open, fluid, multiple, and indeterminate’, which is ‘immaterial but 
objective’. Moreover, this relational interpretation of space dissolves any binary 
relation such as feminine-masculine, West-East, and space-time (Harvey, 2009: 137).  
For Harvey, space cannot be defined as any one of these spaces, but ‘it can become 
one or all simultaneously depending on circumstances’ (ibid: 273-275).   
     Harvey’s discussion points to the similar multiplicity of space discovered in 
Nishida’s place. In the process of knowledge dissemination, once knowledge starts to 
travel into a foreign space, it is reinterpreted and internalised by locals in relation to 
that space, eventually becoming knowledge in a new context. This means that 
relational space and absolute space are linked through actions. When the locals 
interpret exotic knowledge by reading texts, they associate the unknown to the known 
in reference to their experiences in a particular space-place context. At the same time, 
the foreign knowledge per se contains its own ineffaceable tempo-spatiality. The 
negotiation with the text is seemingly carried out in absolute space. Simultaneously, 
it is linked to each actor’s relational space(s) through actions. These actors may in turn 
imagine future spaces. The spaces are therefore not unified, but overlapping, leaving 
cognitive voids between the spaces and places. Such a reading would coincide with 
Massey’s (1993) ‘progressive concept of space’, in which spaces are constructed 
                                                
7 Nishida discussed Leibniz’s monadology relatively often. See for example, Ishiki no Mondai 
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through continuous human actions, identified differently by multiple actors, and 
therefore have no boundaries except to overlap with each other. The spaces are 
characterised by their ‘highly complex social differentiation[s]’ (Massey, 1993: 62). 
What is needed is an ‘understanding of spatiality’ that ‘entails the recognition that 
there is more than one story going on in the world and that these stories have, at least, 
relative autonomy’ (Massey, 1999: 280-283).  
     The Japanese geographer Iizuka Koji, in his paper written in the late 1930s, argued 
that there are two ‘objective worlds’. In the first world, space is identified exactly as 
the actual size for everyone. By contrast, the second world is a relative world that is 
recognised by a specific subject as her world. Iizuka asserted that conceptions like the 
‘expansion’ of the world is viable only in terms of the latter, in which the perceiving 
subject is however in most cases automatically assumed (Iizuka, 1936-37: 119). Some 
conceptualisations such as centre-periphery, most notably employed in Wallerstein’s 
world system theory, likewise rely on this assumption, since to decide where centre 
requires a clarification to the question ‘for whom’. Historically speaking, however, for 
a long time in the modern period, these two frames have dovetailed with each other, 
allowing Europeans to convince themselves and even others that their experiences 
were universal—a perception that, Iizuka held, had continued since the Age of 
Discovery. On the other hand, for most people in the rest of the world, ‘the first world’ 
had been beyond their imagination, and ‘the world’ simply referred to the space that 
they could understand empirically. In other words, the world had existed in plural 
without being significantly overlapped. Following the deepening interdependence of 
global economy and the diffusion of European geographical knowledge, a particular 
framing of space was believed to be universal, and the world was perceived as a 
singular unity, even though this in reality only reflected one specific (Western) 
worldview. A chorographic perspective relevant for a group of people became 
accepted as universal for a much wider audience, even though most of this audience 
did not share the same history and (by extension) perspective (Iizuka, 1935-36: 119-
121; for a similar discussion, see Kōyama, 2001[1940]: 109).  
     As I have shown so far, any traveling theory contains a complex set of spatialities 
as it travels to another space. However, this convoluted spatiality has rarely been 
problematised in world politics, since the ‘original’ European spatial frame has been 
treated as the default representation of absolute space. As I have argued, the gap 
engendered by this complexity is never synthesised and exists in between actors. As 
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Harvey (2006: 277) suggests, only in the frame of relational space can we begin to 
grapple with the problematic of contemporary political subjectivity and political 
consciousness especially in terms of their multiplicity. In this relational conception of 
space, identity is multiple and entangled. When this is applied to my case study, then, 
the complexity becomes this: What did it mean for Japanese people during the first 
half of the last century to interpret European political theory so as to be simultaneously 
part of Asia and part of the West, to be both a coloniser and a liberator of colonialism? 
  
A Community of Experience 
     Conceiving the spaces in relation to each other requires us to see the world as 
essentially divided, rather than as idealistically unified. This means that a courage to 
admit difference is crucial. As Nishida’s theory indicates, only when we admit 
difference can we begin to envisage ‘genuine universalism’ (Dallmayr, 2004: 253) 
starting from the particular, without lapsing into an exhaustive pursuit for a truth that 
is suitable and applicable to everyone. Conversing about each people and each place 
enables us to avoid the seemingly perpetual binary, emphasising the uniqueness and 
the shared, communal nature of lived experiences. As Massey (1999: 279) contends, 
space here is understood as ‘a source of disruption’. Agnew (2005: 92), drawing on 
Thrift (1999) and Jiménez (2003), points out that ‘we always look at “the world” from 
somewhere, from a place. So, knowledge is always geographically contextual and 
reflexive. Space, then, is always and everywhere implicated in what people (and other 
entities) do and how they think, not just where they are’. Spaces are never monopolised 
by a specific actor, but always imagined differently by individuals who live in a 
specific space and gather into a community (or communities). Here, space has to be 
‘no longer a category of fixed and given ontological attributes, but a becoming, an 
emerging property of social relationship’ (Jiménez, 2003; see also Agnew, 2005). It is 
understood as ‘absolute locality’ in Cavarero’s term (2002: 526), absolute ‘insofar as 
it is “freed” from the territoriality of place and from the historical dimension of time 
that we call tradition’. Concerned not ‘what those who share it are but who they are’, 
space ‘extends as far as the interactive space generated by those who share it. It is a 
relational space that happens with the event of this interaction and, together with it, 
disappears. Its place and time are therefore contingent and unpredictable’ (Cavarero, 
2002: 525). When identity is thus conceived not in relation to others but in relation to 
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place, it does not require homogeneity among the members (Sakai, 2000). What is 
needed is only the actor’s own sense of belonging in relation to where and who she is.  
     Thus far, I have been employing Sassen’s concept of territory, following her 
contention to make it as an analytical concept (Sassen, 2013). Relying on these 
discussions, the local community in which an exotic theory is interpreted is re-
calibrated as a ‘community of experience’, where every meaning contains a 
crystallisation of the experiences of the group (Mannheim, 1985: 22; Jones, 1997; see 
also Nelson, 1992). The core of this community is envisaged as a fragile imbrication 
of shared experiences, whose shared-ness is rarely ensured. Its structure is concentric, 
rather than bounded. As Massey suggests, what gives a place its specificity is not a 
historical narrative but the fact that it is the locus in which a particular constellation 
of relations is articulated (Massey, 1993: 66). The self, not the other, decides where to 
belong. In the composition of this community, geography plays a crucial role, since 
all experiences are embodied in a specific space. The human body is ‘unique in playing 
a dual role as both the vehicle of perception and the object perceived, as the body-in-
the-world which “knows” itself by virtue of its active relation to its world’, being 
located always in a specific temporal and spatial configuration (Thrift, 1996: 13).  
     This community of experience is, following Schatzki (in Thrift, 1999: 311), a 
‘space of places at which activities can intelligibly be performed’, where subjectivity 
can be captured as an a priori perception. However, it does not mean that this 
community has existed as a collective from the beginning. On the contrary, individuals 
exist in this space without being limited to the complete sharing of the same 
(inter)subjectivity, since each of them is affected by their own thoughts, concerns, and 
past experiences in their understanding of new events (Harvey, 2006). In the 
meantime, however, experiences are also communally shared through space (Maraldo, 
2002). Thus, while it is possible to term a specific collective identity like ‘Japanese’ 
based on superficially shared experiences, it is in fact an aggregate of individuals who 
understand the same event in supposedly similar but intrinsically unique ways 
(Valentine, 1999: 48) in relation to their past experiences. Such identity is ‘immaterial 
but objective’ (Harvey, 2009). A collective is perceived as one in the unified place of 
spaces only through these hidden connections with multiple individual spaces. This 
community is essentially ‘self-determined’ in Nishida’s sense and therefore dynamic. 
The community called ‘Japan’ appears to be relatively stable largely because of its 
history and geography which has separated the islands from other parts of the world, 
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although this condition is always in flux itself. Individuals come to be members of the 
community by living in a particular area and sharing their experiences. In this shared 
space, people incessantly define and re-define themselves, assembling often 
unconsciously around a nodal point where experiences are crystallised. In this space 
of ‘shifting terrain’ (Harvey, 2006: 277), human experience is embodied as knowledge 
when this ‘relationality connects to the absolute spaces and times of social and 
material life’, as Harvey (2006: 293) suggests. The space contains the capacity for 
agency to ‘com[e] about’ in the structure of meaning (Jiménez, 2003). Essentially, 
then, relation itself is agency (Nishida, 1926). 
 
Three Analytical Spaces 
The aim of this thesis is to explicate the mutation of power and subjectivity in the 
course of the voyage of political theory. What I want to know is what kind of 
geopolitical imagination is generated by the mutation of theory and in what way such 
geopolitical imagination affects the local spatial organisation. It is, shortly put, an 
inquiry into difference. To this end, I will modify Nakamura’s framework based on 
these three spaces: (1) space as a hidden intellectual standpoint; (2) the physical 
location where an actor is situated; (3) the symbolic space of imagination.  
     The first space is identified by considering the spatial context focusing on people’s 
everyday experience. It contains the past and the present. As attested by drawing on 
Maruyama’s concept of basso ostinato in the last chapter, a community shares a 
common understanding of power relation. As demonstrated by the discussion on 
Nishida’s basho, the Japanese had developed in the first half of the last century a 
particular epistemological tradition that had a subjectivist character, as the product of 
a context-dependent way of thinking stemming from an imported Confucianism. 
Imported texts are localised and interpreted through this power structure. In the 
process, what is important is how meanings are read and remade, rather than what the 
text means; a question of the way of interpretation, not that of description. This act of 
knowing by the locals generates often neglected cognitive gaps between the 
intellectual places between the author and the readers of the same text. However, as 
can be seen from the example of international law, these gaps paradoxically facilitate 
the acceptance of the concept, since different ideas are associated and abstracted with 
each other in the sameness. The inflection of theory does not yet come to surface, 
because the misunderstanding is rarely confirmed between different communities. At 
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the same time, basso ostinato is susceptible to change, as seen in the example of 
transatlantic relations discussed in the last chapter. The caveat is that this concept 
works as a heuristic device to calibrate the mutation of concept between spaces.   
     The second space is mainly analysable in terms of time, which different 
communities can to some extent share through big historical events like the World 
Wars. It can be largely observed by the concept of absolute space. In this space, 
knowledge is objectified. The mutation of theory is addressed by the question: Why 
do the local people need a specific knowledge at a specific point of history? The 
process can be observed in terms of the interactions and negotiations between regions, 
and is therefore easier to pin down. However, for the same reason, the transformation 
can be rather short-lived. As seen in the example of realist theory in IR, theory is 
subject to continuous change in this space in a more visible way than in the first space. 
However, it is crucial to be reminded that the two spaces are strongly related. The 
continuity of the first space underpins the change in a theory, and this change can be 
explained in the second space. The first space structurally penetrates into an actor’s 
behaviour in this second space, controlling the formal negotiations covertly.  
     The third space is an imaginary world envisioned by a community of experience 
through partly relying on theories of foreign (mostly Western) origin. In this space, 
people’s identities are essentially imagined but conceived in comparison with each 
other. Accordingly, an analysis focusing on this space tends to see identities as 
dichotomies. This perspective explains the bigger pictures in world politics, which is 
prone to be divided into binary oppositions such as the West and the East.  
     Inspired by Said’s term ‘imaginative geography’ (1991: 49), critical scholars 
engaged in international politics, including critical political geographers, have 
investigated the latter two spaces intensively (cf. Soja, 1999; Howarth, 2000). Adding 
the first space which links the spaces, this thesis stresses the fundamental plurality of 
the three spaces. If, for example we accept that an event such as the World Wars does 
not carry the same meaning for all the communities in the world, or that a state like 
the United States is not imagined in the same manner by everyone in the world, then 
we must also accept that all three types of analytical spaces I have devised must be 
considered in plural. Even the second space is understood differently. The first space 
is nonetheless particularly important for the analysis of traveling theory, not just 
because it concerns the way of interpretation as I have demonstrated so far, but 
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because it can affect the rest of the two spaces in mostly unnoticeable ways due to its 
less-than-conscious character that works like bass notes underlying the main melody.        
 
3.4. Conclusion   
The aim of the analytical framework proposed in this chapter is to expose the subtle 
but substantial differences that traveling theory can generate but conventional 
comparative analyses tend to neglect. This chapter further clarified how elusive but at 
the same time crucial these differences can be, by explicating an epistemology 
nurtured in Japan. As stated in the discussion on the widely-regarded novelty of 
Nishida’s paradigm change, the sort of difference I want to clarify is not one of culture 
in the old-fashioned sense (where differences of beliefs, values, and practices are 
emphasised), but one that is in fact composed by ubiquitous elements. This banality is 
important because it assists the global travel of knowledge, and potentially helps 
transform the knowledge significantly. The ubiquitous elements provide an abundant 
discursive reservoir that allows a different way of thinking to creatively interpret a 
theory into an indigenous context. Whether a theory is successfully localised or not is 
essentially contingent, rendering the map of traveling theory topological rather than 
topographical. Despite the contingency, however, or indeed because of the banality, 
the system of conversion is simultaneously stubborn to change, since it hardly comes 
to the surface and is therefore rarely rectified.   
     In Nishida’s thought, it was basho, or place, that represented the universal. This 
inverse theorisation from Western epistemology is remarkable particularly in terms of 
how political space is organised, because with the emphasis being placed on the 
subjectivity of knowledge, the meaning of boundary becomes less important. The most 
problematic contribution of classical geopolitics to the theory of modern state is that 
it justifies the state’s territorial expansion, and Japan was the sole non-Western 
country that was said to have applied the theory to its imperial expansion. The main 
topic of the empirical analysis discussed in the following chapters is therefore how 
Japan, as a community of experience, overcame this contradiction in the appropriation 
of theory, in an attempt to reorder the global space in their favour.           
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 4  Identifying the Site of Creation 
 
It was when Professor Ōtsuki said 
something quite astonishing. ‘There is 
no weed-grass in Europe, you know’. 
This was something very near to 
revelation to me; and it was at the 
point that I began to grasp what it is 
that distinguishes Europe’s climate.  
—Watsuji Tetsurō, A Climate:  
A Philosophical Study 
 (1961[1935]:1 60) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The latter half of this thesis is devoted to the empirical investigation on Japan’s 
application of European geopolitics and the kind of geopolitical imagination Japanese 
people developed. The empirical research question of the present thesis is: How did 
Japanese people form their geopolitical imaginations by importing geopolitical 
theories of European origin?  
     As Edward Said (1982, 2001) reminds us, texts are restless travellers across times 
and spaces. In each destination, they can be read freely. Locals construe them 
selectively and contingently through practices, emotions, and reasons. However, what 
has been often overlooked is how locals creatively but often unwittingly inflect the 
text through the act of knowing. The previous three chapters have discussed this 
unrecognised difference. In order to attest the nuanced theoretical discussion I have 
developed so far, this chapter clarifies the scope of my empirical investigation. Among 
the theories of geopolitics, the present study focuses on the concept of the state as a 
living organism, which was elaborated by Ratzel in the late nineteenth century and has 
been the central tenet of geopolitics. I trace the migration of this theory from Germany 
to Japan with a brief detour via Sweden. Before I begin, there are a few caveats to be 
acknowledged. Although I have emphasised that this thesis is a collectivist account, 
the development of this theory in Europe will be traced as a history of individual 
intellectuals. In addition, I will deal with Japanese translations of German texts in my 
analysis of German geopolitics, due primarily to my lack of command in the German 
language. These two points however do not contradict with the aim of the thesis, 
                                                
1 A large part of the book was drafted in 1928 and 1929, while the whole book was first published in 
1935. The quote is from the English translation of the book. 
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because the focus is on the theory recipient as a collective and their inflections, and 
not on the sender as a collective. In other words, I am only charting a small part of the 
much larger picture of the traveling routes of geopolitical theory.   
     Classical geopolitics is a theory that justified the Western way of organising world 
space (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Agnew, 2003). In particular, 
the concept of the state as a living organism represented by the idea of Lebensraum 
(living space) is said to be at the heart of German geopolitics known as the ideology 
of the Nazis, and that of the Japanese militarists since the Second World War. 
Although the term itself is rarely pronounced today because of the images that it 
conjures, the ideas implied in the concept have played a symbolic and somewhat 
contradictory role in world politics even until today. It was a symbol of scientific 
objectivity at some point in history, and even now is of a personified state in double 
meanings: one that continuously expands its territory for its survival and represents 
national unity, and the other that represents the universality of the state and therefore 
of the West. This image of the state is particularly valid in the so-called realist 
perspective of IR, as it explains why states fight wars against each other, such as in 
the two World Wars mainly fought among ‘Western’ states including Japan. 
Meanwhile, as demonstrated in the last chapter with Nishida’s basho, space was 
perceived in Japan rather differently during the period, with less emphasis on 
boundary than on centre in its subjective intellectual tradition in which place was 
prioritised. Moreover, wartime Japan’s ambition was to replace the Eurocentric world 
order with a new world order (cf. Schouenborg, 2012). The questions then become: 
How was the causes of war theoretically explained by the mutated geopolitical theory?  
     In order to bridge the theoretical discussion developed in the previous three 
chapters with the empirical study in the next two chapters, the first half of this chapter 
will return to the debates in critical geopolitics. To better situate the theoretical points 
I have raised, I suggest shifting the focus in current literature away from ‘boundary’ 
in conventional critical geopolitics to the inside of the state. I argue that by scrutinising 
the inside of a space, we can better understand the contradiction of geopolitical 
discourse: why it can be powerful for any geographical community even though 
theoretically it seemingly only serves for the powerful. The second half discusses the 
historical development of Japan’s geopolitical tradition and imagination in order to 
identify the site of creation for the import of geopolitics in Japan. 
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4.2. Tensions in Geopolitics 
In the literature of critical geopolitics today, the concept of the state as a living 
organism is rarely discussed despite its centrality. Environmental determinism has 
been treated mainly in the context of Social Darwinism as a justification for imperial 
expansion based on white supremacist assumptions (Bassin, 1987a, 1987b, 2007; Ó 
Tuathail and Agnew, 1992; Ó Tuathail, 1996b, 1998). As critical geopolitics has 
focused on the discursive boundary-making practice of the Great Powers to expose 
the falsity of boundaries, it has rarely looked deeply into the concept of the state as 
living organism itself. However, this concept carries potential in demonstrating how 
locals come to imagine the modern state through the appropriation of not only 
geopolitics but also the Westphalian state system, and in unearthing such neglected 
difference in world politics.  
 
Geopolitical Gaze 
Ó Tuathail has argued that geopolitics as a ‘region of knowledge’ was forged by white 
male intellectuals and has composed a ‘common tradition of thought on international 
affairs’ regardless of national backgrounds and cultures. Classical geopolitics has 
three orientations according to Ó Tuathail: imperialism, Neo-Lamarckian white 
supremacist assumptions, and ‘Cartesian perspectivalism’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 21-23; 
see also Ashworth, 2014; Buzan and Lawson 2015: 52-53). Problematising the modern 
geopolitical subject that has monopolised power, he proposes to examine a ‘distinctive 
geographical gaze’ of the Great Powers. Thus, environmental determinism has been 
treated as illicit since it enables the Great Powers to arbitrarily draw boundaries on the 
globe. As a result, apart from research on Ratzel’s original conceptualisation of this 
concept (e.g. Bassin, 1987a, 1987b, 2007; Halas, 2014), studies on its evolution in the 
history of geopolitics were elided even within the wider discipline of political 
geography.  
     In the tradition of geopolitics, modern Japan’s position in world politics is 
bewildering for two reasons. First, it has been essentially a ‘viewed object’ (Ó 
Tuathail, 1996b) for Europeans. As will be discussed in the coming chapter, the most 
notable geopoliticians—Ratzel, Kjellen, and Haushofer—have all studied Japan (with 
Haushofer being the specialist), stressing its abnormality from the European standard. 
Second, as I have argued so far, it cannot be presumed that the Japanese shared the 
European epistemic tradition. Indeed, the philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō, in his seminal 
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work Sakoku (National Isolation) published in 1950, confidently concluded that what 
had been lacking in Japan was ‘the spirit of Henry the Navigator’ which required 
rational thinking (Watsuji, 1982[1950]: 304).2 For him, this lack was the very reason 
the state of Japan lost in the Second World War. Contrary to Watsuji, scholars in 
critical geopolitics believed that this belief on rational thinking in geopolitics, which 
was disseminated to the world, was exactly what had to be rectified, if not rational 
thinking itself.        
     On the other hand, a largely forgotten historical fact in the post-war debates, 
particularly in the studies of world politics, was that the country of Japan aimed to 
construct a new regional world order during the war through establishing the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS), which encompassed a popular aspiration 
to overcome not only the Anglo-American, but also the Western, world order in the 
widest sense. It was as if Japanese intellectuals, and not just the political elites, tried 
to combat all the -isms that were of modern European origin (including imperialism 
and capitalism), in its war rhetoric so as to establish this new order (Hiromatsu, 1989: 
14-35). Japan’s alliance with Germany and Italy was not contradictory to this cause, 
since the intellectuals saw any racial difference as a socio-historical construction, as I 
have pointed out in the last chapter with Nishida’s thought and will further 
demonstrate later when discussing Japanese geopolitics. In this context, they were 
opposed not to the European race, but to the modern European ‘spirit’. For this 
struggle, the historical and geographical location of Japan became salient in their 
discourse.  
     In the late 1930s and 1940s, geopolitics enjoyed extensive development as an 
academic discipline in Japan (next to Germany), where translations of the most 
important texts from Europe 3  were published, and there were tens of scholars, 
including several renowned academics, working in the field. Because geopolitics was 
so popular outside academia, it was even assumed during the Pacific War that literally 
all geographers had to be interested in geopolitics (Iizuka, 1946: 415).  
     Particularly crucial in relation to the agenda of critical geopolitics, Japanese 
scholars reversely employed geopolitical theories for a regional unity between non-
                                                
2 Accrding to Dower (1999: 492), the ‘connection between science and the “responsibility for the 
defeat” had become idée fixe’ in post-war Japan, particularly in terms of the experience of the two 
atomic bombs. 
3 See chapter 5 for further details. 
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white people. In the debates of Japanese geopolitics, the Japanese race was considered 
a mixed race that shepherded Asians and possibly beyond, contrary to the prevailing 
post-war narrative portraying Japan as a pure-race nation. The Japanese scholars were 
hardly overwhelmed by European geopolitical traditions despite their assertive 
appropriation on the surface. What theories of geopolitics endowed them with was not 
the same ‘gaze’ of the ‘detached viewing subject’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 29), but the 
status as a viewed subject on a ‘worldwide stage’. In fact, the Japanese as a pure race 
was a newly constructed narrative from the final stage of the Second World War till 
the post-war period (Oguma, 1995), a geopolitical fact that has been curiously 
neglected not only in Japan but also in the West to date. This is not to argue that 
Japanese geopolitics was neither imperialistic nor oppressive. As history has shown, 
it unarguably was. However, the way in which Imperial Japan was oppressive was not 
at all the same as that in European imperialism. In this Japanese imperialism, the battle 
ground of geopolitics was not on boundary, but elsewhere. In fact, Japan fought the 
Second World War without having a clear intention to begin the war (cf. Hosoya, 
2015: 139-153; Ōsugi, 2007). It was rather in the ‘deprivation of the World [view]’ 
that Japan plunged into the war (Suzuki, 1990: 46). By excavating this neglected 
history, the present study argues that Japanese scholars employed geopolitics by 
interpreting its environmental determinism as an ecological fatalism in line with their 
own mode of power. This was accomplished as they insisted on their own geopolitics 
and articulated a discourse of the Japanese self who was inclusive. In this context, the 
war was, for Japan, not a struggle for survival, but one for ‘co-prosperity’ in its most 
literal sense. In order to provide a basis to attest this argument, I propose in the 
following to displace the focus of analysis from ‘boundary’ to ‘inside’, by reviewing 
existing discussions in the literature. 
 
The Modern Geopolitical Imagination   
Agnew’s concept of ‘geopolitical imagination’ captures better the capability of 
geopolitics to be employed by the non-Western world. The modern geopolitical 
imagination is defined as the state-centric ‘view of the world and its geographical 
workings that accompanied the rise of the state and capitalism in Europe and that was 
both situated and informed the European encounter with the rest of the world’ (Agnew, 
2003: 135; see also Ó Tuathail, 1998a). Concerned with the question ‘what “made 
some representations more powerful than others”’, Agnew (2013) distinguishes 
  112 
between geopolitical order and geopolitical discourse (Ó Tuathail 1998b). He 
elaborates ‘geopolitical order’ as the history of the evolving ‘modern geopolitical 
imagination’ originated from Europe in the early nineteenth century and diffused to 
the world. He identifies three distinctive ages: civilisational, naturalised, and 
ideological geopolitics. ‘Geopolitical order’ is for Agnew the history of transformation 
of these three geopolitical hegemonic views on territorial states. He states that in this 
history, modern European states and their followers acquired ‘the sense of a world-as-
a-whole’. 
     Relying on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Agnew further argues that the state-
centric and hierarchical world map as the commonsensical understanding of the world 
has been widely disseminated ‘[f]rom Brasilia to Seoul and from Cairo to Beijing’, 
although it has ‘never exercised absolute power over the course of world politics’ 
(Agnew, 2003: 9). Given that the political practices of the Great Powers have diffused 
all over the world, political elites of these powers have, throughout the modern period 
and until quite recently, monopolised the power of organising the world map by 
arbitrarily drawing territorial boundaries. It follows that the modern geopolitical 
imagination, as one of ‘Europe’s most popular exports’ to the world, has composed an 
‘ideological space’ in which the world is ‘actively spatialized’ based on a set of 
common political practices and understandings (ibid.: 3-9, see also Agnew, 2013).4 
From this perspective, Japan, as an offshoot of the modern European nation-state, 
followed the European imagination by affirming the European claim of ‘universal 
knowledge that transcends any particular national, class, gender or ethnic standpoint’ 
(Agnew, 2003: 94). During the period of naturalised geopolitics (à la Agnew), the 
Great Powers were divided into two camps. One of them consisted of Japan, with 
Germany, and saw the geopolitical space ‘as a natural zone divided into imperial and 
colonised peoples, states with “needs” for space and markets, a closed world in which 
one state’s gains meant another state’s loss, and a world of fixed environmental 
conditions and resource distributions that had determining effects on a state’s global 
status’. Agnew insists that this view later was spread wide (Agnew, 2003). 
    This historical perspective, however, also falls short of explaining the Japanese 
geopolitical puzzle. As I will show later, the brutality of Japanese imperialism was not 
                                                
4 For a recent discussion on the conception of hegemony in the field of international relations in relation 
to Asia, see for example Lee (2016).  
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that it excluded the colonised people, but that it forcefully included them by 
paradoxically arguing for the socio-historical construction of any racial as well as 
geographical categories. This shortcoming is due to the fact that Agnew sacrifices 
plurality of practices despite his attempt to guarantee the multiplicity of history by 
noting that there has been no absolute domination. Employing Gramscian hegemony 
and accordingly placing emphasis on socialisation, his assumption must dictate that 
the whole world is structured in a single epistemic logic intelligible among 
international organic intellectuals. This brings the risk of elucidating the European 
history of expansion as the world history, despite the crucial importance he assigned 
to the word ‘imagination’. Differently put, although ‘imagination’ is essentially a self-
reflexive act, ‘hegemony’ requires domination over the other, and this contradiction 
could expunge the subjectivity of the imagination. Agnew’s view is possible only 
when popular consciousness within each community is left out of sight. Unwittingly 
erasing spatiality and diversity in the history of world politics, his view depicts the 
rest of the world as passive and static victims, or at best subservient followers, of the 
Imperial West (Ó Tuathail, 1998a: 17-18). The root of this problem is that Agnew’s 
concern, like Ó Tuathail’s, is on boundary essentially, which is somewhat 
contradictory to his assertion for geographical diversity (e.g. Agnew, 2005, 2007, 
2009, 2016). That is, in an attempt to argue for the suppressed ‘true’ diversity (see Ó 
Tuathail and Dahlman, 2011: 14), both Ó Tuathail’s and Agnew’s accounts end up 
stressing the homogeneity in the way of understanding international politics. Bearing 
this pitfall in mind, this thesis attempts to show that the modern understanding of 
world politics, though superficially based on Western knowledge, has itself been not 
so oppressed to be monolithic, but rather substantially diverse. 
 
Geopolitical Missions 
Nonetheless, this nuanced debate involving two prominent scholars in the field gives 
important indications on how to expand the field of investigation outside of the West. 
Let us look at how power is conceptualised in these two accounts. Ó Tuathail, claiming 
that ‘[g]eography is about power’ (1996: 1), describes the geopolitical discourse by 
the Great Powers (especially the United States) as a boundary-drawing practice that 
erases any historico-cultural difference in world politics. Despite his mentioning about 
the ‘messiness’ of world history (1996b: 73), he unwittingly depicts geopolitical 
knowledge as a means of domination as he speaks of the suppressed plurality. By 
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contrast, Agnew employs the concept of hegemony to emphasise the socio-economic 
aspect and stress the role of common political practices. Here, the power is 
conceptualised as plural, i.e. ‘not a singular entity but [one that] can involve so-called 
soft forms of consent as well as hard forms of coercion’, which ‘can be more diffusely 
distributed among all the actors’ (Agnew, 2003: 57, emphasis in original). Still, the 
plurality is not fully confirmed since he assumes that power is imagined in the same 
manner in any community. Even though he warns of the danger of a ‘territorial trap’, 
in which power in international politics is identified exclusively in the form of state 
power as a bounded space, he consequently posits that this power of the state is 
perceived equally everywhere as long as the idea of the modern state is accepted. 
However, because concepts are ‘not ideational’ but ‘rather are actual physical 
arrangements’ (Barad, 2003: 820), the arrangements can be transformed and the 
relationality differently comprehended when concepts are implanted to a foreign 
space, as the idea of basso ostinato has demonstrated in chapter 2. Thus, although 
Agnew has pointed out different modes of power, he does not pay attention on the 
site-specific character of power. Because power is defined relationally by political 
practices in a community, the putative ‘state power’ can be actualised differently. 
     Still, Agnew’s view bespeaks an important function of geopolitics that Ó Tuathail’s 
view underestimates. Agnew’s scheme of thought implies that geopolitics, despite its 
ostensibly imperialistic and deterministic character, has the capability to be accepted 
by any people. The only qualification for becoming a geopolitician is the appropriation 
of the concept of modern nation-state, regardless of the way of appropriation. This 
point has been further elaborated by Dijkink (1996, 2004) and some others (e.g. 
Rosenboim, 2014). They argue that the efficacy of geopolitics as a category of political 
thought is that it could represent a specific worldview developed in a spatial 
community based on shared experiences, endowing the community with a ‘missionary 
aim’ (Dijkink, 2004: 462). Therefore, Geopolitics is a discourse that ‘describes and 
evaluates a country’s position in the world’ (Wusten and Dijkink, 2002: 20). They go 
on to argue that rather than discerning the global history of geopolitics, studying local 
historical settings that give rise to a particular geopolitics through a comparative 
perspective (Wusten and Dijkink, 2002) could allow us to discern a more nuanced 
imaginative world map of political power (Dijkink, 1996: 4). The first question for 
this project, then, is how geopolitics as a powerful knowledge is differently actualised, 
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allowing them diverse spatialisations, even if it would ultimately articulate an 
ostensible hegemonic power.  
     As I have argued, this power of knowledge is not inherent in a particular agent, but 
emerges in between agents in the dissemination of knowledge. Rather, such power is 
enunciated through actions performed in each space in relation to each episteme. In 
this way, relation itself becomes agency (Nishida, 1926). As Karen Barad (2003: 822) 
argues, ‘[n]either discursive practice nor material phenomena are ontologically or 
epistemologically prior’. However, even if it is ostensibly constructed inter-
subjectively, it cannot therefore be posited that the perception is ‘shared’. In an inter-
regional setting, because of the unsynthesisable cognitive void (see chapter 2), agency 
becomes powerful and even random on the surface. Because power emerges out of 
partly unintentional and unrecognised relations among multiple actors (which in fact 
contain disagreements), it has a factuality that is only tacitly acknowledged among the 
actors in their own ways. However, or indeed because of this less-than-conscious 
character, the relations themselves are difficult to dismiss. Therefore, as Barad (2003: 
819) argues, discourse is ‘not what is said; it is that which constrains and enables what 
can be said’; ‘statements and subjects emerge from a field of possibilities. This field 
of possibilities is not static or singular but rather is a dynamic and contingent 
multiplicity’.  
 
Geopolitical Imaginations 
Jason Dittmer (2014: 386) points out the existence of ‘macro/micro scalar tensions’ in 
the debate of geopolitics. By paying attention to the mediating effect of power, 
however, this thesis considers them not as tensions, but as relations (Dittmer and 
Dodds, 2008: 449) through which the field of possibilities emerge. Micro 
disagreements supported macro agreements in the course of travel for a political 
theory. On a micro level, geopolitics must be underlined by each worldview, often 
crystallised as a mission in a spatial community. Yet when the scope is expanded to a 
macro level, an apparent hegemonic view can be observed as Agnew’s and Ó 
Tuathail’s accounts suggest. While for Ó Tuathail, this macro view is a discursive 
construction, Agnew’s attempts to identify some ‘reality’ in the discourse by shifting 
the focus from text to order as a socio-historical phenomenon. The problem with 
Agnew’s account is that when the concept of hegemony is introduced, micro-level 
differences are expunged. As it is assumed that the macro socialises the micro, and 
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accordingly the international overshadows the domestic, what become left behind are 
the question of epistemology and that of the subject of imagination (see also Valentine, 
1999: 48). By contrast, the assertion for a particular mission for each state implies that 
each geopolitical community has a different understanding of their geopolitical power 
pertaining to their geography, despite the apparent socialisation. However, the sole 
focus on missions does not explain how a world order is formed. In other words, 
hegemony should not be analysed merely as the consensus of numerous views; rather, 
as Slater (199967) states, ‘the politics of representation is itself a terrain of 
contestation, within which what is remembered and forgotten will be moulded by 
counterposed imaginations and visions emanating from different sited of experience 
and subjectivity’.  
     Dittmer’s (2014) attempt goes beyond the scaler tensions by relying on assemblage 
thinking. He argues that geopolitics has been struggling with ‘the topic of materiality’. 
Whilst environmental determinism represents the materialist view in classical 
geopolitics, critical geopolitics deprecates such materiality as it relies on discourse 
analysis highlighting the big picture of the world (Thrift, 2000). On the other hand, 
recent contributions of critical geopolitics have uncovered the importance of a 
‘bottom-up set of process’ (Dittmer, 2014: 386). Linking this process to complexity 
theory, Dittmer (2014) argues that assemblage thinking can help reconceptualise 
dichotomy as relationality. However, since his interest is in ‘posthuman geopolitics’, 
his consideration leans towards the inclusion of non-human elements in geopolitical 
thought rather than towards a thorough investigation of the fundamental tensions in 
geopolitics. He still shares the aspiration of the discipline to expunge boundaries by 
stressing the power from below, arguing that ‘by making a break with the exclusive 
hold of humanity on political agency, we open ourselves up to agencies unlinked to 
an intentional subject’ (Dittmer, 2003: 397; see Dittmer and Gray, 2010). However, a 
question I would ask here is whether this unintentionality is only for non-humans, 
while human activity is always intentional. 
     Incorporating the ‘micro’ into the ‘macro’ and eradicating boundaries do not 
resolve the tension Barad (2003: 807) calls representationalism, namely the belief that 
‘there are representations on the one hand and ontologically separate entities awaiting 
representation on the other’. It is not boundary that produces discourse, for the two are 
in fact mutually constitutive of each other. As Allen (2012) suggests, the power that 
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emerges out of assemblages is not merely the sum of all relations. Rather, both power 
and subjects emerge from this relationality. Boundary is generated through discourse, 
but it does not represent the consensus. While the concept of the state apparently 
represents a macro agreement, the ways in which each state conceptualises this 
agreement would mean that micro disagreements in fact exist. At the macro level, the 
state represents power. However, the materiality of the state is supported by numerous 
and diverse micro views. Likewise, despite its mission in various senses, the term 
‘geopolitics’ works as the frame of reference in world politics. In order to analyse this 
relationality, this thesis wants to examine the neglected subconscious realm of human 
beings and that which lies beyond official interactions. The macro and the micro are 
mutually supported and not in opposition to each other. What we should consider 
thoroughly is how they are related in whose consciousness, rather than by whom they 
are related (and represented). Moreover, the space of consciousness has to be 
envisaged in plurality. Following Mark Bassin (2004: 625-626), not only do we need 
to examine space as a discursive construction as writers of critical geopolitics do, but 
also to scrutinise the ‘enduring appeal’ of ‘a primordial stasis inher[ing] in the very 
nature of geographical space’. For Bassin, geopolitics has been powerful because it 
‘means many things to many people’.  
     So far I have argued that there exists a neglected cognitive void which plays a 
significant role in global knowledge dissemination. In order to understand this hidden 
complexity, space has to be envisaged as relational spaces. On the other hand, people 
are connected through a unified space, as opposed to how it is envisaged in existing 
accounts as ‘a nested hierarchy of differentially sized and bounded spaces’ (Marston 
et al., 2005). These assertions are plausible only when it is assumed that all people in 
this world follow the same epistemology and live in the same unified space. With the 
exception of the missionary perspective, these assertions unwittingly postulate that the 
weaker follows the dominant political practices by readily abandoning their own way 
of thinking. The paradox here is that despite its aspiration, critical geopolitics in 
general has failed to expand its field of investigation beyond the West save a few 
notable efforts (e.g. Sharp, 2011). In order to expand its field of inquiry, geopolitical 
imagination has to be envisaged in plurality. Ó Tuathail suggests that geopolitics is 
‘inescapably cultural’ and ‘plural’, while admitting that ‘in exposing geopolitics as a 
convenient fiction, critical geopolitics reveals itself as a similarly convenient fiction 
of opposition’ (Jones and Sage, 2010). Indeed, as next two chapter will demonstrate, 
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Japanese geopolitics, which opposed European geopolitics, was yet another 
convenient fiction. The issue, then, is not whether a geopolitics is fiction or not. As 
Maruyama (1969: 344) argues, ‘it is our fate to live in a world where there are only 
various fictions and various designs’. Our task is first and foremost to investigate how 
the fictions operate. Geopolitics is a discourse, and not just a collection of texts, 
because it effectively produces ‘the “subjects” and “objects” of knowledge practices’ 
(Barad 2003: 819). However, the condition shown by the discourse to each actor is not 
only historically but also geographically situated. The importation of a concept is not 
accompanied by practices that originally forged it. On the contrary, the concept is 
apprehended through local practices. The putatively same imagination in the world 
stage that is considered to be a product of knowledge dissemination is in fact an 
ephemeral projection made out of different comprehensions. In order to observe this 
ephemeral constellation, and in order to understand its obstinacy and elusiveness, we 
ought to carefully examine what stays the same and what becomes different for each 
actor.  
     This contradiction in geopolitics is analogous to that in neoliberalism identified by 
Ong (2007). She asserts that there are two neoliberalisms: Neoliberalism and 
neoliberalism. The former, with a big ‘N’, is seen in critical analyses as a ‘unified state 
apparatus’, a ‘dominant structural condition’ which overwhelms people like a tsunami. 
By contrast, the latter is a ‘migratory technology of governing that interacts with 
situated sets of elements and circumstances’. This neoliberalism with a small ‘n’ 
fosters ‘self-actualizing or self-enterprising subjects’ and compels less the ‘norm of 
efficiency’ in emerging countries in Asia. For example, in China and Singapore, it was 
not necessarily the IMF or the World Bank but their governments that approved the 
technology of governing. Following Ong, I want to analyse geopolitics in the small 
‘g’, which travels as a technology traversing different structures. Because it is a 
technology, the ways it is used depend on individual communities. From a certain 
perspective, the phenomenon might be compared to a tsunami that engulfs everything. 
However, when the point of view is displaced to somewhere else, it becomes a 
technology that can serve for everyone in line with their various needs. Neoliberalism 
is in this sense powerful, because it works as a technology for all, even if in different 
ways.  
     To date, critical geopolitics has regarded the Anglo-American worldview as the 
hegemonic view. As far as the purview of this thesis is concerned, to ‘undermine the 
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tacit assumption of US (or Western) universalism’ (Dodds et al., 2013: 8) must mean 
to treat it thoroughly as only one of the many possible narratives. What constructed 
the world was not only the ascendant American Mission, but numerous missions of 
many states altogether. Even a Super Power has to be treated as a state and not the 
state (Agnew, 2017). This plurality is not found in representation, but in the everyday, 
or the ‘little things’ as Thrift (Thrift, 2000; MacDonald, 2006) argues. That is to say, 
representations in world politics are not the product of a single dominant political 
practice, but a mere elusive point of node appearing in relation to diverged practices.  
     A promising way to tease out this neglected plurality is to investigate how a concept 
as ‘specific physical arrangements’ (Barad, 2003: 814) is mutated as it travels globally. 
The concept relevant in this discussion is, of course, the state as a living organism, 
because it is this concept that represents the power of geopolitics. As Paasi (1990: 56) 
points out, the essence of classical geopolitics rests on ‘the unity of the state and 
man’—or to adhere to Ratzel’s original intention, it is on the unity of land and man 
(Iizuka, 1935-36). However, the ways of uniting the two have to be diverse at different 
times and spaces. The plurality of geopolitics can be clarified by examining this point 
of departure. How the unity is arranged depends on the community of experience. 
Nonetheless, once the community accepts an exotic theory, it will start weaving 
intricate relations with the outside world. Strictly speaking, those that are involved in 
this interaction are not the agents per se, but the effects, and such interactions can also 
be left unacknowledged by the agents. 
 
The State as Kokka 
Agnew (2003: 52) insists that modern Europe has diffused the idea of the state to the 
rest of the world with the new social science, offering non-Western people the territory 
of modern statehood as ‘a fixed and reliable template for their investigations into a 
wide range of phenomena’. However, the template had to be paid for, since any act of 
knowing requires a foundation. Japan, the first non-Western Great Power, has been 
assumed to be a wilful participant in the Eurocentric world order, employing the 
template successfully and accordingly sharing the same values with the West. In this 
way, Japan joined the World Wars as a struggle among states. However, even a brief 
examination would indicate that the adoption of the template was only nominal, and 
the Westphalian model ‘has never an accurate description’ (Krasner, 1995) of its 
entity.  
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     In Japan, the state is translated as kokka, where the two Chinese characters mean 
country (kuni) and home (ie) respectively. According to Ogawa (1928a), the term 
could be dated back to China’s Warring States period (403-221 B.C.). Before the Meiji 
Restoration, kuni signified the domain of a daimyō but not Japan itself, although the 
notion of Japan as a geographical community could be traced back to the eighth 
century. Even in modern Japanese language, kuni often indicates one’s hometown, 
which is often not Tokyo. This means that there can be numerous kuni in Japan. 
Moreover, when Japan was established as a modern state in the late nineteenth century, 
it was the Emperor, who had been more a cultural symbol than a political one for five 
hundred years under the long samurai reigns (Watsuji, 1948). He came to ‘restore’ his 
throne, wearing Western clothes (Oguma, 2000), and the ‘rebels’ who supported the 
throne were the same samurai class. In other words, Japan did not undergo any actual 
revolution in the Western sense in course of establishing the modern nation-state. 
Some communists argued that Japanese capitalism was a ‘militaristic half-feudalism’ 
in which the Emperor was the absolute monarch, while other schools insisted that he 
was a symbol of national unity. 5  Hence, it can be argued that Japan’s national 
consciousness was the product of ‘an organised mobilisation of traditional society’, 
and not that of an awareness of nation-ness among the Japanese (Maruyama, 1964: 
163).  
     In addition to this historical-cognitive divergence, physical factors must also be 
considered. Maruyama Masao pointed out that the political elites in follower states 
like Japan had to confront a paradoxical project once they decided to establish a 
European-style modern state: whilst the establishment of the state rested on the claim 
of universality of the European system, it was simultaneously given the task of 
maintaining a unique quality of nationhood, whose trait has to be essentially 
distinguished from Europe. In order to achieve these highly contradictory tasks, 
latecomers have to select elements of European modernity based on their needs and 
wants, instead of mimicking it as a whole, while simultaneously claiming their full 
attainment of modernity. The aspiration for particularity is likely to end up with 
emphases on the nation’s unique traditional moral values, and/or a restoration of a 
specific part of its history, all of which are attempts to overcome the apparent spatial 
                                                
5 This became a big debate known as the ‘Nihon Shihonshugi Ronsō’ (Debate on Japanese capitalism) 
in the 1930s (Koyama and Yamasaki, 2014[1947]).  
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and temporal superiority imposed by the West (Maruyama, 1986: 43-56). As a result, 
the narrative of the modern state for these newcomers becomes a complex mixture of 
the past and the future, the universal and the particular. The most useful resource for 
the latecomers in the process of establishing the state is their geography, for it is where 
the power of the idea of nation-state rests. Geography here is not something simply 
‘out there’, but a ‘space as a capacity’, ‘capable of changing’ (Jiménez, 2003: 140), 
and ‘argues’ for their nation-ness (see Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 21). 
     In this way, the state as a template has been deformed into various rearrangements 
as it is disseminated around the world. In Japan, the Gesellschaft was not a 
replacement of Gemeinschaft; instead, the state was a metamorphosis of 
Gemeinschaft. The modern state in Japan was not the ‘mentor’ of the people (Agnew, 
2003: 52), but rather that of the ‘feudal’ elites who restored the Emperor’s throne to 
continue their reign. Of course, this feudalism was not exactly the same as that in 
Europe. The geopolitical concept of the organismic state was understood on this basis. 
The concept of the state in Japan was never an importation but the fruit of repeated 
integrations of knowledge. Therefore, the way Japanese people imagined their state 
must be distinctive. Far before the importation from Europe, the term kuni had already 
developed its own textuality in Japan. The traditional term was transformed into a 
modern notion when the country came to be a modern state, yet also evidently 
retaining all its historical connotations. At the same time, the imported notion also 
carried its own historicity in Europe. To be sure, the transformation was accepted as 
something new in Japan. However, the acceptance was due not only to its novelty, but 
more to a certain familiarity already attached with term. As the renowned poet 
Kitamura Tōkoku ridiculed, the Meiji Restoration was ‘not a revolution but a 
transition’ (Kitamura, 1893[1969]). This indicates the existence of the unsynthesisable 
in the concept, which is rarely noticed but has helped the local Japanese to connect 
themselves to the globe. The supposedly imported concept of the state, then, stood on 
this complexity, and to understand this complexity, we need to move ‘away from 
studying origins and originalities’ (Bilgin, 2016: 141).  
     As I will explicate in detail in the upcoming chapters, Japanese people developed 
from the European canon a different understanding of the territory of the modern state. 
The specificity of this alternative understanding could most evidently be seen in the 
interpretation of the organismic theory of the state, which asserted that the territory of 
the state was not bounded. When this particular understanding was linked to the 
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theories of geopolitics, a unique mission of Japan came to the fore: that the modern 
states would soon dissolve into regions, rendering the world ultimately one. This 
particular understanding of statehood had contributed to the popular fascination and 
support for Japan’s entry in the Second World War, since it allowed not only 
geopoliticians but also notable thinkers to argue for a perpetual war, in order to 
accomplish their mission of organising a regional world anew.  
     Allen has argued that all powers ‘have the potential to be actualised differently 
depending upon the relations of which they are a part and such arrangements may even 
throw up new capacities’ (Allen, 2012). The boundaries of a representation work in a 
space only when they make sense for people in that space, and neither because they 
are forcefully claimed from the outside nor because the people have mastered the 
meaning. Even if ‘state borders’ are a seemingly indisputable element of state power 
in a particular space, they can be marginalised or may even disappear in another space. 
If ‘concept’ is an ‘arrangement’ as Barad has claimed (mentioned above), its 
components can be rearranged by different practices as it travels. Drawing on Allen 
(2012: 192), this re-arranged object is ‘the emergence of a phenomenon that was not 
evidenced before and not reducible to the combination of pre-existing objects’. 
Therefore, each subject envisages the world differently although the lens through 
which they do so, i.e. the state, may be a superficially identical template. There is no 
ultimate consensus on the identity of the state, because the way to imagine the state is 
always governed by local practices. Rather than accusing the strong states of being the 
power holder, we need to investigate each thread in the entanglement in its own right 
by consulting each method of inquiry developed in each space.  
 
4.3. Imaginative Geography 
Proposing an inward turn for analysis, this section elucidates how people in modern 
Japan have historically understood their space in relation to the outside. In 
Orientalism, Said (2003: 54) states that ‘imaginative geography of the “our land-
barbarian land” variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the 
distinction. It is enough for “us” to set up these boundaries in our own minds; “they” 
become “they” accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated 
as different from “ours”’. Hence, it was in fact Western identity that was being 
developed through the othering of the Orient (Howarth, 2000: 67-70). Conversely, 
Chris Browning (2010: 33) argues that the West as a mode of analysis was essentially 
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a construction by outsiders, rather than something that came into being through the 
Westerners’ search for the self. In addition, Alastair Bonnett (2004: 65-66), analysing 
the discourses in Japan and Turkey in the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth 
century, points out that the West in non-Western discourses apparently had multiple 
sites of ‘creation and tension’, and that these sites were not a ‘synthesis’ or ‘hybrid’ 
developed in between the actors but belonged to the non-West (see also Aydin, 2007: 
191). This means that it was essentially ‘the other’, not ‘the self’, that has imagined 
not only the Orient but also the West, and such imagination was not necessarily shared 
by ‘the self’. In other words, in the site of imagination, multiple discourses are at the 
outset in search of difference with ‘the other’ in order to identify ‘the self’, though 
without direct confrontations and communications. These sites are essentially closed 
and not interactive, as their counterparts are also caught in their own imaginations. 
However, in the real world, these sites still have to be connected with each other.         
     Japan’s experience shows that in these multiple sites of selves, the modes of inquiry 
are also diverged as each community holds a unique epistemic tradition. For Japanese 
people particularly in the modern period, the differentiation process started from the 
question of ‘who we are’, instead of ‘who they are’, reflecting the subjective tendency 
in their epistemology which was nurtured from a history of constant knowledge 
importation. This particular mode of inquiry evolved not only from Japan’s secluded 
historico-geographical condition but also from the Japanese language. This section 
argues that as the Japanese deepened their inquiry through the assertive appropriation 
of modern European knowledge, a sense of unique national mission in relation to 
geography emerged. The emergence was not a discursive differentiation between the 
self and the other (Campbell, 1998; Doty, 1996; Neumann, 1999; Rumelili, 2004; 
Hansen, 2006; Browning, 2008; Solomon, 2013; Hagström, 2015), but a performative 
construction of ‘self-image’ (Shih, 2013) without drawing clear boundaries between 
‘us’ and ‘them’. In a topological landscape with multiple selves, Japanese people 
found sameness, rather than difference, in others, and linked such sameness to the self. 
Despite the elusiveness, it was this act that drove them to confrontation against the 
West, as they began to believe in their mission to change the exclusively Eurocentric 
world order into a more inclusive world order.  
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Japan: The Repository of Civilisations     
The continuous assimilation of knowledge for more than a millennium—first from 
China and then from Europe and the United States—cultivated a strong sense of 
mission in Japanese popular geopolitical imagination by the end of the nineteenth 
century. Uchimura Kanzō was an Evangelical Christian thinker who studied general 
science in the United States. In his popular book Chijinron (On Geography and 
People) first published in 1894, he asserted that the Japanese archipelago, whose shape 
was like a goddess ascending towards heaven (ten-nyo), was given the mission to be 
a mediator between the West and the East. According to his insistence, some of the 
main ports located on its eastern shore were opened towards the United States, whilst 
some others were towards China. Hence, Uchimura declared, ‘when the fleet of ships 
from the United States had arrived in Uraga and asked with civility and dignity to open 
the ports, that was the moment the mediator between the West and East met her robust 
and high-potential groom ‘(Uchimura, 1897: 205).6    
     Similarly, the art historian Okakura Kakuzō (Tenshin), who claimed that ‘Asia is 
one’ in his book The Ideals of the East: With Special Reference to the Art of Japan 
(first published in English in 19037), insisted that Japan was ‘the real repository of the 
trust of Asiatic thought and culture’ (Okakura, 1920: 3-5). In Japanese temples, he 
found influences from China as well as India, many of which had already been lost in 
their origins. For Okakura, the various cultures of Asia became a ‘unity in complexity’ 
in the land of Japan by the special faculties of the Japanese race, developed from its 
mixed blood history and from the unique geographical location of the archipelago 
which had not allowed any foreigners to invade.  
     Thus, they argued for the universality of Japanese values based on the 
geographically reclusive character of its islands, explained through the lens of human 
progress and evolution in toto. However, as Mitani Taichirō argues, this contradiction 
was not unique to Japan, but could be found also in Wilsonianism. The end of the 
nineteenth century was characterised by the rise of America in relation to the fall of 
Europe. According to Mitani, the rise of the ‘New World’ was perceived in Japan as 
                                                
6 Nakano (2011) classifies Uchimura as part of the school of ‘Japanese Humanism’. I acknowledge this 
classification, but Uchimura’s humanism is, I think, better understood in the wider context of the 
humanistic tendency seen in modern Japanese thought, which is distinguished from European 
humanism. As Rob Walker (1993: 16) asserts, ‘humanity as such is not a meaningful political category’. 
Both Takagi (1942) and Yamaguchi (1943) named Uchimura as a forerunning ‘geopolitician’. 
7 The Japanese version was published later in 1939. 
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the advent of relativism in line with the decline of the ‘Old World’. America was 
understood as an opposing force to Europe, and its rise did not mean another 
vindication of the universality of Western values. The uniqueness of the state that 
brought the United States to the leading position in world history was comprehended 
in relation to its geography rather than to its race (Mitani, 1974: 125-154). In this 
respect, environmental determinism essentially contains a dualistic character, the 
interpretation of which depends on where the reader is.  
     Social Darwinism was accepted in Japan under this wider contextual change in 
world history. Katō Hiroyuki’s controversial work Jinken Shinsetsu (1882)8 was the 
earliest and an extreme example of this Japanese apprehension of a relativising world. 
In it, he vigorously asserted that natural human rights were just a ‘fantasy’ of Rousseau 
and had to be rectified by Darwinism. He maintained that international relations, 
which until that point had been confined to like-minded societies of the European 
Great Powers, would soon become ‘the society for all the peoples in the universe’.9 
The newly emerged power of the United States at that point was the vindication of this 
development. In this particular imagined atlas, the state was located on the other side 
of the globe when seen from Japan, but it was not in the West.  
     In this way, during the Taishō Democracy in the Taishō Period (1912-1926), when 
the two-party political system entered a time of maturation, the rise of the United 
States was equated to the universality of democracy per se. Following the Wilsonian 
understanding of democracy, intellectuals in the Taishō period saw democracy as ‘an 
organic development of human life’ rather than a polity (Mitani, 1974: 133-139). 
Together with Social Darwinism, the universal claim of democracy contained a 
geographical particularity in itself. Since democracy presented a possibility of winning 
in this relativising world, it showed hope, rather than harsh reality, to the Japanese as 
a coloured race. It was only in 1943 when the geopolitician Komaki Saneshige urged 
his peers to think of the United States as being located ‘at the other side of Africa, the 
west of Japan’ and not the other side of the Pacific Ocean (Komaki, 1943), thus 
inverting the world map. Therefore, in the beginning of the last century, the decline of 
Europe accompanied by the rise of America, as well as Japan’s own victory in the 
Russo-Japanese war, was for the Japanese people a strong vindication of this universal 
                                                
8 The title can be translated as ‘A New Theory of Human Rights’. 
9 This statement should not be understood as an idealist statement, since the whole tone throughout the 
book is rather cynical and sarcastic. 
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organic development materialising across the globe, which would go on to foreshadow 
its relative superiority across the Pacific Ocean. For the Japanese, their contribution to 
this organic development was a gift of their unique geography. 
 
Invention of ‘the East’, ‘the West’, and ‘the South’  
As the Japanese envisaged their islands as a repository of civilisations with two 
manifest others as their ‘faceless’ teachers, the imaginative geography in Japan in the 
beginning of the last century came to be a space of multiple selves and others. The 
country invented not only the term ‘Tōyō’, which is better translated as ‘the East’ 
compared to ‘the Orient’, as it was a malleable geographical term for including and 
identifying Asians in contrast to not only ‘the West’ (Seiyō), but also ‘the South’ (Nan-
yō) and the North (Hokuyō). Accordingly, Japan’s site of creation of the self became 
messy.  
     Whether the label ‘the West’ has any substance or not is an ongoing debate in 
Western academia especially after the end of the Cold War (Gress, 1998; Jackson, 
2006; Hall and Jackson, 2007; Browning and Lehti, 2010; Katzenstein, 2010; 
Hellmann et al., 2014). However, for the Japanese, the debate on the social 
construction of the East has been almost a century old and yet to be abandoned. In the 
1930s and 1940s, the idea of the East became the centre of the debate in national 
identity. Tsuda’s work introduced in chapter 2 is a case in point. In a foreword to a 
book written in 1947, he noted that his motivation for the work was to attest the 
uniqueness of Japanese culture by arguing for the social construction of ‘Tōyō’. In 
opposition to the mainstream opinion during wartime which saw the East as 
primordial, as seen in Okakura’s contention mentioned above, Tsuda argued for the 
constructedness of the East. He asserted that the term Tōyō came from China, which 
originally indicated that which stood in the east of China (i.e. Japan in most cases). 
Moreover, the Chinese character yō means ocean, not land. He argued that during the 
Edo Period, as Seiyo came to signify Europe, Tōyō respectively became a geographical 
term that spelled Asia as a whole. Hence, Tōyō was a Japanese creation (Tsuda, 1936). 
Yamamuro (2000: 36) further points out that it was Arai Hakuseki whofirst used Seiyō 
to indicate Europe in Japanese in his book published in 1715; however, such usage 
was not widely seen until the late nineteenth century, when Westernisation, considered 
to be synonymous with the West, had diffused to a broader level in Japanese society. 
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     What is important for this thesis, however, is not the constructedness of the 
concept, but the fact that the ideas of the three ‘yō’ had a remarkable signification in 
Japan’s inquiry of the era. For any of the signifiers, the signified changed constantly 
depending on context. Even the East, this hastily invented anti-notion of the West for 
the purpose of indicating the Japanese selves, worked as a kaleidoscopic site of 
creation, in which its identity constantly fluctuated. In the 1930s when tension was 
rising towards the Second Sino-Japanese War, Tōyō became a fashionable term, 
enjoying popularity as Japan had built up hostility against the West. Furthermore, in 
addition to Tōyō and Seiyō, modern Japan coined the terms Nan-yō and Hokuyō, which 
only rendered the site even more complex. Whilst Hokuyō remained a mere 
geographical designation with very limited indication of the sea around Hokkaidō, 
Nan-yō, which originally largely referred to the islands in the Pacific, came to be an 
enigmatic fusion of both the ‘realist’ self and the ‘idealised’ other. Nonetheless, 
curiously, Nan-yō, together with Daitōa (Greater East Asia), became a forgotten 
‘geopolitical’ vocabulary in the post-war landscape. 
 
Nan-yō: A Fusion of the Self and the Other  
In the imaginative geography of wartime Japan, it was the forgotten term Nan-yō, 
rather than Tōyō or Seiyō, that played a considerable role, embodying the confusion 
of the identities between the self and the other. It was significant not because it 
effectively crystallised the self, but because it was elusive enough to expunge the 
difference between the two. Already being used in discourses during the Meiji Period, 
Nan-yō was an extremely versatile notion which enkindles mystical but intimate 
spatial imagination (Yano, 1975). As Nan-yō moved to the centre of Japanese popular 
consciousness and came to be seen as the space to which the state had to expand 
(Nanshinron, or the Southern Expansion Doctrine 10 ), it came to function as an 
ideology, signifying both fantasy and anathema. Despite the reality that it was a target 
for imperial expansion, Nan-yō was depicted, more metaphorically than realistically, 
as the place where young people were heading for their dream and where the Japanese 
originally came from (Kiyono, 1942; Komaki, 1942; Muroga, 1944). In popular 
                                                
10 The oldest example of Nanshinron can be seen in Bōkaisaku written by Satō Nobuhiro (1769-1850) 
(Yano, 1970: 48; Hirano, 1942: 13-19). Sato is also considered to be a pioneer of the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere (Hirano, 1942; Miwa, 1981: 199-200) and Japanese geopolitics (Ishibashi, 1942: 
15). 
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imagination, the term Nan-yō is said to have been introduced first by the geographer 
and politician Shiga Shigetaka in 1887. Soon, it was presented as a romanticised 
heaven-like place awaiting the Japanese to explore in adventure novels for children, 
travel writings for adults, and advertisements for jobs in the Pacific Islands.11 As 
Yamaguchi Sadao(1943: 110), relying on Uchimura, stated, the South was perceived 
as the meeting point of Westing and Easting of civilisations. During the war, 
Nanshinron became an official policy of Imperial Japan. After the Second World War, 
however, it turned into another taboo-like geopolitics term (at least formally) and was 
largely replaced by the more ‘scientific’ moniker ‘Southeast Asia’, to be reborn as a 
space for post-war Japan’s economic, but no longer political, expansion under the 
authorisation of the United States. In this context, Japan was a ‘beneficiary’ of the 
Cold War (Yano, 1975: 179). Nan-yō has since then become a marginalised research 
topic in history, politics, and geography in post-war Japan, with the exceptions of a 
few notable works mainly by area specialists of Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, although 
the designation is almost obsolete today, Nan-yō still provokes a rustic and warm-
hearted image and used in popular films like Godzilla (1954), while Tōyō and Seiyō 
are still widely used even today. 
     Thus, Nan-yō was significant and convenient not because the term represented 
Japan’s other, but because it obscured the very target the Japanese were fighting 
against. It represented whatever that was contradictory: old and new, foreign and 
domestic, self and other, past and future, stagnation and progress. Right before the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, the journalist Murofuse Kōshin vigorously declared that 
Nan-yō was ‘a vast virgin land’ (Murofuse, 1936: 221), representing ‘Japan’s 
mission’, ‘the tao (dō, see chapter 2)’ that ‘the geographical nature’ dictated (ibid.: 
255-261). The word embodied the end of imperialism and white supremacism’ (ibid.: 
267), and for Murofuse, what would wipe out the European-ness—not Europeans per 
se—was the Japanese spirit and also not the Japanese per se. The Japanese spirit was 
seen as the alternative to the deteriorating European spirit in order to ensure a healthy 
human universal progress. Shiga Shigetaka, in his best-selling work published half a 
century before Murofuse’s, lamented the tyranny of white people in the Pacific 
Islands, and worried about the possible extinction of the yellow race as the result of 
                                                
11 In 1915, the Nanyo Foundation was established, and recently renamed as the Asia-Nanyo Foundation. 
The mission of the foundation was to ‘contribute global interests’ (http://newicf.org/history.php: 
accessed on June 3, 2015) 
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white domination. At the same time, however, he invited his coeval Japanese people 
to this ‘big market’ for the sake of the country’s economic success—the solid 
establishment of Japan as a modern state with the support of Great Britain (Shiga, 
1887). Shiga claimed that until his work was published, Nan-yō had not existed in 
Japan’s popular imagination. As Japan’s economy expanded, however, the world 
vision of Japanese people, gradually widened towards the Pacific. The key event for 
this development was when those Pacific Islands that were under Germany’s control 
were given to Japan under a mandate in 1919. Thereafter, Nan-yō entered Japan’s 
imaginative theatre of world politics, in which the Japanese would play the lead. 
However, an obvious difference from the Europeans, besides the fact that the islands 
were ‘awarded’ by the European-led League of Nations, was that the Japanese was a 
non-white race. In this sense, not neither the indigenous people in Nan-yō, nor the 
Europeans even, could be strictly objectified as ‘the other’.  
     The dilemma surrounding Nan-yō was palpable also in the creation of the East and 
in the timing when the East as a concept came into the spotlight. Having broken away 
from China first intellectually, Japan then fought two wars against it. In this context, 
the East was for the Japanese a necessary, rather than just a convenient, fiction for 
these clashes. This was especially important in the Second Sino-Japanese war, since 
the Japanese had to reason that they were fighting the war not against Chinese people 
but for the union of Asians. This war was, for Japan, not a war between China and 
itself, but one that tried to save China from being tainted by the West, even though the 
irony was that Japan benefitted from the West’s colonialism. A logic attempting to 
whitewash this conflict arose: For the Japanese, a ‘just’ order was naturally developed 
as the current world order led by the Europeans began to deteriorate, and the 
Europeans became Japan’s enemy because their position was in opposition to Japan’s 
in this ‘just’ world order. In this context, the Europeans were not inherently bad or 
different. Rather, for the Japanese, the locus of ‘justice’ had moved from Europe to 
Japan as a natural development of history. Any identity was, in the Japanese 
imagination, in progress (Morris-Suzuki, 1998), and the new order therefore had to be 
an evolving regionalism that would replace the modern European state system (Mitani, 
1974: 254).!
     Differently put, following Ole Wæver (1996) though in a different context for a 
different subject, Europe became ‘the other’ for Japan not because the Europeans were 
the ‘racial other’, but because they embodied ‘the past’ of human progress in contrast 
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to the Japanese which represented the future. Here, the basis for otherness was 
sameness. For the Japanese, any identities are blurred and overlapping with another, 
and each of them contained a part of another while being simultaneously different. An 
identity was a mixture of the self and the other, and can never be clarified what it really 
was. All humans were equal in the sense that they would evolve in the same manner 
but at different speed in different space. Therefore, their security discourse was not 
drawn from the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, the domestic ‘us’ and the 
foreign ‘them’ (Walker 1993; Campbell, 1998; see also Agnew, 2015), but was instead 
distinguished between the past and the future of universal human progress. 
 
Fate? 
In this way, in the course of self-searching, the Japanese discourse oscillated between 
the universal and the particular. As they tried to understand themselves in the context 
of universal human history, they came to realise that the reason they were embodying 
universal history was their geographical peculiarity. Watsuji’s Fūdo, first published in 
1935, is a case in point. More precisely, it was read in that manner by his 
contemporaries, probably against his will as it became a national classic. Later 
translated as A Climate: A Philosophical Study, Fūdo, literally meaning ‘wind and 
earth’, is Watsuji’s most well-known work. Reading Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit in 
Berlin, he was haunted by the question why spatiality was not taken into account as 
part of the basic structure of existence while temporality was. The book was a pioneer 
of Nihonjinron,12 as it vividly illustrated a ‘personality’ of the Japanese as a nation in 
relation to its natural environment, culture, and history in comparison with other races, 
thereby contributing to Japan’s mythology of its unique nationhood in the post-war 
era (Inoue, 1979). On the other hand, the book was also criticised as an example of 
environmental determinism (Iizuka, 1944; see also Inoue, 1979).  
     According to Watsuji, climate was ‘the agent by which human life is objectivised, 
and it is here that man comprehends himself’ (Watsuji, 1961[1935]: 14). This was 
because humans invented things for a purpose, and these inventions were inextricable 
from local conditions as well as customs developed under those conditions. To this 
end, he presented a threefold typology of people: monsoon, desert, and meadow. 
                                                
12 Nihonjinron (or discussions about the Japanese) is a genre of studies on Japanese national and cultural 
identity. For a comprehensive history of the literature, see Aoki (1999). 
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Europeans were of a meadow type, and the Japanese together with other East Asian 
countries, belonged to the monsoon type. Furthermore, he distinguished the 
particularity of the Japanese from other Asians, claiming that Japan’s climate was ‘by 
far the most distinctive within the whole monsoon zone’ because of its duality: ‘that 
of a tropical belt and that of a frigid zone’. For this reason, the Japanese had a 
conflicting character of ‘a quiet savagery of emotion, a fighting disinterest’ due to the 
constantly changing climate (Watsuji, 1961[1935]: 138), and were just not as receptive 
like the other monsoon people.  
     After his travel to Europe, Watsuji found his home country Japan strange. Western-
style houses, cars and trams had been part of Japan’s landscape, and, accustomed to 
seeing them, he did not find those in Europe new. He even witnessed the trams’ 
‘skimpiness’ in their place of origin, as opposed to the neat ones in Japan.!After his 
return to Japan, he recognised that these things of Western origin sat in an odd 
equilibrium in his native landscape. The oddness was as if ‘I was watching a wild boar 
rampaging through fields. When a tram surges through the houses that line the tracks, 
they seem to crouch and bow spiritlessly just as the commoner would grovel in face 
of a feudal lord’s procession’ (Watsuji, 1961[1935]: 158). The Japanese people, living 
in Western-style houses, had preserved their traditional way of living. Watsuji was 
interested in how spatial difference was elicited in intellectual life. He stated that 
Dilthey, for example, called Oriental art ‘primitive’ and ‘semi-barbarous’, even 
though what counted as ‘Orient’ was unclear (ibid.: 171). Watsuji was ‘not 
unsympathetic to’ such European romantic adoration for Asian earthiness, as he 
understood the Europeans’ suffer from the ‘mechanisation of life’. Yet, the Japanese, 
who followed the Europeans and pursued a similar sort of mechanical life, had at some 
point lost ‘a great deal more of its “primitiveness” than has Europe’ long before 
modernisation qua Westernisation (ibid.: 176). He argued that the Europeans would 
not appreciate this maturity of the Japanese, as they believed that Europe was the most 
progressive region in the world (ibid.). On the other hand, Japan’s thirst for European 
science was, for him, a longing for the meadow type of people. However, immersing 
themselves in Western life, the Japanese were oblivious to the fact that Japan’s climate 
could become neither a meadow nor a desert (ibid.: 117-118).  
     Japan, a viewed object of Europe, was about to transform into a viewing object by 
importing Western knowledge, particularly its science. However, this brought 
unexpected bewilderment to the Japanese. Although the Japanese actually shared with 
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the Europeans a nostalgia for the cultural ‘primitiveness’ of the Southern Islands, 
Watsuji believed that the Europeans would never distinguish between Nan-yō and 
Japan, and would simply consider Japan as part of the East despite Japan’s 
abandonment of Asia by the import of foreign knowledge. Moreover, the Japanese 
themselves still felt a sense of affinity to that primitiveness. Hence, Japan was all 
Eastern, Western, and Southern at the same time, but simultaneously none of them. 
Contrary to the West’s claim of objectivity, it appeared impossible for the Japanese to 
objectify themselves. Watsuji went on to say that despite the impossibility, the 
Japanese pretended to have successfully objectified themselves. However, being 
affected by Japan’s climate, the Japanese had retained a subjective inclination despite 
Western learning. Watsuji claimed: ‘The problem of such lack of discernment still 
faces the Japanese today’ (1961[1935]: 118). Indeed, this mixture of hollowness and 
pride in their distinctiveness led them to attempts of including others, which however 
brought about another identity crisis, since the claim for hegemony by stressing their 
superiority entailed a paradoxical differentiation inside the allegedly inclusive 
community. As Watsuji (1961[1935]) argued, although the Japanese were 
of a monsoon type among other monsoon types, they must be the monsoon type that 
was specially given the mission of vindicating universal human progress. After all, 
this had to be corroborated by their unique geography, because a combination of a 
particular geography and a particular people could not be replicated. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 The modern state has been the node in the formation of world politics. As Agnew 
argues, it is at first glance the very template that has diffused from Europe to all over 
the world. However, this conceptualisation neglects the fact that Europe was not the 
only place that has historically developed a geographical community analogous to the 
state. As the case of Japan has shown, a theoretical template had to be re-interpreted 
into an indigenous concept in order to become knowledge. In this respect, although 
the nation-state is certainly an imagined community (Anderson, 2006), the way of 
imagining the nation-state must be diverse. Therefore, how the world of states as a 
whole came to be established is better observed only when the respective localisations 
of the concept are properly examined. Geopolitics is the theory that rationalises the 
power of the modern nation-state. The concept of the state as a living organism is a 
central idea of geopolitics that justified the expansion of the state. Together with 
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environmental determinism, it was considered to be a rationalisation of Western 
domination in the literature of geopolitics. However, to identify what it has 
rationalised in each destination as a traveling theory requires a detailed investigation. 
As the concept can be mutated by local practices, what the theory has justified can 
differ in each destination. 
     The discourse of the self in Japan in the first half of the last century began from the 
question of ‘who are we’, rather than ‘who are they’. This was not only because Japan 
was a viewed object for the West, but also because Japan’s intellectual tradition had 
a subjective inclination. With multiple selves and others whose boundaries were fairly 
blurry, Japan’s site of creation of the self oscillated between the particular and the 
universal. At the final step on the ladder towards the Second Sino-Japanese War in 
1937, Japanese people started to look for the meaning of their reason of existence in 
their geography. This historical development pushed Japanese people to interpret 
geopolitical theory as an inclusive idea, contrary to the so-called classical geopolitics 
superficially. The final two chapters will study how they transformed the theory.       
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5   The Importation of Geopolitics into Japan 
 
The world is not a ladder and humankind 
is not a ladder climber. Today is not for 
tomorrow and tomorrow is not for the 
day after tomorrow … European 
philosophy of progress bid us perpetual 
expense with perpetual swindle: We had 
to continue to follow a rainbow just like 
a child.  
—Murofuse Kōshin,  
Beyond Civilization (1927: 309) 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (1996), Andres 
Stephanson writes:  
 
To imagine one’s national self in this exemplary manner is not unique to the 
United States. Every nation-state lays some claim to uniqueness, and some 
nations or empires, historically, have even considered themselves on Higher 
Authority the anointed focal point of world or universal history. Yet, for 
example, the dynastic ‘Mandate’ that legitimated Confucian China never 
envisaged a transcending ‘end’ of history through a fundamental change of the 
world in accordance with its own self-image. … In the twentieth century, only 
one case compared to the United States in claims to prophecy, messianism, and 
historical transcendence: the Soviet Union (xii-xiii). 
 
Here, he overlooks another example against which the United States fought a ‘hot’ 
war: Imperial Japan. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitōa Kyōeiken, 
GEACPS) was a grand design that aimed exactly to transcend the end of history. 
Theoretically underpinned by German geopolitics, and originally proposed by the 
established liberal political scientist and politician Rōyama Masamichi in 1938 though 
in a slightly different designation, it became Japan’s official policy in 1941 mainly 
under the cabinet of Konoe Fumimaro, a popular social-liberalist politician and the 
heir of an aristocratic kin group. Although this regionalism has rarely been revisited 
squarely in studies of international politics to date (Schouenborg, 2012), it was 
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undeniably the most ambitious world vision presented by modern Japan and supported 
by popular imagination hitherto (Miwa, 1981).  
     Contrary to the popular perception today that it was a militarist policy, Miwa 
Kimitada (1981: 196-197) suggests that this policy conjured up ‘what might be called 
an idealistic yearning for Asia’ in popular imagination, with which people had been 
imbued for a long time. The Daitōa Chiseigaku as Japanese geopolitics 
enthusiastically buttressed this popular yearning. By interpreting the knowledge 
coming from Europe, Japan envisaged a confrontational modern geopolitical 
imagination against the West, and this vision was most eloquently represented in the 
idea of the GEACPS.  
     The initial application of German geopolitics in Japan was an empirical study on 
US immigrants in the Pacific, titled ‘The Truth of Racial Struggle and Geopolitical 
Observation’, published in 1925 by the geographer Iimoto Nobuyuki (1895-1989), 
who rebuffed the increasing white supremacism in the Pacific region. Following this, 
in these two final chapters of the thesis, I will explicate and analyse Japan’s application 
of geopolitics diachronically by setting two time frames according to the related 
historical events: from 1925 to the mid-1930s, and from the mid-1930s to 1945. The 
current chapter is devoted to the former period, during which geopolitics only enjoyed 
limited appreciation. However, it was the interpretation in this period that set the 
orientation of Japanese geopolitics for the enthusiastic support of the GEACPS later. 
Japan, which had been the object of geopolitical scrutiny by European geopoliticians, 
used the theory to analyse the country’s own situation, rather than to observe the 
objective state of international affairs as classical geopolitics is considered to have 
suggested (Ó Tuathail, 1996). The Japanese scholars, who were critical of the 
imperialist character of geopolitics, reversely wielded German geopolitics to analyse 
the contents of its own geographical community, which they thought had a different 
order from Europe and so attempted to rebut the contemporary Western world order.  
     This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section presents a summary of data. 
Then, I will briefly discuss how Ratzel, Kjellén, and Haushofer analysed Japan as a 
geopolitical object. In the third section, I will examine geopolitics’ first application in 
Japan, explicating the mutation of the theory at this first stage of importation, which 
would develop into what I call ecological fatalism later. The fourth and final section 
revisits the history of the concept of the state from Ratzel to German geopolitics during 
the Weimar Period, relying mostly on the debate among Japanese scholars, in order to 
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confirm to what extent Japan’s interpretation was a creation of them. A concept key 
to Japan’s appropriation of geopolitics, instead of Lebensraum (living space), was 
Lebensform (form of living), which was originally introduced by Kjellén but is almost 
forgotten nowadays not only in Japan but also in Anglophone academia. As Japanese 
scholars focused on the components in their own space and on the organic 
development between geography and humans, they came to understand geopolitics as 
a theory that would endow them with knowledge to predict their own future. As they 
tried to understand the theory in relation to their own history as a non-Western modern 
nation-state, they began to conceive of the world as fundamentally inclusive, rather 
than exclusive. That is, contrary to their American contemporary Nicholas Spykman’s 
claim that geography is self-evident and does not argue by itself (Ó Tuathail, 
1996b:51), Japanese scholars, through a critical appraisal of geopolitical theories, 
construed geography as not simply ‘out there’, but as something that voluntarily 
‘predicts’ by itself in the organically evolving relations between its inhabitants. 
  
5.2. Data Summaries and Justification 
A total of eighty-two works, mainly on theories of geopolitics, by forty-eight Japanese 
authors are analysed in this study. nine of them were published in the 1920s, twenty-
two in the 1930s, and the rest in the 1940s. Acknowledging the difficulty of defining 
‘geopolitics’ as an academic discipline (Murphy ed. 2004), I confine the selection to 
works that discuss theories of so-called Western classical geopolitics—mainly the 
original works of Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolph Kjellén, Karl Haushofer, Halford 
Mackinder, and Alfred Mahan (cf. Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 22-24). With a few exceptions, 
most of the Japanese works I study are theoretical investigations, and in practice, a 
large portion of the works dealt exclusively with German geopolitics instead of the 
Anglo-American variant. I have only been able to find one paper that introduced 
Mackinder (Tanaka, 1928) and a few articles referring to Bowman and Spykman (e.g. 
Komaki, 1934: Research Division, South Manchuria Railway Company 1942). Also, 
despite the large quantity of translations on his works, there was no study on Mahan’s 
theory made by Japanese scholars during the period. This was probably because his 
geostrategic theory was mainly studied within the Imperial Japanese Navy given its 
long-standing ties with the US Navy. This absence of Anglo-American geopolitical 
research outside the military probably means that German geopolitics was more 
appropriate for Japanese scholars to justify the GEACPS as a scheme that aimed to 
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effect a new world order. For these empirical reasons, this study does not deal with 
Anglo-American geopolitics, but almost solely on the so-called German School of 
geopolitics.  
     The works under study here were published in academic journals, general 
magazines, newspapers, and also as books. Although the majority were written by 
geographers, many of them had a background in economics. The authors came from 
all walks of life: natural scientists, political scientists, philosophers, lawyers, 
journalists, bureaucrats, high school teachers, and so on. Geopolitics as a new field of 
study was first introduced by Fujisawa Chikao in 1925 in Kokusai Gaikōhō Zasshi 
(Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs). Later that year, Iimoto Nobuyuki 
first translated the term geopolitics as chiseigaku and applied the concept to his case 
study in a series of articles in an academic journal (1925, 1926a, 1926b). Meanwhile, 
Abe Ichigorō (1933) translated the term as chiseijigaku, which had a stronger 
emphasis on political science than on geography. Nonetheless, the former ended up 
being used until today. In 1942, the journal Chiseigaku was launched by the Japanese 
Geopolitics Association (Chiseigaku Kyōkai). Having the Vice Admiral Ueda 
Yoshitake as its president, the mission of the association was to contribute to Japan’s 
security policymaking. The journal was sold in a relatively affordable price and widely 
read not only by geographers but also by military personnel (Takagi, 2009: 190), but 
ceased to exist in 1944. Several articles were published in popular general interest 
magazines. One of the magazines was Kaizō (Reorganisation), whose readership 
included ‘the leftists’ since some contributors were from the so-called worker-farmer 
school (Rōnōha) of Marxists. As some members of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Showa 
Research, Institute, Premier Konoe’s brain trust) joined the writer group of Kaizō in 
the late 1930s, the magazine became the epicentre of the idea of the East Asia 
Cooperative Community, which would later unfold into the GEACPS. The most 
established writer among them was Rōyama, known for being the founder of public 
policy and international politics studies in Japan (Takagi, 2009).1 Generally speaking, 
the writers were heavily influenced by Marxist thoughts, and a few notable writers 
were Marxist economic geographers, reflecting a trend in the Japanese intellectual 
community during the period.  
                                                
1 Rōyama will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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     Since the aim of this thesis is not to analyse the ideological inclinations of this 
specific academic field,2 but rather to identify wider intellectual tendencies in a human 
collective with qualitative analysis, those wider works of the period which I consulted 
were more or less related to geographical ideas. Geography had been a constantly 
popular topic in Japan throughout the late nineteenth to early twentieth century 
(Yamaguchi, 1943), with the publication of several national best-sellers, including 
Fūdo which was discussed in chapter 4. I also examine some policy papers, in order 
to consider the validity of my analysis in a broader context. These sources are not 
counted in the number given at the start of this section above. In addition to the works 
written by Japanese scholars, the translated works of Kjellén and Haushofer will also 
be referred to. Kjellén’s Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart (The Great Powers of 
Today) was published in 1918, well before geopolitics itself was introduced to 
Japanese academia on a full scale. In sum, six of Kjellén’s works, fifteen of 
Haushofer’s,3 two of Ratzel’s and twelve of Mahan’s have been published by 1945, 
but it was not until 1939 that the first translation of Haushofer appeared (Nichigai 
Associates, 2007).4 However, most of the writers I analyse did consult the originals 
directly, judging from their references. Also, it is worth noting that the works of Karl 
Wittfogel, who was also critical to geopolitics, were widely appreciated, and twenty-
one of his works were translated (Nichigai Associates, 2007), probably reflecting the 
strong influence of Marxism on interwar Japan.5 Because most of the Japanese works 
made references in the original language, the issue of translation is not taken into 
account in this study. 
     However, the notion ‘analysing the Japanese appropriation of German geopolitics’ 
should not be understood literally. ‘German geopolitics’ here means a series of studies 
from Ratzel via Kjellén to other German geopoliticians, most famously represented 
by Haushofer. Besides the fact that Kjellén was a Swede, as Lucien Ashworth (2014: 
203-206) argues, the categorisation of ‘German geopolitics’ is over-simplistic. David 
Murphy insists that geopolitics in Germany is better understood as a wider intellectual 
spectrum that had ‘a powerful magnetic attraction’ with a ‘nonpartisan utility’ 
                                                
2 For this type of analysis of Japanese geopolitics, see Takagi (2009). 
3 Some of these are different titles of the same book. 
4 According to Spang (2000), Haushofer published some articles in Japanese newspapers from the 
1920s. 
5 Two geographers had already introduced Wittfogel’s criticism before geopolitics became a fascination 
(Kawanishi, 1933; Satō, 1939: cf. Research Division, South Manchuria Railway Company 1942). 
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(Murphy, 1997: l.1010). Following him, the conventional understanding—that 
geopolitics flourished because of the Nazis’ support—makes a grounded analysis of 
German geopolitics difficult. 6  In fact, German geopolitics is still readily 
misunderstood today. Haushofer for instance is often regarded as an advocate of the 
kind of ‘pan-regionalism’ that took off in Japan and that divided the world into three 
(Yamazaki, 2013: 7-9). However, as I will demonstrate later, his original works are 
better understood as historical ethnographies rather than as strategic analyses (Obara, 
1940: 395). As Murphy argues, German geopolitics mainly developed in ‘the fertile 
pluralistic political setting of Weimar Democracy’, but lost its power in Nazi Germany 
(Murphy, 1997: l.62). In addition, in Japan in the 1940s, Haushofer was not the only 
name in geopolitics. Others, such as Otto Maul, Walther Vogel, Ewald Banse, Erich 
Obst, Arthur Dix, Richard Hennig, and Hermann Lautensach, were frequently referred 
to in the works of Japanese scholars.  
     This affinity with German geopolitics at large is not surprising given that, first of 
all, Japanese academia was most strongly under German influence since the Meiji 
Restoration, and for this reason German was the first academic language in several 
fields including geography. In addition, as mentioned by Watanabe (1942), there was 
a shared tendency among people to blindly admire German culture in Japan. Behind 
this was a sympathetic feeling for the Germans as another Volk ohne Raum (people 
without space), as markedly represented in Hans Grimm’s book title, which was a 
bestseller in Japan. Lastly, and most importantly perhaps, Haushofer’s geopolitics was 
centred on Japan and the Pacific region.  
     Japan’s apparently wholesale appreciation did not necessarily mean that German 
geopolitics provided tangible theories for Japanese scholars. In fact, the reverse was 
true. Iwata Kōzō, in the introduction to his book titled Chiseigaku (1942a), confessed 
that despite the numerous number of translated works on geopolitics, no single book 
could convince its readers what geopolitics was (see also Kunimatsu, 1944). He stated 
that in practice each scholar had his distinctive methodologies, rendering the definition 
of geopolitics rather difficult to determine. In particular, Haushofer’s works were 
notoriously hard to translate; translators of his works equally confessed in their 
prefaces how the translation was strenuous because of his esoteric writing style full of 
                                                
6 It has been argued that the enigmatic relation between German geopolitics (particularly Haushofer) 
and Nazism was largely a myth (see Heske, 1987; Kost, 1989; Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 111-129; Murphy, 
1997). 
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jargons and neologisms (Tamagusuku, 1941; Satō, 1942; Umezawa, 1943). However, 
it is safe to say that Haushofer’s incomprehensible writing style was at the same time 
the source of the popularity of German geopolitics, as it was perceived as a ‘mystic’ 
(rather than scientific), and therefore ‘prestigious’, scholarship (Watanabe, 1942; 
Iwata, 1942). As Iwata (1942) had pointed out, it was in this ‘inspiration’ seen 
especially in Haushofer’s ‘recondite’ works, that a sense of geopolitics was 
paradoxically found. Differently put, it is this dense aspect of geopolitics that was 
hailed. Therefore, German geopolitics served more as a symbolic reference, the 
density of which allowed Japanese scholars a creative interpretation. The vague and 
diffused character of German geopolitics was more a promotional factor, rather than 
inhibiting, for its affirmative employment in Japan.  
     Finally, I will briefly provide a rough overview of the history of modern Japan’s 
geography as an academic discipline up to the first half of the last century. Drawing 
on Yamaguchi Sadao (1943), geography, originally developed as area studies during 
the Edo Period, had attracted ample attention from Japan’s leaders far before the 
official opening-up of the country. The first map of Japan using modern surveying 
techniques was created by a Japanese person in the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. In 1810, the Shōheikō, the highest educational institution in Edo, established 
the Division of Topography. Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of modern Japan’s founding 
fathers, published Sekai Kunizukushi (The Countries in the World) in 1869, in which 
he classified the globe into five regions. In the beginning of the subsequent Meiji 
Period when modern education system was introduced into the country, geography 
came to occupy one-third of the classroom time in elementary school, reflecting the 
Meiji leaders’ strong interest in the world beyond Japan. In 1879, the Tokyo 
Geographical Society, modelled on the Royal Geographical Society, was founded. 
Geography as an academic discipline in Japan diverged from geology in the early 
1890s, which was originally established by a scholar who studied at Leipzig 
University in Germany. Since then, geography had kept a rather ‘naturalistic tendency’ 
under the strong influence of German geography, although some scholars, like Iizuka 
Kōji, studied in France and were influenced by the French school of geography, and 
therefore critical of German geopolitics. Others, such as Uchimura Kanzō, whom I 
have mentioned in the last chapter, studied geography in the United States and brought 
back with them a ‘romantic geography’, which was nonetheless influenced by a 
teleological view of German geographers such as Carl Ritter. Although this American 
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route was accepted as rather outdated by the geographers trained in the German 
tradition, it was this view that prevailed in Japan’s popular imagination, as seen in the 
example of Uchimura’s Chijinron which came to be a bestseller (Yamaguchi, 1943; 
see also Tsujita, 1977). Another favourite book of the era on this topic was Shiga 
Shigetaka’s Nihonfūkeiron (On Japan’s Landscape) published in 1894, in which the 
journalist-cum-politician celebrated the beauty of Japan’s diversified natural 
environment in implicit comparison to Europe (Shiga, 1937). In sum, it would be safe 
to say that geography was a popular subject of study in Japan until the end of the 
Second World War. 
 
5.3. Japan as a Case of Classical Geopolitics 
Japan’s specificity as a destination of the travelling theory of geopolitics lies in the 
fact that the state had been under the intensive scrutiny of geopoliticians before 
Japanese scholars became interested in the theories. Although rarely mentioned today 
in the literature of geopolitics, Ratzel, Kjellén, and Haushofer all worked on Japan. 
This was indubitably because of the impressive rise of Japan transforming from an 
Asian feudal nation into a modern European state through the Meiji Restoration, and 
also because of its unique geography that resembled Great Britain. Japan’s success 
had a twofold contradictory significance to European intellectuals: Whilst the rise of 
Japan was seen as a vindication of s the fin de siècle world since it evoked the image 
of Europe being in a relative crisis, it simultaneously signified the validity of the 
European state-system. Accordingly, their assessments of Japan tended to be biased 
and even divided. 
 
Ratzel 
The least well-known among the three geopoliticians was Ratzel. Ironically, according 
to Tanaka, Ratzel had a long-lasting interest in Japan, which resulted in at least five 
major works on Japan, and occasionally mentioned the country in his lectures and 
papers between the 1870s and the first decade of the twentieth century. Tanaka argues 
that as was common in his era, his view was racially biased and largely underlined by 
Enlightenment thought, maintaining vigilance against this ‘uncivilised’ non-European 
state. In his earlier works, Ratzel, consulting research in medical studies, enumerated 
a few ‘bizarre’ physical traits of the Japanese, such as the ‘dilation of stomach by 
overeating of rice’ and ‘dullness to pain’, of which he was duly convinced as inferior 
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to European standard. Consequently, he predicted that these inferiorities could cause 
Japan problems in the near future. Also, he showed disgust towards the complex Asian 
political system which appeared to him to be a double standard, disagreeing with some 
of his contemporary Germans who blindly admired and idealised the country as a 
‘Shangri-la’. Ratzel’s racial prejudice aside, his account was, as Tanaka argues, a 
reflection of his realist view on international relations in terms of German interests in 
the Asia-Pacific (Tanaka, 1996).   
     However, towards the end of the century, Ratzel’s main interest changed from 
anthropology to geography. According to Tanaka, Ratzel’s increasing concern in 
geography gradually, if not totally, eliminated his racial bias, as the shift allowed him 
to analyse this exotic people from a different point of view. Particularly after the Sino-
Japanese War in 1895, Ratzel changed his opinion. Mentioning the geographical 
similarity between Japan and the United Kingdom, he estimated Japan’s location to 
be possibly superior to the European empires, not only because its coastline indicated 
both openness and closedness, but also because the Japanese in general showed strong 
patriotism with a unique combination of an expansive worldview and a strong affinity 
to their homeland. Nevertheless, Tanaka concluded that, in the end, this grandfather 
of geopolitics did not abandon his faith in European superiority, for Ratzel after all 
attributed the strength of the Japanese to its experience of Westernisation (Tanaka, 
1996). 
 
Kjellén 
In his book Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart (1918), Kjellén discussed in detail 
Japan’s rise as one of the eight Great Powers. At a glance, Kjellén’s appraisal of Japan 
was similar to Ratzel’s. Calling Japan a ‘new version of the United Kingdom’, he 
asserted that it was Japan’s geographical location that granted it to absorb both 
Western and Eastern civilisations (Kjellén, 1918). Haggman (1999) holds that Kjellén 
visited Japan and China in 1909, and Carl Marklund (2015) points out that Japan 
appeared as a role model for Sweden in his writings. However, from my point of view, 
Kjellén’s appreciation of Japan was not so favourable, as his writing indicated a 
stronger interest in Japan’s unusual mentality. Kjellén (1918: 324-325) argued that 
Japan’s novelty was that the country ‘changed the yellow jacket that she has worn for 
more than 1250 years to a white jacket’. His insistence on Japan’s fortune was 
threefold. First, breaking away from the Chinese ideal, on which it had relied for quite 
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a long time, Japan employed the ‘Western spirit’ more for pragmatic reasons than for 
blind worshiping. Second, its race was the product of racial mingling between the 
Malayan, the Mongolian, and some others, thus giving the Japanese a dualistic trait. 
Third, this dualistic trait, together with Japan’s realism that retained the dual ideals 
and policies of the West and the East despite its Westernisation, worked well in turning 
it into a Great Power. However, he argued, Japan’s national aspiration for overseas 
expansion would not be accomplished, because, first, its economic performance could 
not be compared to the European countries, and second, its expansion in the Pacific 
would be blocked by the United States (Kjellén, 1918: 322-356).  
 
Haushofer 
Despite these differences, in the end it was the Pacific Ocean that was the important 
clue to understanding Japan’s bonanza of becoming the sole non-Western Great 
Power. This was especially true for Haushofer, an expert in Japan. His geopolitics was 
based on his experience of staying in Japan between 1909 and 1910 as a Bavarian 
Military officer. Upon returning to Germany, he wrote his doctoral thesis on German 
influence on the development of Japan (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 45; Spang, 2001). During 
his time in Japan, Haushofer was profoundly impressed by its culture, climate, and 
geography, all of which he found very different from those in the Atlantic (Haushofer, 
1941, 1942a, 1942b, 1943b). In his best known work Geopolitik des Pazifischen 
Ozeans (Geopolitics in the Pacific Ocean), first published in 1925 and claimed to be 
the ‘Bible of German Geopolitics’ (Weigert, 1942: 738), Haushofer asserted that Japan 
was the sole practitioner of ‘the Pacific form of living’. For him, the Pacific was a pure 
space that ‘had not yet been tarnished by the struggle in the Atlantic’ (Haushofer, 
1942b: 162-165), where ‘heterogeneous peoples’ had been living together in peace for 
‘2500 years’ (ibid.: 6). In contrast to a centrifugal tendency in the Atlantic, it was a 
centripetal force that rendered the Pacific a peaceful community. However, this peace 
was broken when the ‘white race intruded’ (ibid.: 142). Hence, it was actually a ‘White 
Peril’, not the Yellow Peril, that the Pacific suffered from (ibid.: 171). For Haushofer, 
the Pacific was literally a gigantic space of peace that was woken up by the invasion 
of ‘Anglo-Saxons’ (ibid.: 22). 
     Japan was an integral part of Haushofer’s geopolitics, if not for German geopolitics 
as a whole (Spang, 2001). Haushofer himself admitted that it was the experience and 
knowledge he gained in Japan that made him write a series of works on geopolitics. 
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This was to inform his German peers the reason Japan, who had learned most of the 
modern state system from Germany, was able to maintain absolute independence, 
whilst his homeland was not (Haushofer, 1943: 3). He even stated that his works on 
geopolitics were ‘confined within the monsoon region in Asia and the Pacific, which 
was known to him through his personal experiences’ (Haushofer et al., 1941: 26). His 
knowledge on Japanese history and culture was certainly extraordinary. According to 
Spang (2001), eleven out of his forty books in total were about Japan. In addition, 
Haushofer tried to develop close ties with notable Japanese political and military elites 
(Spang, 2006). If the claim that he was ‘the geopolitical advisor of Japan itself’ 
(Weigert, 1942: 738) was only some big talk about this old general who had an 
exhibitionistic disposition (Spang, 2006; Murphy, 1997), it was only because the 
vitality of Japan during the period, which fostered the country to subsequently expand 
its sphere of influence into the Pacific, attracted and inspired Haushofer to write the 
numerous works on in the country (Haushofer, 1942b; Weigert, 1942: 735). In this 
respect, German geopolitics already contained certain Japanese elements before it 
travelled (back) to Japan (Spang, 2001, 2006). The Japanese influence on Haushofer, 
in a similar vein to the German influence on Watsuji mentioned in the last chapter, 
highlights the creativity, the inward-character of knowing, and the entanglement of 
reception, which undermines the premise of the addresser-receptor binary in terms of 
power-knowledge relations.  
     It is safe to conclude this brief observation by claiming that, from the pragmatic 
analysis of Ratzel to the idealistic affirmation of Haushofer, studies by all three 
geopoliticians had accentuated Japan’s distinctive geography. For them, it was 
geography that made Japan the sole non-Western empire in the period. Despite this 
consensus, however, each scholar perceived a different reality in their slightly 
different spatio-temporal frames. In Ratzel’s works, geography allowed him to 
standardise his analytical frame and see Japan from a less racial point of view. For 
Kjellén, on the contrary, the same geography provided him with a biased standpoint 
that may be close to a classical geopolitician’s in our understanding today. Finally, for 
Haushofer, geography was the means to explain differences between peoples. Despite 
the divergence, all three European scholars used geographical factors to explain 
Japanese people’s peculiarity.  
     Most of the geopolitical studies above were believed to have been read by Japanese 
scholars. As discussed in the last section, it was a question of self-identity, rather than 
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the scrutiny of others, that dominated Japan’s intellectual situation in the first half of 
the twentieth century, as the Japanese found themselves having already ‘surpassed’ 
European modernity from their point of view. This was accompanied by their pride in 
their geographical characteristics that had not only been protecting them from external 
invasion, but also allowing them to import foreign knowledge selectively from all 
around the world, empowering them accordingly with a sense of ‘being the chosen 
race’. But by whom were they chosen, if they had no God? Moreover, as discussed in 
the preceding chapters, their method of thinking was subjectivist and context-
dependent, which might be called a ‘constructivism’ in contrast to Cartesian 
objectivism. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the works of the European 
geopoliticians appealed to the ego of Japanese people. Naturally, then, Japanese 
scholars began their own geopolitical investigation from the consideration of their own 
state, rather than from analyses of international affairs and other surrounding states.  
 
5.4. The First Application of Geopolitics in Japan  
The year 1924 was a watershed for international politics in the Pacific. Before the 
Immigration Act of 1924, existing nationality laws in the United States had already 
excluded immigration from any Asian country except Japan and the Philippines. With 
the 1924 Immigration Act, all those born in the geographically defined ‘Asiatic Barred 
Zone’ (Office of the Historian, the U.S. Department of the State) were banned from 
emigrating to America. From the first decade of the last century, tension in the Pacific 
was increasing as Japan carried out expansionist policies in China, whilst hatred 
against Asians heightened in the West Coast of the Unites States. Because the Japanese 
government had complied with the Gentleman’s Agreement in 1908 whereby it 
offered voluntary restraint of immigrants, the enactment of the Immigration Act was 
accepted as a violation which ‘could subvert the justifiable self-esteem of the Japanese 
people in Japan because the ban undermined Japan’s voluntary effort to abide by the 
agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1924: 11). Aydin (2007) argues that this 
became the decisive reason Japan and Japanese people felt that their Western and 
modern identity was rejected. Ōkawa Shūmei, a renowned socialist intellectual who 
was later prosecuted in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, had already 
started to argue for a ‘clash of civilization thesis’ during this period (Aydin, 2007: 
151-153), which came to overwhelm the intellectual atmosphere in wartime Japan.  
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     Iimoto Nobuyuki’s article, published a year later in 1925, was a challenging 
application of geopolitics that aimed to make a rebuttal against this move made by the 
United States. If scholars of classical geopolitics shared a tradition of imperialism, 
neo-Lamarckian white supremacism, and Cartesian cogito rationalism (Ó Tuathail, 
1996b: 21-23), Iimoto’s case study, which however drew on geopolitics, was in 
opposition to all of them. In order to reversely use geopolitics, he interrogated the 
substance of the organism rather than the boundary, by relying on the concept of the 
state as a living organism and Lebensraum. Through Haushofer, he claimed that 
geopolitics was ‘a study on political Lebensform in a natural Lebensraum’ (Iimoto, 
1928: 91), and developed a unique variation of environmental determinism. Whilst 
European geographers used geography to explain the traits of a particular race, Iimoto 
read geopolitical theory inductively and tried to think what kind of people geography 
would construct, rather than looking for a causal factor of certain ethnic 
characteristics. This transposed mode of inquiry, which evidently contained the 
problem of induction in spite of the egalitarian outlook, would come to be widely 
shared among Japanese geopoliticians especially during the Pacific War, allowing 
them to claim the justice of their new world order.  
 
Inclusive Geopolitics? 
Having studied mineralogy and geography at Tokyo Imperial University (Asami, 
1990), Iimoto was a central figure in Japanese geopolitics till 1945. He was dispatched 
to Germany by the Ministry of Education, and met Haushofer in 1936 (Okada, 2002). 
He deeply committed himself to the founding of the Japanese Geopolitics Association. 
Still, he was not a wholehearted supporter of geopolitics. Pointing out that geopolitics 
placed a disproportionate emphasis on foreign policy, he criticised that geopolitics 
could become a weapon of imperialism (Abe, 1933: 15). His fundamental concern was 
the ‘exclusivity of others’, which outweighed ‘inclusivity’, in modern history—a 
lamentable reality of human nature for Iimoto. The ‘organism’ in his article obviously 
referred not to the state, but to a group based on race (Iimoto, 1925a, 1925b, 1926). 
At a glance, this conflict between European geopolitics and his ‘liberal’ view was 
irredeemable. 
     At the outset of the article, Iimoto asserted that despite the fact that there were at 
least four racial categories, any racial conflict to our attention seemed to be limited 
within the struggles of coloured races against the white race. From his point of view, 
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whilst the coloured races plainly claimed social equality, the white race was opposed 
to it and oppressed the coloured races, reflecting the inevitable human necessity to 
expand his Lebensraum in order to sustain his life. Then he went on to claim that 
geopolitics was ‘the scholarship that examines the relation between political power 
and space’. What he was interested in was a ‘fair filling of space’ among diversified 
political powers (1925a: 18-22). This fairness for Iimoto could not have meant ‘the 
survival of the strongest’ as neo-Lamarckian geopolitics had claimed (Ó Tuathail, 
1996b), since he was trying to protect the weak. In search for an inclusive geopolitics, 
he employed geographical determinism to address the question: What kind of people 
could a specific geography form? In contrast to the European understanding of 
geographical determinism, which used geography as a factor to explain certain traits 
in certain race(s), Iimoto argued that it was this European discourse that precisely 
constructed the ‘inferior colonial others’ through colonialism, an experience to which 
many Asian countries could relate. He illustrated with the rise of anti-Chinese 
immigrant sentiments in San Francisco, reasoning that it was due to the fact that 
Chinese immigrants worked more effectively than white workers—the Chinese, most 
of whom from the semitropical zone along the Chinese coastal line where the average 
temperature was much higher than in San Francisco, had a better tolerance for hot 
climate than white people. For Iimoto, the trait of the Chinese people was understood 
as nothing but a fortune endowed by their environment. However, he observed, the 
fortunes of the Earth were not distributed properly, and this issue should be rectified 
by attesting the righteousness of geopolitics.   
     Thus, in Iimoto’s analysis, geography came to be not just a cause but rather a 
dynamic determining factor which however had a volatile tendency. He argued that 
once the state as an organism finished filling a space by ‘laying down’ its roots in the 
land, it would gain mobility as the people were able to overcome geographical 
conditionality, which had been rapidly transformed since the previous century. This 
mobility, however, was not directly derived from the condition of geography, but 
depended on the ‘art of conquering space’ by the people. The coloured races in the 
Pacific had acquired this art in the course of globalisation. Therefore, the unfair 
occupations of space must be rectified (Iimoto, 1925a). For him, it was not the strong 
that determined the distribution of space. Rather, the right distribution was mutually 
determined through the interaction between people and their geographical condition. 
Despite the employment of geographical determinism and the organismic concept of 
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the state, Iimoto’s argument did not partake of the essence of a conventional Social 
Darwinism, but was ostensibly much closer to the original idea of the survival of the 
fittest.  
     Conceiving the organism as mobile, divisible and even transmittable like bacteria, 
Iimoto emphasised the specific disposition of people nurtured in a particular 
geographical condition. ‘The art of conquering space’ was, for him, acquired as people 
lived in a space long enough to accustom themselves to the environment. The 
expansion of the state was the result of this historical mutuality between the 
environment and people, and not that of the struggles among organisms. This means 
that the winner was determined by the environment, not by battles and clashes, and 
that there would only be winners, not losers, as everyone could become a winner in 
the course of adjusting themselves to the environment. This diversified way of 
conceiving of relations (Qin, 2016: 12) was what made Iimoto’s determinism different 
from conventional geopolitics. Although the elements that composed the theory were 
the same, the answer to ‘what was determined by what or whom’ became different in 
the end under Iimoto’s line of inductive reasoning. To a certain extent, inductive 
reasoning was, as Hirakawa Sukehiro (2006: 31) has claimed, a typical ‘reaction seen 
not only in Japan but in non-Western countries in general when those countries 
encountered the superior technologies of Western Civilisation’. What made this 
interpretation particularly Japanese was that power according to the interpretation 
served for everyone and was not someone’s possession, as I have explained in chapters 
2 and 3. For the Japanese, geography was powerful because it carried a discretion of 
power. Moreover, this discretion was decisive not because geography was static and 
objective, but because geographical conditions were indeterminate in nature. Iimoto 
believed that geography was the factor that decided who was the fittest in the Pacific 
at that particular point of history, and that the fittest would never be ensured an 
impregnable position since geography was always changing.  
     In his observation, examples that supported his argument were everywhere in the 
Pacific region. Black Americans, for instance, had acclimated themselves to the new 
land after numerous hardships, their quality of life improved due to their efforts 
(Iimoto, 1925a). Each people was characterised by their own specific features 
endowed by their respective geographical conditions. Therefore, space had to be 
properly distributed according to different people’s acquired art of living. The fittest 
could occupy the space not because it was strong, but because they were destined to 
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be eligible for the occupation according to their ever-changing environmental 
condition and themselves.  
     Needless to say, for Iimoto, Japan itself was the most compelling vindication of 
this reasoning. He asserted that Japanese immigration to the United States began with 
a demand from the West Coast homesteads after the labour shortage derived from the 
ban of Chinese immigrants in 1882; the Japanese migrated to the United States due to 
the increasing demand of labour power in the country, not because of their own will 
(Iimoto, 1925b: 964). While by then the Japanese had already been expanding their 
sphere of living, Iimoto saw it as a proof of Japanese people’s vitality rather than 
Japan’s population issue. Geography was, for him, a gift, rather than a constraint, 
bestowed upon Japan.  
     Iimoto’s opinion of geography as bearing an overriding influence on humans could 
be seen as a variance of geographical determinism bolstered by a unique optimism—
Every race has its own art of living nurtured in each unique land. Hence, each people 
must have their proper place. Above all, people, who live in a blessed geography, 
could become powerful even if it is not the result of their own will, but of geography. 
In this respect, a particular group of people’s success depends on geography, or 
Erdgebundenheit according to Iimoto, which might be translated as ‘spatial 
conditionality’.7 Emphasising the art of living on the one hand, and attributing the 
discretion of power to geography on the other, he conceptualised the result of the 
interactions between people and geography as ‘the golden mean’ (chūyō)8 (Iimoto, 
1928: 96-98). Indeed, the coloured races in the Pacific, including the Japanese, were 
the blessed effect of this interaction. Here, we can observe several differences between 
Iimoto’s geographical determinism with conventional determinism: First of all, there 
is no loser since all people are on the same trajectory, only that they are endowed with 
different goals by their respective environments; second, Iimoto emphasised 
historicity; third, geography is the agent rather than a determinant; and therefore, 
fourth, each people has a proper role according to the compatibility of their 
environment.  
    Iimoto claimed that the United States had closed its door despite this vitality of the 
coloured people authorised by their environment. Worse still, Australia, who was the 
                                                
7 This term is from German geopolitics. See the next section.  
8 Zhongyong, a concept originated from China. For a detailed discussion on this concept, see Qin 
(2016).  
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most vigorous opponent of Japan’s Racial Equality Proposal at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1918, was ‘passively protesting’ against the coloured races, ‘fearing the 
collapse of the world for the white race’. They did not see the ‘truth’ of racial conflict. 
The Europeans, who had been fearing the Yellow Peril, had never looked back upon 
their White Peril. Thus, the Japanese were responsible for the solution of this in justice. 
Iimoto believed that Japan had ‘a destiny’ to rectify it for all the coloured races, and 
this destiny was backed by its unique geography and allowed Japan to ‘know the truth’ 
so to speak (Iimoto, 1926: 47-60). Japan represented the ‘natural order’, while the 
Western order was ‘unnatural’ (Satō, 2005: 110). Still, despite the superficial idealistic 
character, it should be noted that the inclusiveness of this belief contained a 
hierarchical division of labour among peoples in terms of their progress and status. 
 
Classical, Critical, or Neoclassical?   
Accusing the white race of their tyranny and arguing instead for the solidarity of races, 
his belief was ostensibly similar to critical geopolitics today. For Iimoto, ‘the truth’ 
was an alternative of the improper status quo. However, it is not only the similarity I 
want to stress here. The graver question is how we envisage intellectual history when 
it cuts across several traditions and/or regions. Following Bassin (2004: 621), Stefano 
Guizzini (2012: 17) terms the recent rise of geopolitics ‘neoclassical geopolitics’, 
which for Guizzini is a revival of environmental determinism ‘best understood in the 
context of several foreign policy identity crises, a kind of “ontological security”’ 
(ibid.: 3). At the same time, he points out that both classical and neoclassical 
geopolitics are not for everybody. In contemporary Germany and Sweden—indeed 
paradoxically in terms of the history of classical geopolitics—‘geopolitical thought 
remained basically a dead letter’ (ibid.: 16). In this respect, the Germans and the 
Swedes do not have ‘neoclassical’ but only ‘classical’ geopolitics, whilst many states 
perhaps have only ‘neo’. However, is ‘neoclassical’ geopolitics still ‘neo’ without 
having the ‘classical’ bit? Indeed, in Japan, geopolitics in its most classical sense is 
only becoming increasingly a buzz word recently (cf. Mogi, 2015; Funahashi, 2016).9 
                                                
9 The International Geopolitical Institute Japan, whose members include politicians and retired self-
defense officials, was established in 2011. It is interesting to note that it is the Anglo-American 
geopoliticians, such as Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman, not German ones, who are gaining popularity 
in contemporary Japan, with a few translations of their works (e.g. Mackinder 2008; Spykman, 2008; 
Asada, 2015) being continuously republished.     
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Differently put, in Japan it is possible to argue that ‘critical’ geopolitics emerged 
decades before ‘classical’ or even ‘neoclassical’ geopolitics. In contrast, critical 
geopolitics has confined its inquiry largely within Western contexts (Slater, 1993, 
1994; Sidaway, 1997; Sharp, 2011; Atkinson and Dodds, 2000; Dodds, 2001; Hepple, 
2001). To put it straightforwardly, the reason critical geopolitics has not been widely 
accepted could be that, for the Japanese, critical geopolitics might have been perceived 
not as something new, but rather as something dubious in reference to their wartime 
experience. If this is true, critical geopolitics is nothing but a Western critical 
geopolitics, and by extrapolation, Japanese geopolitics in the second quarter of the 
twentieth century was neither critical nor neoclassical in today’s sense, but could only 
be correctly understood in the specific spatio-temporal context in which Japan was 
located.  
     Therefore, Japan’s organismic theory of the state and geographical determinism 
were, following Iizuka (1935-36: 80-85), neither ‘Darwinism’ as in English, nor 
‘Darwinisme’ as in French, nor ‘Darwinismus’ as in German, but Dāwinizumu in 
Japanese. They would also be developed into core components of Japanese geopolitics 
subsequently in the second analytical period I proposed. As I have demonstrated, this 
ecological fatalism was already evident in Iimoto’s argument, which insisted that 
different peoples could develop differently, for the reality was a contingent historical 
integration of possibility and necessity between land and people via the mediation of 
environmental conditions. In such a conceptualisation, however, this difference 
among peoples was justifiable because it was each people’s fate (Kōyama, 1940). For 
this Japanese variety of determinism, the truth was a matter of consonance between 
people and geography, in which geography apparently had the last word. Therefore, 
Japanese geopolitics examined the spirituality and morality—rather than the physical 
strength or adaptability to the environment—of the state as an organism. For Japanese 
geopoliticians, it was Japan who represented this spiritual power of geography, since 
it was endowed by a fortunate geographical condition paralleled by no other states. As 
a corollary, the application of Japanese geopolitics developed in two notable 
directions. The first put stress on ‘subjective truth’ rather than on objective science. 
This truth was however governed by geography despite the subjectivity. The second 
direction tried to reject existing classifications such as race, ethnicity, nation, region, 
and culture. Instead, as the next chapter will explain, it would go on to develop its own 
typology.          
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     Also to be demonstrated in the next chapter is that the state as organism was 
depicted in Japanese geopolitics as a continuous growth of an organic-aggregate body, 
in which the strong and the weak in concert performed their respective and ‘proper’ 
roles based on their place endowed by their geographical conditions. This organic-
aggregate body of the state was neither a single entity nor a unit of one species (cf. 
Bassin, 1987), but a peaceful, transcendental agglomeration that gave each people a 
proper place as part of its organism. As such, this Japanese justification of state 
expansion had no boundaries, only a concentric and relational structure. It gave rise to 
the potentialities to render the world as literally one, under the leadership of the 
Japanese as the most progressive mixed race and hence the brain of the ever-growing 
organic entity beyond the nation-state. Importantly, the theory argued that the 
Japanese were progressive because they were the vindication of the progress as well 
as the evolution of human being. The Japanese only happened to occupy the leading 
position because of Japan’s fortunate geographical condition. In this respect, the centre 
was fundamentally a replaceable place for them.  
     This worldview was radically different from the prevailing European 
understanding in the early twentieth century of the international arena as a jungle of 
competing state organisms (Bassin, 1987; Agnew, 2003). In fact, for Japanese 
geopoliticians, Darwinism was a mere ‘illusion’ (Komaki 1942: 99). In their rhetoric, 
the West, which tended to be more narrowly defined as Anglo-America, was strictly 
speaking not their enemy, because what they were fighting against was not the people, 
but the Anglo-American way of thinking that had occupied the centre of the world at 
that point. For the Japanese, the West would become their friend only if they could 
accept the alternative logic arguing that the evolving organic ideal could include 
possible differences. In other words, the mission of the Japanese was to let the 
Europeans realise the truth.  
 
5.5. European Geopolitics as Travelling Theory 
This section reviews to what extent Dāwinizumu, the Japanese version of Social 
Darwinism, was a creation of Japanese scholars. The best way to do this is to compare 
the writings in Japanese with the German originals. However, due to the lack of my 
language proficiency in German, here I mainly rely on the theoretical debate published 
in Japan and the United States during the first half of the twentieth century, the 
translated versions of the German originals, and contemporary research on classical 
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geopolitics. This inquiry is essential because German geopolitics, specifically the one 
developed in Weimar Germany, has until now rarely been squarely examined within 
Anglophone critical literature, with the exception of some notable works (e.g. Heske, 
1987; Kost 1989; Murphy, 1997, 1999). In addition, critical geopolitics, with its 
emphasis on discourse, tends to deal with the representation of German geopolitics in 
the American political discourse, rather than looking into what it really was (Ó 
Tuathail, 1996b).  
     The centrality of the concept of the state as a living organism in classical 
geopolitics is best represented in this question: What is the difference between 
geopolitics and political geography? was probably the biggest theoretical debate 
among geopoliticians in Germany (Murphy, 1997) and in Japan, one which however 
did not produce any satisfactory answer. In Germany, even though no explicit 
conclusion was found regarding this debate among the circle of editors of the 
Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (Haushofer et al., 1941), a certain implicit consensus seemed 
to have nonetheless existed in both countries: Geopolitics was ‘dynamic’, whilst 
political geography was ‘static’ (Ishibashi, 1930; Abe, 1933; Haushofer et.al., 1941; 
Iwata, 1942; Kruszewski, 1940; see also Murphy, 1997).  
     Geographical determinism and the organismic concept of the state have been in the 
firing line in geopolitical debates. They have offered a ‘very specific appeal’ for 
nationalists here and there on the globe, even in this remote Asian state called Japan, 
because it ‘appreciated how effectively it could help the popular imagination 
transform a national construct into a desired vision of the nation as a natural and 
eternal or primordial entity’ (Bassin, 2007: 18; see also Agnew and Muscarà, 2012: 
14). Following Bassin (2007), the two became more powerful when linked to national 
historiography. However, as Iizuka (1942-43: 206) had already pointed out in the past, 
the organismic concept of the state itself was a manifold conception conjuring up a 
variety of images. This indeterminable character of this conception and therefore the 
geographical determinism was what afforded a space of creation in the history of 
geopolitical theory. In what follows, I will briefly explain the evolution of the concept 
in geopolitics, discussing particularly the kind of social situation in which the three 
European geopoliticians developed the theory.  
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Ratzel 
Ratzel’s original conception asserted that the state, like a creature, had its own ‘living 
space’ (Lebensraum) that had to be incessantly expanded. Inspired by Darwinism, he 
conceived of the growth of the state as the domination by the strong over the weak. 
However, largely forgotten was that in his theorisation, the state as a living organism 
was ‘ein aussserst unvollkommener Organismus’ (a very incomplete organism) 
(Obara, 1936: 279), which possibly continued to live even after it had lost a large part 
of its land. This somewhat immoderate theorising from our viewpoint today reflected 
how Ratzel tried to situate human organisation in the natural environment in order to 
understand something dwelling deep in people’s mind. That is, he sought a rational 
explanation (natural law) for something ostensibly irrational and even spiritual (the 
state) (Iizuka, 1942-43: 211-212; Iizuka, 1935-1936). Inevitably, the concept became 
literal rather than metaphorical (Bassin, 1987a; Murphy, 1997: l.326). In doing so, he 
contributed ‘to reorganising political geography as a science that studies distribution 
and expansion of human’ (Iizuka, 1935-1936: 94).    
     According to Ratzel’s theory, all state-related phenomena, such as politics, 
economics, and even wars, have to be understood as natural (Iizuka, 1942-43: 216). 
The evolution is subject to biological law and is not the result of rational choice by its 
people. However tragic and irrational it may be, any result of these phenomena is 
according to universal law determined by the state’s environmental conditions. The 
state never escapes from physical land and is always embedded in it, and is destined 
not only to expansion but also the ultimate death. Geographical conditions hold 
ascendency over history (Yoshimura, 1933). Differently put, it is in geography that 
people find a ‘rational’ explanation to the enigmatic life of the state. Humans are seen 
as fundamentally passive (Iizuka, 1935-36: 76) in this ‘scientific’ functionalist-
materialist view that analysed the state as a ‘physical space’ (Ezawa, 1944: 5). This 
theorisation is better understood as a contrast to social organism theory which opposed 
modern individualism (Iizuka, 1935-1936: 125; Bassin, 1987a, 1987b: 116-117). In 
this context, Ratzel’s theory was not racial (Smith, 1980; Bassin, 1987a, 1987b; Halas, 
2014); rather, it has no room for politics (Kost, 1989: 371), nor historicity (Kōyama, 
1940), nor even locality (Durkheim, 1898-99 in Iizuka, 1935-36: 88-89). In Iizuka’s 
words, Ratzel’s aspiration was ‘the longitudinal integration over the living world 
indicated by evolution theory’ (Iizuka, 1947: 367; see also Watanuki, 1942).  
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     For both German and Japanese geopoliticians who lived decades later, this 
Ratzelian political geography was seen as a theory that observed static conditions 
(Iimoto, 1926). On the other hand, Iizuka, who was critical of geopolitics, claimed that 
Ratzel’s theory was in fact ‘dynamic’. This disagreement suggests a difference in the 
referents induced largely by historical contextual differences: As stated above, whilst 
many geopoliticians’ interest was in the state as society, Ratzel’s object of analysis 
was in land itself, as something embracing human society and possibly the state. In 
this particular perspective, geographical conditions were understood as dynamic 
constraints to human action (Iizuka, 1944: 324), and it was this misunderstanding that 
slightly but fundamentally diverged Kjellén’s conceptualisation of state as a living 
organism from Ratzel’s. 
    
Kjellén 
Bassin (1987b: 117) has identified another aspect of Ratzel’s determinism: Under the 
influence of Carl Ritter, Ratzel saw ‘physical environment as a molding influence on 
the character and development of human society’. Kjellén’s organismic theory, 
borrowing mostly this aspect but not the ‘purely biological’ idea from Ratzel, 
belonged to the tradition of social organism theory, whose concern was on society. 
This was because Kjellén’s theory was, as he himself had put it, for the purpose of 
answering the ‘lack of our science’ (Kjellén, 1936: 21; see also Iizuka, 1942-43: 187), 
in complete contrast to Ratzel’s aspiration of geography as a science. As a politician, 
Kjellén looked for a proper explanation for the everyday reality of (European) 
international relations he and his contemporaries were facing. At the outset of Der 
Staat als Lebensform (1917), the work that earned him most popularity in Japan during 
this period, he defined the aim of the book as revealing the substance of the state 
empirically. In other words, his object of study was the state as a power holder as 
clearly seen in the title, rather than the state as a geographical entity.  
     For Kjellén, the state was metaphorised as a person with a ‘Janus-like’, ‘two-sided’ 
face. Whilst its domestic legal and institutional aspects had been well examined, its 
international aspect as a historic and social entity constructed through interactions 
among nations had not. Accordingly, he asserted, existing approaches in the coeval 
Staatslehre (political science) had left the state ‘in the air’ without discussing its 
relation to geography. Whilst those approaches could explain how the state functioned 
domestically, they were of little use in explaining international relations, a growing 
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concern of his era. He illustrated with news article titles such as ‘voracious Russia’, 
‘vengeful France’, ‘Paris is talking with Berlin, while London is listening’, and so on, 
talking about states as if they were persons—an aspect of the state which he termed 
mächte (power) (Kjellén, 1936: 3-17; Haggman, 1998), which is the state as 
Lebensform. The expansion of Lebensraum depended on the quality of this 
Lebensform, i.e. the quality of the state as ‘überindiviuelle Lebewesen’ (super-
individual being) (Kjellén, 1936: 31; Mattusch, 1942; Kruszewski, 1940).  
     As Fujisawa (1925) had praised, the ‘novelty’ of Kjellén’s theory was that it 
explained ‘our everyday and practical experience’ of the state as a phenomenon. In 
Kjellén’s own words, through geopolitics he wanted to consider the ‘spiritual depth’ 
of ‘the enigma of the state’—which for him was far deeper than ‘geographical science’ 
could reach (Kjellén, 1936: 20-21; Ogawa, 1928). That is, he relied on Ratzel’s 
concept to address the same question as he did though in a very different way. Ratzel, 
who was twenty years older than Kjellén, believed that evolution made people realise 
all things (including humans) are part of nature. By contrast, for Kjellén, it was 
difference among humans that differentiated the Great Powers from other states. 
Consequently, environmental determinism in Kjellén’s work became very close to 
what we understand today, asserting the survival of the strongest instead of the fittest 
(cf. Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 22-23). It was claimed to be a dynamic theory because it 
emphasised the will of the state as a Lebensform, whose power was assumed to be 
designated by the state’s geographical condition. Kjellén regarded the state as an 
‘organic individual’ with an ‘autotelic personality’ (Kjellén, 1936: 32), but in such a 
theorisation geography was treated as static in contrast to Ratzel’s theory. Therefore, 
despite the emphasis on geography, the state seemed to be paradoxically detached 
from the environment.        
 
Haushofer   
To a certain extent, the state as living organism was marginalised in Haushofer’s 
geopolitics, even though the concept was claimed to be a component of the theory. 
According to Murphy (1997: l.2599), many German geopoliticians actually tried to 
seek ways to escape geodeterminism. The reason for this inconsistent marginalisation 
can be discerned when we consider Haushofer’s aim of studying geopolitics. 
Flourished in the Weimar Period, German geopolitics was faced with the task of 
addressing the issue about the land Germany had lost in the First World War. In order 
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to avoid further tragedies, and hopefully to take back the land, the livelihood of the 
Germans had to be reestablished on a concrete foundation. However, the territory lost 
was no longer part of the state, and it was difficult to depict it as an integrated 
personality like Kjellén had posited. Instead, Haushofer insisted that geopolitics was 
the study on ‘Lebensform in a natural Lebensraum’ (Haushofer et al., 1941), which 
rendered his study fundamentally ethnographic rather than strategic. Accordingly, the 
state as organism came to be envisaged as a group of humans, or Volk, rather than a 
single person. Bluntly put, borders had to be dynamic in German geopolitics.  
     Living in a state that had lost the First World War, Haushofer’s ambition was to 
predict a better future for his peers and compatriots. This was well reflected in 
Bausteine zur Geopolitik (Principles of Geopolitics, 1928), which he co-wrote with 
other editors of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik. As Obara Keishi (1936: 302-303) 
summarised concisely, the work had three main focuses: the state as an organism; 
geographical determinism in relation to Erdgebundenheit; and the practical role of 
geopolitics as a guideline in leading political actions. In Obara’s interpretation, there 
was no logical connection between the first and second focuses (i.e. between the 
organismic concept of the state and geographical determinism), for they existed only 
to justify the third principle. This discrepancy as well as ambition was evidenced in 
this claim of Haushofer: ‘There rarely exists an objective fact in geopolitics’ 
(Haushofer, 1943: 543). This was obviously in contradiction with conventional 
geographical determinism. In addition, he asserted that geopolitics was about techne 
(art) (Haushofer et al., 1941: 61). Whilst setting up the hurdles by emphasising 
geographical conditionality, he on the other hand asserted that the conditionality was 
surmountable by arguing for subjectivity. Haushofer wanted this dubious argument to 
become a fulfilled prophecy, since the wish of the Germans during the period was the 
change of territorial borders (Murphy, 1997). He also claimed that he wanted to 
educate the people, particularly the workers rather than the state elites (Haushofer et 
al. 1941: 70-71).   
     His prediction for a better future would be reliable only when it could ratify the 
existence of a special bond between a specific land and a people somewhere else on 
this planet. Here, it should be noted that for Haushofer, Germany was by his time no 
longer a great power. In his own assertion geopolitics was a comprehensive science 
‘to retain the state in its space that has already existed from long ago for visionary 
Völker’, a point that explained why he limited the field of his geopolitical investigation 
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to the region of ‘monsoon Asia and space of pacific’ (Haushofer et al., 1941: 26). It 
could never happen to the ‘best democracy’, stated he, that ‘only a few rich people in 
the imperial great powers’ could supress ‘peoples in monsoon region’, the ‘Germans’, 
and ‘Near Eastern people’ (Haushofer et al., 1941: 73). On the contrary, Haushofer 
found in the Pacific the ideal bond between people and land, which could attest to the 
righteousness of his prediction. The Japanese was the visionary Völker. As briefly 
introduced in the last section, the Pacific was for Haushofer a space where people 
enjoyed a long-lasting peace in contrast to the Atlantic, and Japan, which was still 
independent at that point and was about to drive the Anglo-Saxons out of the Pacific, 
was the sole practitioner of the techne and utilized the geographical conditionality 
(Haushofer, 1943b). In this respect, Haushofer’s Volk is not an elusive concept, as has 
been assumed since he found his evidence in the coloured race of the Japanese, but an 
adjustable one (Obara 1936: 301).   
     Therefore, it is too facile to argue that geopolitics was an abuse of science by those 
who were not satisfied with the Treaty of Versailles (Iizuka, 1942-1943: 197-202; 
Bowman, 1942: 648). On the contrary, geopolitics, at least in Germany in the early 
twentieth century, came to be a theory that allowed its practitioners to bypass a 
scientific investigation, since it placed a blind faith on human will, which did not 
necessarily mean rationality, but could mean spirituality sometimes. For Haushofer’s 
geopolitics, what was important was the organic bond between land and people, rather 
than organism. Emphasising this bond, he saw geography as a subjective and unique 
projection whereby a people cultivated their own future by deliberately selecting 
environmental factors in accordance with their needs and wants. Geopolitics was in 
this way acknowledged to be an applied science that made his prediction possible so 
as to encourage the Germans to believe in a better future.   
     In this respect, Haushofer’s geopolitics was a bold ‘challenge to the objectivity of 
truth’ (Iizuka, 1946: 424). Or it was, ‘political metaphysics’ (Morgenthau, 1993: 179), 
or ‘pseudo-philosophy’ (Neumann, 1943: 285; see also Hagan, 1942). In our context 
today which sees the rise of post-positivism and the increasing questioning of the 
feasibility of plurality, it may even be considered by some that Haushofer’s 
subjectivism, together with Kjellén’s personified state, contains an implication for 
cosmopolitan and multi-national aspiration (Tunander, 2005). Haushofer’s subjective 
and ‘aesthetic’ turn could be attributed to a few reasons. First, in 1920s Germany, 
science was no longer something that could free humans from any enigma of life as it 
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had been for Ratzel. Murphy (1997: l.1233) points out that the turn of German 
geopolitics was not a reflection of its ‘nonrationalism’, but a ‘deliberate effort to 
incorporate the irrational in geopolitical thinking about the relationship between 
geography, humankind, and politics’. In doing so, it was asserted, human had to 
overcome science. Germany’s traumatic experiences ‘encouraged German academic 
geographers to turn away from earlier interests in physical and mathematical 
geography’ and ‘instead to cultivate more subjective branches of their field’ (see also 
Bassin, 1987b). Thus while science could be regarded as the magic word in early 
twentieth-century America, the same could not be said for Germany in the same 
period. 
    In the end, the power of geopolitics was not in its novelty but in its revisionist 
tendency, and Haushofer’s subjective turn was no exception. Kost (1989: 369; see also 
Smith, 1990) argues that German geopolitics in the twentieth century ‘only 
reinforce[d] patterns of thinking which have been a component of the German 
geography since the end of the 19th century’. Indeed, German geopolitics was nothing 
but uniquely German geopolitics. This may contradict Murphy’s point, but it means 
that the superficial novelty was accepted because it contained familiarity, and it is also 
appropriate at this point to be reminded of Japan’s influence on Haushofer (Spang, 
2000, 2007).     
     At the same time, German geopolitics was a product of Germany’s bitter rivalry 
with the United States. According to Iizuka (1946: 424), Haushofer’s claim to 
subjective truth should be better understood in the context of German aversion against 
Anglo-Saxon universalism, rather than as a mere political propaganda to unite their 
homeland. To be sure, for the Americans, Haushofer’s geopolitics appeared to have 
foreseen ‘the coming doom of the white race with fatalism and even with malicious 
joy’, as Hans Weigert (1942) put it. Haushofer’s discourse identified no ‘instinct of 
the unity of white race’ (Weigert, 1942: 735), which might strike the Americans as a 
curtain-raiser to the end of not only colonialism but also white supremacism. 10 
Theodore Roosevelt famously foretold that the start of the twentieth century was the 
period when a dawn of the Age of Pacific was anticipated. The Pacific Ocean was a 
                                                
10 Dower (1986: l.3503-3512) points out that American leaders during WWII believed that the Japanese 
and the Germans were trying to mobilise black Americans to demand for racial equality. Indeed, in the 
1930s, the Japanese did attempt to influence the opinions of the black population in the US. 
  160 
gigantic space waiting to be filled, heralding a new age of international politics. It was 
in this context that German geopolitics had a mythic effect in the United States.  
     Thus, as Werner Cahnman (1943: 56) had pointed out earlier, ‘no rigid 
geographical determinism is applied in geopolitics’. Geopolitics had ‘no singular 
form’ (Weigert, 1942: 733). Moreover, as seen in Haushofer, the emphasis was not 
always on the state and its materiality (cf. Dittmer, 2014). In short, geopolitics did not 
exist solely for the state. Classical geopolitics is readily equated with geographical 
determinism of the state in geopolitical debates today. It is geographical determinism, 
posited as the logical corollary of the concept of the state as living organism, that is 
considered to exercise the discursive power of the state. However, my arguments 
above also show that the way the two concepts are related was actually diverse. Thus, 
geographical determinism as a discourse is the product of indeterminate process(es), 
a large part of which are however neglected and therefore generate unsynthesisable 
cognitive voids that go on to facilitate other misunderstandings.  
     Returning to the first application in Japan, Iimoto’s assertion for a fair distribution 
of space in the Pacific was certainly an employment of Haushofer’s theory. However, 
the difference between the two is that in Iimoto’s discussion, the concept of the state 
as a living organism returned to the centre of discussion, emphasising the fatalistic 
element and even going beyond subjectivism. This point will be further clarified in 
the next chapter. With this chapter, what I want to draw attention to is this point: theory 
is always travelling, and a pair of seemingly analogous conceptions can in fact be 
significantly different. No two versions of geopolitics are the same, and the state can 
be conceived differently in each geographical community. Eventually, then, as the 
next chapter will demonstrate, Japanese geopolitics developed a very different 
projection of the state as a living organism, despite its supposed wholesale 
appropriation of Haushofer’s theory.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter studied the first period of Japan’s importation of geopolitics between 
1925 and 1936. This first application was in order to counter the racism that became 
increasingly hostile in the Pacific region. Iimoto, interested in the different ordering 
of space in the Pacific from the Atlantic, and relying on German geopolitics especially 
Haushofer’s work, argued for the fair reordering, rather than distribution, of global 
space. In Iimoto’s writing and inductive application of geopolitical theory, it was 
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geography that speaks truth, not the objective reality humans perceived in their 
environment. In his argument, Japan was the embodiment of the natural law that 
governed the Pacific. Despite the employment of German geopolitics, his argument 
was distinctively Japanese, underpinned by the site-specific practices nurtured in the 
community of experience to which he belonged. This can be clearly seen in his latent 
attribution of power, and assignment of agency, to geography. For him, geography is 
deterministic because it endows people with power. Two traits of Japanese geopolitics 
have been identified in this chapter. First, in Japan, it was Lebensform, rather than the 
well-known concept of Lebensraum, that inspired their geopolitical imagination. 
Second, this emphasis on content, rather than on boundaries, led Japanese people to 
believe in the righteousness of their expansionist policy, which was conceived as a 
regional and possibly global integration that would eventually dissolve the state 
system. Thus, in Japan, geopolitics was interpreted in a unique ecological fatalism 
with an idealistic character. As Iimoto (1928: 92) claimed, in Japan, ‘the task of 
geopolitics’ was ‘to acknowledge the political ideal embodied by the existence of the 
state’.  
   Another important claim of this chapter is that theory is in fact always travelling 
both temporally and spatially, even within Europe. The geopolitical theory of the state 
as a living organism was transformed as it travelled from Ratzel in Germany to Kjellén 
in Sweden and then back to Haushofer in Germany. In the process, Ratzel’s 
determinism was significantly altered according to each context, and through this 
process, the concept of the state as a living organism became ‘a thick signifier’ 
(Huysmans, 1998: 228) in which various meanings were articulated in accordance 
with each site-specific understanding of power relations. However, it was difficult to 
detect such substantial mutation, because the concept was claimed to be applied 
affirmative in each site. This ostensibly invisible transformation of the concept is 
better understood as ‘an adjustment of the way of looking at a problem’ (Maruyama, 
1978: 332-33) therefore tends to be forgotten later.  
     Certainly, the transformation of geopolitics was a continuous myth-making process 
‘or imaginative economy around geopolitics-as-object (a concept, but also a focus of 
desire)’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 114). However, this mythologisation of geopolitics was 
complicated, despite the simplicity of the myth on the surface. This complexity was 
the fruit of a chain of misunderstandings, wilful creations, and convenient oblivions 
of several groups of peoples in different spatio-temporal situations. The 
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miscomprehensions remained unaware among the practitioners of geopolitics, and 
they even facilitated further misunderstandings, but these are no excuses to continue 
ignoring the complexity of such myth.  
  163 
6  Japanese Geopolitics 
 
Thus the unorthodox theories of the 
past become the commonly accepted 
ideas of the present; yesterday’s 
eccentric notions become today’s 
common knowledge. Therefore the 
unorthodox views of today will most 
certainly become the common ideas 
and theories of the future. 
 
—Fukuzawa Yukichi, An Outline of a 
Theory of Civilization (2009: 15)11 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates how the Japanese developed their own geopolitics from the 
mid-1930s to 1945, the second analytical period I have devised for this thesis. This 
geopolitics came to be called Daitōa Chiseigaku (Greater East Asia geopolitics), 
taking a pivotal role in the academic debate on the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere (GEACPS) at the time. In this second period, geopolitics offered Japan a 
subjectivity to face off against the Western world order. Japanese geopolitics argued 
that the region (rather than the state) as a living organism—a peaceful polity 
originating from the peaceful history in Asia—was awaken by the intrusion of the 
white race. It was believed that a new regionalism emerging in the Pacific was destined 
to supplant the European modern state system to attain a more peaceful world order. 
By doing so, Japanese geopolitics developed an ecological fatalism instead of 
environmental determinism. This ecological fatalism asserted that Japan, because it 
was endowed with a rare felicitous combination of geography and people, had a 
mission to change the Eurocentric world order.  
     Daitōa Chiseigaku, which analysed almost solely Japan and its surrounding region 
by inductively applying geopolitical theories, was fundamentally supported by 
popular imagination, as it evocatively argued for people’s form of living (Lebensform) 
in a specific geographical space. The present thesis does not aim to provide evidence 
that the government of the Japanese Empire abused geopolitics. Instead, it supports 
the recent argument about the performative nature of imaginative geographies in 
security discourse (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007), and shows that the efficacy of 
                                                
11 This is taken from an English translation. The original was published in 1875.  
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geopolitics was that it helped a certain type of policies make sense, rather than help 
creating them. The idea of the GEACPS attracted a broad support from the political 
left and the right, contributing to ‘a remarkable consensus after a long political 
confusion’ which eventually led Japan to the Second World War (Takeyama, 1985: 
131; see also Samuels, 2007). The evanescent assemblage, in which Japan saw the 
Japanese political subjectivity as independent from Western domination, emerged out 
of numerous contact points between multiple elements to make sense of knowledge in 
the local context, automatically identifying the law that the people followed. Although 
the knowledge looked novel, it actually contained familiarity, and moreover was 
inflected in the process of knowing. An important part of the inflection rested on the 
subconscious, creating an unsynthesisable realm between the original and the 
interpretation. Despite this subtlety, the conversion of knowledge became salient when 
it was turned into a geopolitical imagination, as this chapter will demonstrate. In this 
way, geopolitics, which was of European origin, paradoxically fostered the 
transformation of modern Japan’s identity in world politics, from one that saw itself 
as part of the West to one as part of the East, eventually enabling Japan to fight against 
the ideal of the West. 
     This development will be attested by three approaches. First, I will introduce the 
example of tenkō (ideological reversal, conversion)12 of a scholar from European 
political theories to Japanese geopolitics, so as to explicate how a hidden standpoint 
of the knowledge recipient, the internal structure of one person’s thought however 
embedded in a community, contributed to the devotion of geopolitics. For this 
discussion, I will introduce the work of Rōyama Masamichi (1895-1980). He 
established the Shōwa Kenkyūkai in 1933, which was an influential political think 
tank for Premier Konoe and proposed the idea of the East Asia Cooperative 
Community (which would be developed into the GEACPS later). Rōyama was elected 
into the House of Representatives in 1942, and purged from public service in 1948.13 
My choice of using Rōyama is justifiable not just by his prestigious political position 
but also his fame as a liberal socialist who had consistently pursued the ideal of 
                                                
12 Tenkō is a Japanese term originally indicating the ideological reversal of socialists. Many of them 
became a nationalist who supported the Emperor system. It first came into use when the socialists 
renounced their political belief under the implementation of the Public Security Preservation Law in 
1925. However, the term has been widely used in the post-war period. See for example Tenkō: 
Kyōdōkenkyū (Shisō no Kagaku Kenkyūkai, 1960).     
13 However, the purge was lifted in the following year. 
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democratic coexistence both domestically and internationally throughout his academic 
career (Matsuzawa, 1962). It is this liberal profile of his that suggested a typical 
tendency among academics who were devoted to Daitōa Chiseigaku. Rōyama’s idea 
of geopolitical regionalism was an idealistic cosmopolitan alternative to European 
power politics. In his employment of geopolitics, he was guided by intuition and 
emotion as a Japanese person, rather than by erudite and external reasons to defend 
Japan’s national interests.  
     Second, I will discuss a Japanese geopolitician’s theorisation on especially space 
and taxonomy, in an effort to understand how a different epistemic tradition mutates 
theory. For this, I rely on Ezawa Jōji (1907-1975). His works are the most 
sophisticated example in which a common understanding of the role of space in 
knowledge production, vaguely identified among the Japanese intellectuals of his 
time, was well elaborated as a theory, resonating with Nishida’s theory of basho. In 
studying his work, I will delineate how tacit knowledge in a community of experience 
worked behind the ostensibly reasonable theorisations. Finally, I will explicate the 
new world order envisaged by Japanese geopolitics, which was borderless but 
paradoxically had a rigid hierarchy whose building blocks were different peoples. 
Here, I draw on as many scholarly works as possible in an effort to show how broadly 
the analogous way of thinking, particularly power relations, was identical amongst 
Japanese intellectuals. In addition, some reflections outside the academic circle will 
be examined. For this, I rely on a series of policy papers and some popular writings of 
the period. The policy papers were written by the Population and Minzoku14 Division 
of the Health and Welfare Ministry Research Institute in 1943. They are probably the 
most detailed existing official documents on this subject, in which the population and 
ethnic policies in the GEACPS were fully elaborated. In examining these sources, this 
chapter demonstrates how the one-world strategy modern Japan presented by 
supposedly relying on European geopolitical theory was in fact supported by a 
performative self-image of the state in popular consciousness, in which even academic 
circles were embedded.   
 
  
                                                
14 The concept of minzoku will be explained later. 
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6.2. An Idealist Geopolitics? 
The 1930s saw the escalations towards the Pacific War. Two years after the 
Manchurian Incident in 1931, which led to the establishment of Manchukuo by the 
Japanese government, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. In 1937, a series 
of battles started with the Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident. In December 
1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour in Hawaii and finally declared the Greater East 
Asia War. In this path towards the war, the Japanese government made a curious 
policy change. This series of battles and military clashes were informally called ‘the 
War against Great Britain, America, and Dutch’. However, the moniker was changed 
when the war was officially launched, an attempt to clarify, it was said, the aim of the 
war. The new nomenclature was controversial within the Imperial Government itself, 
with two major camps on the war objectives. Whilst some insisted that the war was 
for ‘self-sufficiency and self-defence’ (jison jiei), others saw the establishment of the 
GEACPS as the ultimate aim (Shōji, 2011). A common ground was sought in that the 
GEACPS was for jison jiei and not for colonisation. In the meantime, the new name 
also evidently blurred who the enemy was. Nevertheless, as a curious mosaic of 
moralistic reason and practical demand, and saliency and opacity, hitched to the fore, 
the geographical designation Daitōa in the war’s new nomenclature provided a nodal 
point of interpretation of European geopolitics. It was in this assemblage that scholars 
found a usefulness of geopolitics, which had been disregarded for a decade since it 
was first imported. Rōyama was the first to excavate geopolitics to explain the 
equivocal regionalism after a decade since Iimoto’s first application.  
 
The ‘Awakening’ of the East 
Rōyama is still one of the biggest names in the history of Japan’s political science, 
while his assertive commitment to geopolitics during wartime is less known or largely 
forgotten today. This is not only because Rōyama himself was silent about it after the 
war, but also because geopolitics per se had been literally abandoned after Japan’s 
defeat. His own work on the history of Japanese political science published in 1950 
had no reference about geopolitics at all (Royama, 1968). He was more an Anglophile 
than a Germanophile, since he had studied in the United Kingdom for two years from 
1924. The later generations regard his detour to German geopolitics as a compelling 
‘choice of the lesser evil’ (Maruyama, 1980) and a limited application (Hatanao, 1981) 
under the wartime structure. By contrast, following Matsuzawa Hiroaki (1962), I 
  167 
argue that his application was rather comprehensive, and the shift to German 
geopolitics was primarily induced by a way of thinking that was shared in Japan as a 
community of experience. 
     Rōyama’s commitment to German geopolitics began soon after his visit to the 
United States accompanying Premier Konoe in 1934, a year after Japan’s withdrawal 
from the League of Nations. In a paper titled ‘The U.S.-Japan Relations and its Crisis’ 
written in 1935, he stated that he was baffled during the visit that the American 
specialists on Japan assessed its diplomatic issues as being inherent in ‘the 
universalising process of modernisation or Westernisation’. In other words, Japan’s 
alleged aggression was understood by the Americans as a symptom of a specific stage 
in the universal progress of the state, whose standard was ‘Western Civilisation’ 
(Rōyama, 1935a: 116). Or in short, the Americans believed that Japan’s aggression 
arose because the country was still on a learning curve. In this way, Rōyama (ibid.: 
117) asserted, the Americans saw ‘international cooperation’ ‘based on evolution 
theory’. On the contrary, for him, the diplomatic crisis was attributable to Japan’s 
‘revolutionary situation’ as a result of its actions in the past few years. Japan had found 
that its history diverged from the Western trajectory of modernity. He argued that these 
actions changed even the perspective of the Japanese leaders who had been taking the 
stance of cooperative diplomacy with Anglo-America following the universal claim 
of the West (1935a: 1935b).  
    The idea of kyōchō gaikō (cooperative diplomacy), which Japan carried out in the 
interwar period, was a ‘pacifist’ foreign policy in harmony with the West led by 
Shidehara Kijūrō. According to Rōyama, however, this policy was sustainable if and 
only if two premises were first proven right: first, that China, which was at the time 
confused with itself, would evolve to be a ‘perfect modern state’; and second, that 
Japan’s harsh economic situation would be stabilised as its capitalism developed 
further (Rōyama, 1935a: 118-119). Differently put, for him, kyōchō gaikō was 
possible only when the premises became evidence to the universal development of the 
modern nation-state. From his point of view, however, both premises were failing. The 
Manchurian incident (1931), in particular, suggested that the relation between Japan 
and Manchukuo was not that of a colonial economy, but of a ‘regional cooperative 
economy’ (Rōyama, 1938: 15), which indicated that Japan had a unique form of 
civilisation that was completely different from the West. For Rōyama, this realisation 
was never meant to be an imperial expansion, and was therefore in total opposition to 
  168 
America’s Manifest Destiny, which had expanded into the Pacific and China by that 
time (Rōyama, 1935b: 131, 1938). Despite this fact, Rōyama argued that American 
intellectuals had difficulty in admitting that Japan’s unique development was rooted 
in the unique Eastern civilisation that had different standards. The Americans, 
believing in the ‘universality of material conditions’ and showing a tendency of ‘self-
centredness’ in their historical consciousness, merely viewed Japan’s actions in the 
Pacific region as part of its imperial expansion (Rōyama, 1935b: 127).  
    For Rōyama, geopolitics was a revelation for this awakening of Tōyō, because he 
saw a profound potential in geopolitics to explain the ongoing and remarkable 
phenomenon that indicated the historical divergence between the East and the West. 
Following Okakura’s declaration of ‘Asia is one’ (see chapter 4), this awakening was 
for Rōyama a true arousal of Japan after a long slumber since the opening of the 
country. In a 1938 paper, he proposed the establishment of the East Asia Cooperative 
Community by vigorously asserting that Japan’s war with China was a ‘holy war’ not 
for its territorial ambition, but for the moralistic purpose of attaining perpetual peace 
by integrating Tōyō in the name of Asia’s justice. Japan, ‘being independent for the 
first time from the intervention of Western countries’, had acknowledged its mission 
from its own standpoint. Therefore, Japan’s war was ‘a phenomenon of the global 
historical significance’, which had to be strictly distinguished from the regionally 
limited wars in modern Europe (Rōyama, 1938). Furthermore, this awareness carried 
a hint of Rōyama’s own academic enlightenment: He blamed himself for not having 
studied the ‘forming principles of Japanese politics’ until then. The consequential 
events following the Manchurian Incident were an alarm that led him to the 
acknowledgement of the ‘reality of politics’ (Rōyama, 1941: 55). 
 
Inversions? Organism beyond the State  
In Rōyama’s geopolitics, and in Daitōa Chiseigaku more broadly, there are certain 
tangible inversions from the original theory, not unlike Iimoto’s case. Whilst classical 
geopolitics is considered realist, arguing for the objective truth of the state to survive 
(Ó Tuathail, 1996b; Guzzini, 2012), Daitōa Chiseigaku argued for the survival of the 
region, not the state, and for subjective truth. It was an intellectual weapon for the 
Japanese geopoliticians to assert the plurality of local knowledge to counter the West’s 
abuse of geographical knowledge for the survival of the state. In this assertion, Japan 
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was described as the leader of the people supressed by European knowledge. Simply 
put, it was an unmitigated idealism.  
     Rōyama’s philosophy was a functionalism of sorts, postulating that social bonds 
were an intrinsic ideal to be attained by individual human beings (Matsuzawa, 1962: 
259). The ideal functioned as a social bond because it was considered to be a shared 
value in society. As Sakai Tetsuya (2007: 122) maintains, Rōyama’s intellectual 
trajectory started from an exploration of the dissolution of the state posited as given in 
the German Staatslehre, which had dominated Japanese academia in Rōyama’s time 
(Rōyama, 1949; Sakai, 2007). According to Sakai, this was a trend broadly seen 
among Japanese scholars who aspired to establish political science as a discipline 
independent from legal studies (cf. Fujisawa, 1925). Influenced by British idealism, 
Rōyama conceived of politics as an expansion of the internal order, which was for him 
primarily the inner self of an individual (Sakai, 2007). Therefore, the twentieth century 
had to mark the end of the nation-state, the establishment of the League of Nations 
was a perfect vindication of this theory, even if Japan’s withdrawal from the League 
would question this hypothesis.  
     In addition, there was another problem with his theory. At first glance, Rōyama’s 
conception of the world resembles that of the English School of IR. However, his 
understanding of physical space revealed a grave contradiction to the English School’s 
spatial conception. Objectively speaking, Japan’s entry into international society was 
undeniably an inclusion into the Western international society and never vice versa. 
So long as world history was comprehended in such a way that Japan was ‘forced 
open’ by the West, Japan’s expansion could never be comprehended as the expansion 
of the internal principle, but only as a domination of the external principle, in perfect 
opposition to Rōyama’s hypothesis, which would become plausible only when Japan’s 
modern history was recognised in another way. This trouble was caused by Rōyama’s 
position in between what Iizuka called two ‘second worlds’, namely the world of 
Europe and that of Japan (Iizuka 1935-1936; see chapter 3). Theoretically, he was in 
the European world, whilst physically and empirically he was in Japan. To be sure, 
applying a theory of Western origin to another spatial context is a common practice in 
the non-Western world even today. However, when it is a theory concerning social 
systems, its irredeemable spatiality could cause issues.  
     The Manchurian Incident in China was a timely happening that inspired a 
breakthrough in his theory. The incident was, in retrospect, full of conspiracies by the 
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Imperial Japanese Army. Yet for Rōyama, who probably did not know the facts at that 
time, it was an apocalypse that indicated that Japan was in fact spatially different from 
the West. The consecutive events after the incident could not be explained by Western 
experiences. Viewed from a different angle, the Incident could attest to his theory, 
only if the space of the theory was replaced from Europe to Japan through a 
reinterpretation of history. For him, it was a natural consequence that the Japanese 
eventually reached the end of its following of the Western trajectory of modernity after 
having abandoned Asia for nearly a century (Rōyama, 1939d: 196-197).  
     Indeed, emphasising the shared value of inner selves, Rōyama’s conception of the 
individual diverged from the conception derived since the Enlightenment. As 
explained above, however, Rōyama’s ideal of the internal self was posited as ‘a 
common ideal’ in the society to which one belonged (Matsuzawa, 1962: 259). Society 
and individuals mutually developed and therefore individual’s ‘will, affection, and 
passion’ were embedded in the society (Rōyama, 1939e: 172-173: Matsuzawa, 1962: 
259). International politics was an ongoing reality, whilst its conceptualisation was 
only embryonic in the thought of a limited number of intellectuals. Therefore, Rōyama 
stated, it was the task of students of political science to develop concepts to promote 
the correct understanding of international politics to the public (Matsuzawa, 1962: 
253). Led by an awareness of being a Japanese person in Asia but having been inspired 
by European theories, he conceptualised international politics as an incessant, 
expansive progress of society from the local community to the state, and ultimately to 
the whole world. Crucially, as Matsuzawa claims, envisaging the emergence of society 
as fundamentally spontaneous, this idea accompanied the disavowal of intellectualism. 
Royama saw the possibility of a new world order in which each people would live 
together based on common emotions. For this order, the state and even European-style 
nationalism were the mother of all evil (Matsuzawa, 1962: 251-254), since they were 
a rationalised as thought by European capitalism (Rōyama, 1938: 12-13). The real 
order had to be established on a deeper common ground between Asians. The theory 
for regionalism had to be based on an ‘aesthetic intuition’, generated out of ‘people 
and earth’ (Rōyama, 1938: 19).  
     Thus, for Rōyama, who had found Japan’s uniqueness in world politics, geopolitics 
offered both theoretical and empirical usefulness. Theoretically, it helped him re-
conceptualise international politics as an expansion of their own internal principle. 
Empirically, geopolitics supported Japan’s ‘true’ identity that he had found, liberating 
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it from the straitjacket of Western modernity. Geopolitics informed him what Japan 
really was, in contrast to the universality of human progress suggested by those 
Western-originated democratic theories familiar to him. Therefore, for Rōyama, 
geopolitics was a saviour, for it gave a concrete meaning to his country’s growing 
isolation from Western international society, while simultaneously lending support to 
his own prognosis of world politics.  
      Rōyama’s employment of geopolitics and its inversions were apparently induced 
by Japan’s physical conditions. As Hatano Sumio (1981) insists, Rōyama, a liberalist 
deeply committed to Konoe’s policy-making, needed a logic to differentiate Japan’s 
reasoning to fight the war from the West’s reasoning to gain support of Asian nations. 
However, the discussion above shows another aspect of his tenkō: Rōyama came to 
be interested in geopolitics, as Hatano states (Hatano, 1981: 36), exactly because of 
the subjective nature of geopolitics, which offered him a way to rewrite Japanese 
history based on their own history. In doing so, his ‘second worlds’ (Iizuka, 1935-
1936) would become Japanese, filling the gap between theory and practice. He 
interpreted the aim of Haushofer’s geopolitics as understanding historical events as 
geographical phenomena in relation to the content of the ‘natural living space’ of the 
state. He argued that ‘this particular science cannot reject the existence of subjective 
aspects in the movement of history’ (Rōyama, 1939c: 99), as understanding history 
essentially required a subjective appraisal. Through this subjective appraisal, 
Universal History would be successfully reinterpreted to support his theory. Whilst 
science was based on objectivity, geopolitics would exceed it by giving explanations 
to the ‘subjective romantic mystique’ of statecraft, which was the uniqueness of Japan 
(ibid.: 100). It was this subjectivity, historicity, and expediency of geopolitics that 
allowed him to insist that ‘it is only in geopolitics that the GEACPS can be dealt with 
as an object of research’ (Rōyama, ibid.: 102).  
     Rōyama further claimed that ‘[g]eopolitically’, modern Japan had until that point 
belonged to a ‘significantly alien category to where the ordinary interpretation of 
history indicated’, or in other words the West. This ‘ordinary history’ was based on 
the concept of the Westphalian state that had dominated Japanese academia. However, 
he insisted, what had been totally forgotten was ‘the location of the national land of 
Japan’. For him, the difference lies ‘in the location and not in a matter of good or bad’ 
(Rōyama, 1939c: 104-105). Thus, he relied on geopolitics because he thought it was 
crucial for his own conceptualisation of the idealistic society, rather than for a torturing 
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justification of Japan’s imperialism. Above all, his own sentiments as a member of 
society, rather than that as a scholar, urged him to argue for the uniqueness of Japan. 
It was this shift from the passive acceptance of foreign knowledge to the surge of an 
intrinsic creativity, that German geopolitics, especially Haushofer’s (1942a, 1942b), 
encouraged the Japanese to do as German geopolitics argued for the plurality of world 
order. Hence, it was Rōyama’s own internal construction, if not the intrinsic elements 
of him, that echoed this proposition of German geopolitics.  
     As already discussed in chapter 5, all the European geopoliticians interested in 
Japan had pointed out Japan’s geographical peculiarity. Yet, geographical terms such 
as the Far East and Asia were given by the West and demonstrate the passivity of the 
East. Nevertheless, Japan was assertive in its expansion into the continent, and 
nationalism was on prominent rise at that point. Rōyama saw these developments as 
the vindication of shared values in Asia in opposition to Western dominance, and as a 
support to his inside-outside hypothesis of the expansion of international society for 
non-Western states. He called this ‘the awakening of Asia’: Asians would finally recall 
that they had their own traditional world order. The real obstacle for Rōyama was that 
the Chinese, who allowed the West to fight against their own nationalism, had not yet 
truly awakened as Asians. Hence, Japan had the responsibility to wake Chinese people 
up and bring them to understanding their proper ascription in order to accomplish the 
integration of Asia, which had never been accomplished nor imagined yet (Rōyama, 
1938). 
     As discussed in the last chapter, this switch from geopolitical objectivity to 
subjectivity was already seen in Haushofer. Yet, his challenge was still a half-baked 
one, for he was an outsider to the Pacific and still held an objective position to the 
subject of analysis. By contrast, in Rōyama’s geopolitics, the analyst was inevitably 
embedded in the reality as he analysed his own space. Inspired by German geopolitics, 
the reality acknowledged by Rōyama was that Japan was part of Asia and not that of 
the West. Locating his political ideal in the tradition of Japan, Rōyama considered the 
ideal to be what had to be expanded to the outside world in order to make his 
cosmopolitan ideal come true. For him, the Pacific order was much more peaceful than 
the confrontational order of the Atlantic. This was the subjective truth about Japan 
found by Rōyama qua a Japanese that both the West and China had not yet realised. 
Therefore, the ‘destiny’ of Japan was to form a new global society by relying on 
Japan’s ‘philosophy of harmony’, in contrast to Western science which tended to 
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facilitate conflicts (Rōyama, 1938b: 11). It should be noted that Japan and Asia were 
confounded in Rōyama’s argument, which ended up rendering a unified Asia, if not 
the entire globe, as his analytical space.                                                  
      Incoherent as it may sound with the post-war common belief on Japan’s fanatic 
nationalism of the pure Yamato race, this idea of ‘beyond the nation-state’ was shared 
widely among academics, politicians, and militarists. In this discourse, Japan was 
depicted as a mixed race. The Emperor’s role was assumed to be the symbol of this 
greater expansive order based on cultural affinity, which was widely called ‘Tōyō 
humanism’ (Shōwa Kenkyūkai, 1939; Nishida, 1982[1940]; Ishiwara, 1940), and not 
necessarily the symbol of Japan as a pure nation. Moreover, because society under this 
particular order was assumed to be peaceful and never confrontational, it could expand 
even beyond Asia. As chapter 4 has explicated, Japan was perceived as the integrative 
repository of diverse Asian cultures (Okakura, 1920). What had been crucial for the 
advocates of this idea was, as seen in Rōyama’s assertion, that the Japanese happened 
to have developed such a superior order by virtue of their unique geography and 
history. Put differently, the Japanese believed they were superior because they were a 
mixed race. Human will emerged through the interaction between humans and the 
environment.15 Hence, Rōyama therefore employed geopolitics not out of necessity, 
but for this unconscious autonomy that was shared tacitly within a group of people 
(Matsuzawa, 1962: 262-272). 
     Thus, Daitōa Chiseigaku was an idealistic theory that argued for perpetual and co-
prosperous peace among nations, in complete contrast to the conventional 
understanding of geopolitics today as a justification of war. However, even if it was 
allegedly opposed to the idea of national interests and therefore the European mode of 
power, it did not disavow power altogether. Instead, all societies have their own power 
structure, and Rōyama merely argued for another mode of power. The Japanese during 
this particular period found ‘the truth’ in the ‘Asian way’ of organising space. The 
ideal was perceived as Asia’s forgotten reality due to European suppression. By 
categorising Japan as ‘have-nots’, in contrast to E. H. Carr’s criticism of his own home 
country (Matsuzawa, 1962: 255-256; Sakai, 2007: 141), Rōyama saw geopolitics as a 
philosophical weapon arguing for the political ideal of co-prosperity among nations, 
as a way to confront the individualistic power politics from Europe. For him, the 
                                                
15 See the discussion on this ‘will’ in Nishida’s thought in chapter 3. 
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reality of power was that it revealed who was just. Japan would rule the world as 
geography endowed it with power. Authorised by geography, Japan came to realise its 
‘honzen no sei’ (the natural disposition given by Heaven) (Matsuzawa, 1962: 274). 
Indeed, for the Japanese, this ideal contained a danger of being ‘misunderstood’ as a 
harsh realist theory by other Asians, since it saw Japan’s ideal as the one and only 
reality.  
 
6.3. The State as an Organism in Japanese Geopolitics 
According to Yamaguchi (1943: 229), geopolitics came to be known to a wider public 
from around 1935. It gained popularity among politicians, military personnel, and the 
business community. In academia, by contrast, despite Rōyama’s work, geographers 
in general kept distance from geopolitics until around 1940. Apart from the fact that 
earlier applications were followed by few, for those geographers who had already been 
familiar with Ratzel’s theory and German geopolitics, the organismic theory of the 
state and the concept of Lebensraum were rather anachronistic, imperialistic even 
(Kawanishi, 1933; Obara, 1936; Iizuka, 1942-1943; Watanuki, 1942; Yamaguchi, 
1943; Motokawa, 1943). However, in the wake of the implementation of the GEACPS 
in early 1940s, many geographers began to reengage in the debate. Accordingly, their 
discussion focused on how to re-evaluate the organismic theory with a view to avoid 
anachronism. 
     The state as a living organism was an integral part of classical geopolitics because 
it represents the power of the state. However, as seen in the last chapter, this theory 
was in fact very complicated, containing contradictory connotations on the term 
‘organism’ and varied forms of power relations. However, such cognitive gaps 
between those perspectives have been largely neglected in the course of mutation, and 
therefore left intact in the theory. Accordingly, the concept of ‘organism’ had become 
polymorphous, which further induced incongruous interpretations.  
     Let me briefly review the discussion on the theory of the state as a living organism 
in the last chapter. Ratzel’s original theorisation was rather literal, portraying the state 
as a lower organism. Kjellén was interested in the organic nexus between territory and 
people’s experience. At the heart of his geopolitics was ‘the understanding of the state 
as an acting subject’ (Komaki, 1942: 68), which was realised by the Europeans living 
through the Concert of Europe and the First World War (Ogawa, 1928a). Finally, 
Haushofer went further by focusing on the will of humans in a particular geographical 
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environment. We see here the precipitously changing perception of state power among 
Europeans between the final decade of the nineteenth century and around the 1930s. 
In Ratzel’s concept, power lies in nature, and he was overwhelmingly impinged by 
Darwin’s theory. By contrast, for Kjellén, the power holder was the state itself 
conceptualised as a super-individual. In his theory, environment actually played only 
a secondary role. In Haushofer’s geopolitics, more power was given to Volk in the 
state, further reducing the importance of geographical factors for the state, because for 
him, as a German, the power of the state and accordingly geography had already 
become less reliable.  
     In Japan, as I will explicate below, whilst the locus of power was apparently 
occupied by the state, the centre of power was replaceable with no stable referent, and 
the discretion of power was conferred to geography per se. In other words, in the 
Japanese conception, geography restored the power of the state, though in a different 
way. To explain this particular construct of power, I will now introduce Ezawa Jōji’s 
discussion.  
 
Space as Lebensform 
Ezawa called the complexity of the organismic theory ‘the duality of geopolitics’. He 
argued that although geopolitics gave the impression of being a reactionary thought in 
antagonism to the flourishing of sociology, it in fact aggressively employed modern 
sociological thinking (Ezawa, 1940: 81; see also Cahnman, 1943; Murphy, 1997). For 
him, the key to understanding this confusion was the concept of space which had not 
been fully theorised by the Europeans (1944: 9). Ratzel’s theory considered physical 
space and any phenomenon that is understood as a transformation of this space (ibid.: 
12, 30-31). Geopolitics, on the contrary, was concerned with Lebensform, with which 
we live in reality. It was the ‘fundamental meaning which fills our life’, and therefore 
not a physical space. Thus, Ezawa insisted, geopolitics had to understand space from 
a ‘perspective of mental science’. In doing so, he aimed to dissolve ‘the contradiction 
without losing methodological coherence’ (1940: 81). 
     In comparison to political geography, the peculiar characteristics of geopolitics 
was, Ezawa argued, its embedded-ness, by which he meant that ‘the national land, as 
the analytical object of geopolitics’, was understood as ‘the objectification of the entire 
structural relations based on our experience’ and never independent from the cognitive 
subject. Lebensform, as the fundamental meaning of people’s life, was paraphrased as 
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‘the entire relations between our styles of living’ which had to be ‘objectified’, and 
was therefore comprehended in relation to people’s affects. In other words, 
Lebensform was about how people ‘feel’ about their own land. This objectification 
was promoted when a Lebensform confronted another Lebensform. Through the 
process, Lebensraum became a ‘kokudo’ (national land), the ‘body of a nation’ 
(Ezawa, 1944: 18). The state as Lebensraum was spatialised only when it was given 
meaning through Lebensform, the objectification of people’s life. The people living in 
the kokudo, the cognitive subject, were referred to as minzoku (Volk), who developed 
a particular Lebensform. In other words, a minzoku was historically constructed 
according to the ‘affinity of experiences’. Simultaneously, territory as their kokudo 
was formed as the objectification of the minzoku’s style of living. Hence, kokudo was 
the external manifestation of people’s collective experiences, indicating the 
historically constructed power of its minzoku. Minzoku was thus dependent on and 
never detached from the land in which it inhabited, even though the land was 
spatialised by their will. For Ezawa, kokudo and minzoku, the cognitive object and 
subject respectively, were mutually constituted through this interdependent relation, 
and this dynamic character was what distinguished geopolitics from political 
geography.16  Lebensraum had to be reconceptualised as kokudo in this particular 
meaning in geopolitics (Ezawa, 1944: 10-24). 
 
Minzoku 
In wartime discourse in Japan, the term minzoku became an extraordinarily influential 
concept. A large volume of policy documents on Japan’s world policy, written by a 
research team at the Health and Welfare Ministry in 1943, defined minzoku as a 
cultural concept of a group of people, as opposed to the biological concept of race 
(shuzoku), even though both were deeply related. According to the document 
(Population and Minzoku Division, the Health and Welfare Ministry Research 
Institute, 1982: 29), minzoku was ‘a priori in relation to individual experience’, as all 
humans were born into a community of a specific minzoku. Despite the significance 
of this, it was considered ‘extremely shaky, variable, and fluid that a new minzoku can 
be formed gradually or even abruptly’, because different minzokus could be awaken 
                                                
16 According to Rosenboim (2015: 2), both the American geopolitician Nikolas Spykman and a leading 
American Sinologist called Owen Lattimore, understood geopolitics as ‘dynamic’, and rejected the 
static and deterministic perception of geography.    
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as one unified minzoku, when geographical, cultural, material, historical, and other 
proximities between different minzokus came to be acknowledged by a certain 
historical event (ibid.: 35-37). In this respect, minzoku was composed by a centripetal 
force. Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1998: 32) argues that whilst this Japanese concept 
anticipated more recent debates on the social construction of race and nation, in its 
time it provided a ‘convenient blurring between the cultural and genetic aspects of 
ethnicity, while emphasising the organic unity of the Japanese people’.  
     The question asked in this thesis is neither whether the term was progressive, nor 
whether it was convenient. Instead, the question is why Japanese people understood 
the formation of social groups in this particular way as an unusually accessible term. 
The term was, as Morris-Suzuki (1998: 87) puts it, ‘a continuous slippage backward 
and forward between different levels of justification’ in Japan in this period. That is, 
this concept enabled people to comprehend the rapidly changing landscape of the 
international political map, because the concept manifested Japan’s specific social 
relations and power. It foretold the outcome of the fluidisation of the world map. For 
Ezawa, the object of analysis in geopolitics was this malleable concept of minzoku, 
not the state (Ezawa, 1944). Seeing the union of the land of man as an intimately 
evolving relation, he insisted that geopolitics was idiographic and not nomothetic, 
because, following Kjellén, ‘kokudo cannot change its place’ and is therefore unique. 
The identification of minzoku rested on kokudo, which should not be understood as a 
mere physical space, but instead as ‘the basis of communal affects’, an ‘externalisation 
of the minzoku’s worldview’ based on an ‘affinity of experiences’ (Ezawa, 1940: 84). 
The organisation of space in geopolitics has to be understood in this ‘semantic nexus’ 
(1944: 23), rather than in causal logic, and was the result of the interactions between 
people and geography, in which space was to be organised voluntarily and properly. 
Here, the similarity to Rōyama’s concept of society is obvious. 
 
Ecological Determinism? 
As in Rōyama’s theory, geography also had the ultimate discretion in Ezawa’s theory, 
highlighting its deterministic nature, even though Ezawa placed stronger emphasis on 
agency. While it may appear that Ezawa’s emphasis on people’s will downgraded the 
importance of environmental factors as merely consequential, this ‘will’ in fact could 
also be identified in Rōyama’s argument (cf. Kawanishi, 1942a). For Ezawa, this ‘will’ 
was, like Rōyama’s ideal, a tacitly-shared collective intuition embedded in the 
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geographical community (cf. Ibert, 2007). Lebensform was the objectification of the 
historically constructed structural relations based on the subjects’ own perception. 
Here, Nishida’s two sense of consciousness, discussed in chapter 3, can clarify the 
apparent confusion. The collective will, for Ezawa, was based on Nishida’s idea of 
‘consciousness that is conscious’, and not on ‘consciousness that one is conscious of’ 
(Nishida, 1926b: 54). The objectification of Lebensform essentially relied on this less-
than-conscious but collective will. Hence, the social structure could not be subject to 
people’s explicit consciousness. Conceiving of human will in this way, Ezawa 
believed that the future could be foretold by examining historical patterns of 
interaction in a particular kokudo, because these patterns were governed not by rational 
thinking but by relational unconsciousness. And because they were in the unconscious 
realm, they had to be repetitive in nature. Focusing on the ecology between minzoku 
and kokudo, rather than on geography itself, he concluded that the usefulness of 
geopolitics was this possibility to foresee the future, indicated by the intimate 
relations. 
     Therefore, the decisive factor in determining Japan’s future was found in this 
ecological space. The future became predictable by investigating the ‘acting-intuition’ 
of a collective subject as Ezawa (1940: 88) put it, apparently drawing on Nishida’s 
term but without mentioning his name. Here, we see a vague, common recognition 
between Iimoto, the first Japanese geopolitician discussed in the last chapter, Rōyama, 
and Ezawa. For all three geopoliticians, it was geography that held the discretion of 
power. The difference between their ideas is that whilst for the first two, geography 
was an embodiment of the socio-organic ideal, for Ezawa, it was what had to be 
investigated for theoretical usage. In Ezawa’s discussion, minzoku was the indicator 
of power but not the power holder. Power was something that existed in-between; it 
required an endorsement because society developed according to the intuitive 
interactions among humans, rather than according to the rational choices of 
individuals. Hence, the superior minzoku had to be endorsed by something 
transcendental. The malleable minzoku was a mere conceptual vehicle of power. The 
living organism was an embodiment of this in-between power arisen through human 
interactions. Thus, in Japanese geopolitics, the state was likewise a mere embodiment 
of power. The fate of a minzoku was determined by a specific disposition of kokudo, 
which itself was nurtured in relation to the minzoku, and power resided in this relation. 
Because of this, the embodiment of power was always in flux.   
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     Ezawa elaborated his own idiographic approach of minzoku in 1944. He 
conceptualised minzoku as a divergent category from the concept of race in the natural 
sciences, arguing that while the latter was detached from the inherent meaning of one’s 
living space, the former in geopolitics was not since it was understood in semantic 
sequence. The approach taken in Ratzelian environmentalism was, for Ezawa, not 
appropriate for his ecological geopolitical theory, because it was likewise nomothetic 
and founded upon causal logic, neglecting the role of meaning.  
     His starting point was Thomas G. Taylor’s ethnography employed in Environment, 
Race, and Migration (1937). Ezawa called attention to the point that Taylor 
distinguished between four types of races based on three regions, namely the 
Eurafrican peninsula, the Austracian peninsula, and the American peninsula. Ezawa 
argued that whilst Taylor’s categorisation rested on races as the standard in any given 
region, what geopolitics was interested in was the point that the migration of each race 
implies a unique direction. That is, while Taylor categorised peoples based on their 
objective differences, Ezawa was more concerned with the subjective sameness as 
perceived by the actors. For Ezawa, the direction of migration indicated the unique 
sense of living of each minzoku. He asserted that, ‘[w]e understand that the region of 
Austracia becomes a unified space as the consequence of a semantic nexus’. Migrating 
to the same direction, the minzokus in the region had historically nurtured a ‘common 
sentiment’, rendering Austracia a place for mutual empathy among Asians (Ezawa, 
1944: 44-51).  
     Natural resource was likewise understood in relation to people and geography in 
Ezawa’s works. ‘Geopolitical resource’ was for him ‘ethnographic (minzoku) 
resource’. These resources form kokudo as a semantic nexus and unify minzoku in this 
concatenation. Consequently, ‘the geopolitical meaning of a resource is measured by 
the extent the will of minzoku is reflected in the production of the resource’ (Ezawa, 
1944: 56-57). Ezawa gave the example of the production of rubber in Southeast Asia, 
which he viewed as geopolitically wrong because it was jeopardising the native’s 
independence while fulfilling the Europeans’ demands (ibid.: 58). Therefore, as a 
‘geopolitical necessity’, Japan had to intervene and re-unite Asia, where European 
imperialism had destroyed its ‘geopolitical integrity’. The Minzoku of Tōa (East Asia) 
needed to be aware of their common destiny, and Japan’s role was to facilitate this 
awareness (Ezawa, 1944: 90-91).  
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    Thus, Ezawa’s organism could be expanded beyond national borders to the whole 
Asia also without any friction. The mission would be accomplished by enhancing the 
organic relations among Asians, or ‘Austracians’, setting aside any physical, and in 
fact geographical, difference. Such formulation possibly contradicted Ezawa’s 
assertion of kokudo as a unique place, but this contradiction was negligible because 
the basis of his understanding of society was Lebensform, suggesting ‘mutual 
empathy’ and a ‘shared sense of destiny’ (Ezawa, 1943: 235). Stressing the form of 
living as the basis of categorisation for geopolitics, he conceived of society as a 
centripetal and permeable, rather than bounded, structure. The requirement of 
common identity was only a sense of sameness, whatever small it might be. As 
discussed in chapter 4, the Japanese often comprehended another people as part of 
them rather than a pure ‘other’, and this was possible because their epistemology was 
based on the perception of sameness rather than difference. This particular epistemic 
tradition made the Japanese state an absorbent and profoundly expansive organism. 
     The rapidly changing political climate had jeopardised the Japanese’s isolated 
stance in the world since the Meiji Restoration. The era asked the Japanese as a 
coloured race to take the side of either the West or the rest. Subsequently their 
theorisation of geopolitics diverged from the others not only to oppose the imperialist 
practice of the West, but also because it made more sense for them in reference to their 
own practice. They translated the geopolitical theory not only through rational 
thinking but through their historically developed mode of thinking in the first place. 
In doing so, their site-specific practice turned the German narrative to the Japanese 
discourse for war. 
 
Symbolic Power in Unstructured Structure 
In many ways, Daitōa Chiseigaku looks totally inversed to the geopolitics that is 
known today. To illustrate, in line with geopolitics, Daitōa Chiseigaku asserted that 
in the GEACPS, peoples were connected through blood (chi) as well as soil (chi), 
which became a pun based on the incidentally identical pronunciations of the two 
words in the Japanese language. However, in Japan, this familiar phrase of ‘blood and 
soil’ in geopolitics in fact meant that blood was shared through the earth (Kawahara, 
1943), and therefore connoted not a confrontation between different bloods, but a 
forceful inclusion of bloods through the earth—family, the state, and Asia were one, 
since all of them shared a blood through an expansive living space (Nakahara, 1944). 
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This argument was made possible because, as evidenced in Ezawa’s argument, the 
state was a historical and social organic ideal evolving limitlessly in an intimate 
relation between minzoku and kokudo (see also Kunimatsu, 1944a). Indeed, this 
organism of the state is living in the unstructured structure (see chapter 2), where the 
self and the other are living together side by side without boundaries. In this 
unstructured structure, power becomes the possession of no one, but is something 
diffused and actualised through place where people live, making the place borderless 
in practice. Placing stress on experiences and accordingly forms of living, the 
organism paradoxically transgresses geographical confinement.  
     Some may notice the absence of the Emperor in these arguments. This is because, 
as stated in the previous chapters, the Emperor was the symbol of power relations and 
not the symbol of power. The person occupying the locus of power was in fact, 
changeable. During the first half of the twentieth century, the locus, which had been 
occupied by the West since the Meiji Restoration, was yielded to the Emperor. This 
might sound odd given that it was the Emperor who restored the throne in the middle 
of the nineteenth century. However, as Oguma Eiji (2000) argues, this Emperor wore 
a Western outfit and was not the one in a traditional guise. An example that illustrates 
this confusion is the original Japanese term for Meiji Restoration, Meiji Ishin, which 
in fact is better translated as ‘renewal’. In other words, the revolutionary Meiji period 
was only understood as a continuation. As Yoshimoto Takaaki (1969) points out, 
throughout Japan’s history, the Emperor has been a talisman of power and never the 
power itself. In this context, the political power since the Meiji Restoration had existed 
in the idea of the West, and the Emperor was only the embodiment of this ever-
changing power as well as continuity. Yet, as the country followed the trajectory of 
Westernisation and finally became one of the Great Powers, the locus was replaced by 
Japan’s own history, which was but again embodied by the Emperor.17 Thus, the 
Emperor himself has always been an empty signifier. Admittedly, it is also this 
discursive malleability about the Emperor that makes the claim of his political 
responsibility in the Second World War controversial. 18  (This debate is however 
beyond the scope of this thesis, and my interest here is the enigmatic mode of power 
                                                
17 This elusive power of the Emperor was acknowledged by the Americans during the occupation 
period. See Takeda (2001). 
18 Some of the latest research on this inquiry are Itō (2011) and Katō (2011). For a more comprehensive 
inquiry, see Takeda (2001). For research on the changing political narrative and the Emperor system, 
see Narita (2012). 
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around the Emperor.) Nonetheless, whoever was occupying the place of the executor 
(even the Emperor) had in fact no substantial power, but functioned only as a vehicle 
of power. Natural law decided who would occupy the locus of power. In other words, 
the Emperor was the talisman not because he was the Emperor, but because the 
Emperor, but not the person, was the embodiment of nature.  
     The affinity between this particular mode of power and environmental determinism 
is obvious. It is doubtful whether German geopolitics would have been as influential 
in Japan without this unique understanding of power and hence the metamorphosis of 
environmental determinism. In any case, when such a subjective perspective was 
applied to the ideal of a researcher’s own society, it was only highly likely that such 
perspective would become nothing but a total affirmation of the society’s past. 
Undeniably, even for a well-elaborated theory such as Ezawa’s, Daitōa Chiseigaku 
could maximise one’s optimistic and arbitrary imagination, ultimately rejecting 
intellectualism in favour of ‘mental science’ as Ezawa put it. The danger was, 
obviously, that it could be used for political prediction. Ezawa (1940: 81) stated that 
both Ratzel and Haushofer did not see ‘something magnificent’ in space. Citing these 
crucial insights, nevertheless, the solution Ezawa reached in order to resolve the 
incoherence of geopolitics was by yielding agency to geography, endowing it with 
‘something magnificent’ by ultimately confusing scholarly analyses with their 
political. 
         
6.4. Geopolitical Imagination in Japan 
The final task in this chapter is to explicate Japan’s modern geopolitical imagination 
in a wider intellectual context. This section will do so by weaving together these 
geopoliticians’ writings and some official documents. The main point is that Japan’s 
geopolitical imagination, envisaged as a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1990), was 
existed essentially in popular imagination and was deeply rooted in society, rather than 
having any practical or formal implication (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998). This thesis 
does not investigate whether Japanese policy makers had employed geopolitical 
theories. As Yamazaki Takashi (2013) points out, there is only sparse and unclear 
evidence to support the popular assumption that geopolitics was abused by the 
Imperial Government of Japan. At the same time, however, the eighty-odd works I 
examined undeniably focused on the GEACPS. Many of these works were published 
in general interest magazines, expanding the group of followers of geopolitics to the 
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public. Thus, the regionalism depicted by the geopoliticians was already shared in 
popular imagination, and was, I argue, the formidable effect of geopolitical discourse. 
Geopolitics helped a certain type of policies make sense at the popular level. 
Differently put, geopolitics affirmed Japan’s foreign policies by articulating the 
subjects in its discourse and not foreign policy per se. Only when this articulation was 
successful could geopolitical discourse exert its power. In wartime Japan, geopolitics 
remained ‘popular geopolitics’ (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998) from the outset to the 
end, even in the writings of the academics. 
     Richard Samuels points out that in wartime Japan, an enigmatic convergence of the 
divergent ‘ideological dots’ onto the GEACPS was observed (2007: 13). The enigma 
of this congealment which led the country to the Pacific War could be explained by a 
thorough examination of the historical context. The GEACPS was an assemblage idea 
where foreign knowledge and indigenous knowledge intersected. Each knowledge had 
its own history, and therefore contained contradictory ideas. When the diverse 
elements converged into a geopolitical idea, the convergence would enable the idea to 
express a remarkable capacity for manifold interpretations. At this intersection, a 
constellation of intellectuals, regardless of political inclination, interpreted the 
polymorphous idea in their own contexts, and the remnants of rudimentary 
misunderstandings almost suddenly crystallised into a manifestation of people’s 
everyday relations, projecting a remarkably powerful popular imagination.  
 
A Borderless World? 
At this particular historical juncture, it was the imagination of a borderless regional 
world that became salient. This imagination was already seen in the theorisations of 
two prominent writers discussed in the previous sections: While Rōyama’s 
theorisation was more emotionally motivated, Ezawa’s was sophisticated and logical, 
focusing on micro-politics. Despite this difference, the two theories were remarkably 
similar in their conception of the state as an unbounded space in which people live in 
relation to each other. This idea was clearly reflected in official documents, an example 
of which I will present here. From Japan’s point of view, the Second Sino-Japanese 
War was not an official war. Part of the reason for this was technical, as both Japan 
and China did not declare war (Iwatani, 2015). Yet, how did Japan reason the need for 
this undeclared war? The guidance for the conflict released in 1937 stated that the 
government had been ‘strongly wishing’ the Chinese government to align with Japan 
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for peace in East Asia (Cabinet Approval on December 24, 1937). That is, the ‘Shino 
Incident’ as the war was termed required mutual empathy between China and Japan 
for Japan’s emancipation of China for its true identity as Asians. Therefore, Japan was 
fighting for Chinese people against the Western ideas that had hampered the coming 
of peace in Asia and possibly in the whole world.  
     This line of reasoning would become Japan’s enduring source of justification until 
at least 1945 and possibly later,19 including the Imperial Rescript on the Termination 
of the War, in which Emperor Hirohito assured that his aspiration to fight the war was 
for ‘common prosperity and happiness of all nations’ (The Imperial Rescript on the 
Termination of the War, 1945).20 In December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour. 
Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, in his policy speech on January 21 in the following year, 
declared the war objective to be the establishment of a new world order. The speech 
reads: 
 
….the basic policy of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere indeed originates from the grand spirit of Japan’s nation-
building. In the Sphere, each state and nation will acquire its own proper 
place in order to establish a co-existing and co-prosperous order based on 
moral principles whose centre is the Empire (Tōjō, 1942).21 
 
Tōjō went on to assert that the regions that would be part of the GEACPS had been 
‘so extremely and fiercely abused by Anglo-America and some others that their own 
cultural development has been significantly hampered’(ibid.). Japan and the idea of 
the GEACPS would fight for ‘perpetual peace’ in support of such frustration felt by 
the local Asians. For the Japanese, regionalism was an extension of domestic politics 
and never an implementation of foreign policy. This understanding was not born out 
of the fact that part of China was Japan’s colony at that point, but rather out of the 
belief that any state border, as a Western-centric idea, ought to be erased. Regionalism 
was perceived not as a strategic choice, but a historical, emotional, and above all, 
destined consequence.  
                                                
19 A post-war example of this is the Counsel’s opening statement in the Tokyo Tribunal. 
20  Available at: http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/017/017_001r.html. [Accessed on 25 
September, 2016] 
21  Available at: http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19420121.SWJ.html.[Accessed on 25 September, 2016] 
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     Indeed, in Japanese geopolitics, the concept of border carries much less meaning, 
if not no meaning at all. To illustrate, Yonekura Jirō argued that historically, conflicts 
among states in Asia had rarely happened. In Japan at least, the state was 
acknowledged as given ever since the dawn of history, as clearly seen in Japanese 
mythology (Yonekura, 1941: 45). Simply put, the state was not an import from the 
West. It was, according to Nakahara Tōru (1944: 5), a ‘Lebensgemeinschaft’, and was 
neither a legal institution, nor a community of interest or of imagination, whose bond 
could be strengthened by wars. Nakamura Ryōnosuke (1942: 529) argued that, the 
borders in Europe drawn by the Treaty of Versailles were the last product of the blind 
belief on natural science that had flourished in Europe since the Renaissance. 
Kawahara Jikichirō (1942) asserted that European insistence on the independence of 
the state and the equality between states was a fallacy that ignored reality. The 
developments in world economy in the 1920s demonstrated the impossibility of 
forming closed economic blocs (see also Rōyama, 1938). Equally, British Imperialism 
all over the world had also reached the limit of its sustainability. The collapse of state 
borders in Asia was envisaged as a checkmate to the European modern state system 
whose premises were the independence of each state and hence the equality between 
states. At the same time, this collapse signalled the decline of European capitalism, as 
the interdependence of the states had apparently reached an unsustainable degree.  
     By contrast, the Japanese geopoliticians’ idea of regionalism was based upon 
geographical proximity, which, as Kawahara (1942) had stated, implied a shared 
destiny. Kawahara insisted that national borders, which had been brought into Asia to 
deceive the natives, had to be expunged: Mankind could do without any type of 
borders, even that of the GEACPS, so long as the centre of Lebensform was established 
(Kawahara, 1943). Nakamura (1944: 538-539) stated that in Asia, where a 
‘cooperative worldview not by intellect but by will’ had existed historically, the 
concept of territory was ‘fundamentally different from that in the West’. In Asia, ‘the 
order is not stabilised by boundaries’; instead, ‘regions’ were created out of the order. 
As Ezawa had argued, geopolitics was a theory of subjectivity that investigated the 
dynamic aspects of the state. In this dynamic, what should be identified was the centre 
and the subject, which in the GEACPS was Japan (Kawahara, 1942). Nakahara 
maintained that ‘geopolitical blood relations’ were based on subjectivity. The 
globalisation of what he calls ‘geopolitical state’ that has no borders would allow 
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people to notice that ‘we all are humans’. Therefore, he asked: Was Rudyard Kipling 
right in saying that ‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet’?  
  
The Ocean as a Web of Association  
In this borderless world, relations and associations were given more focus. In Japanese 
geopolitical imagination, seas and oceans played the role of relating peoples together. 
As Kōyama Iwao (1942) stated, seas and oceans had played the remarkable, dualistic 
role of blockade and connection in Japanese history, best represented in the historical 
event of kaikoku (opening of the country). In chapter 4, I have already explained how 
the notion of Nan-yō (the South), which vaguely corresponded to South Pacific, had 
been seen as the imagined roots of the Japanese since the late nineteenth century. In 
addition, European geopoliticians had stressed Japan’s geopolitical advantage of being 
a maritime nation (see chapter 5). Above all, ‘blood and soil’ obviously would not 
suffice as medium to connect peoples, as Japan was an island nation. Historically, the 
island-studded sea in Asia had been a space for networking rather than a void (cf. 
Steinberg, 2001; Hamashita, 1999).       
     As the war escalated, especially after the invasion into French Indochina in 1940, 
Nan-yō came to occupy the centre of the imaginative map. Semantically, with ‘East 
Asia’ clearly gestured in the name of GEACPS, Japan’s penetration into the continent 
was considered to be an insistence on the part of the Imperial Army, who had seized 
leadership in the government, whilst Southing via the sea route was originally an idea 
of the Imperial Navy. Later, as Germany continued to advance in Europe, the Japanese 
army also started to support the Southern Expansion Doctrine. Yet, as the war heated 
up, the regions that was called as South and East Asia were significantly enlarged, 
with the ocean being a limitless mediation of the enlargement (Yano, 1975: 156).  
     As Watsuji’s best-selling book Fūdo (chapter 4) and Haushofer (chapter 5) asserted, 
‘monsoon’ was a keyword in this discourse, and its meaning as sea breeze developed 
over the ocean played a metaphorical role that stressed the shared destiny between the 
Japanese and the Asians. Satō (1942: 132) equally insisted that in the South, and 
likewise in Japan, Manchuria, and China, the monsoon rain was a ‘basis of living’ of 
the people (see also Yonekura, 1941; Kawanishi, 1942a). Here, the ocean came to 
express the routes the ancestors of the Japanese had followed through both the islands 
in the South Pacific Ocean and the Asiatic continent via the Sea of Japan, thus 
  187 
vindicating the Japanese archipelago’s role as a repository of minzoku (Iwata, 1942c; 
see chapter 4).  
     Therefore, it was the Pacific Ocean that gave the Japanese race a superior 
disposition as a maritime nation that could ‘know the world, redress inequality, 
mediate peoples, improve the Lebensform of each other in order to attain peace and 
co-prosperity’ (Nishimura, 1942: 56; see also Iwata, 1942c). For them, the Ocean was 
the mediator that drew the country into the modern world (Hirano and Kiyono, 1942). 
Accordingly, a ‘marine geopolitics’ was proposed (Kunimatsu, 1944b; see also Uda, 
1943). In an extreme example, it was even argued that ‘the ocean, as a person that 
holds personality’, had to be ‘objectified to organise a Lebensraum’, where water was 
equated as earth (Kamakura, 1940: 34-35). Therefore, the sea between the Pacific 
Ocean and the Indian Ocean had to be called the ‘Asia-Australia Mediterranean Sea’ 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 1942), because it was mare nostrum of the GEACPS. Finally, there 
were even assertions that, as the natives in the American continents were originally 
from Asia, the whole Pacific Ocean was the Ocean that belonged to Asians (Komaki, 
1943). 
      
Proper Places: Regions as a ‘Rigid’ Hierarchical Order 
Even if the new order stressed morality and the spiritual bond in an unbounded space, 
it still required a certain principle to become an order. In Japanese geopolitical 
imagination, this was imagined as a hierarchical order rested on a notion of human 
progress and evolution, which made its structure paradoxically rigid. It was conceived 
as a gigantic, unified, expansive organism, which might be closer to Ratzel’s idea of 
lower organism than Kjellén’s super human being (see chapter 5). This is where the 
Japanese version of Social Darwinism, i.e. ecological fatalism, was applied. Its main 
points were already outlined in the last chapter. The remarkable difference with 
Ratzel’s idea was that in the Japanese version, there existed only one gigantic, unified 
organism integrating all the organisms on the globe. 
     As we have seen, the profound question that the Japanese intellectuals tried to 
address was one about particularity and universality in world history. Japanese people, 
having pursued modernisation by employing Western political theories, reached an 
unexpected gap. In the meantime, they noticed another gap that distinguished them 
from other Asian countries. In particular, the destiny of China, whose territory was 
divided by the Great Powers, was telling, not least because the country was Japan’s 
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former teacher. In search for a convincing explanation, they found a clue in Japan’s 
geography and history. The most compelling point of contention was, for them, to 
assume different goals at the end of universal progress, rather than fully 
acknowledging plurality. Thus, they presumed that each minzoku must have its each 
destined role. Only by interpreting in this way could the Japanese experience bear a 
‘worldwide significance’ in spite of its geographical peripherality in relation to the 
West as centre (Rōyama, 1938: 2).   
     As Dower (1986) brilliantly puts it, this ‘proper place theorizing’ showed a 
remarkable versatility throughout the war and even during the post-war period in 
Japan. 22  The material that most remarkably reflected this idea was the series of 
documents written by a research team at the Health and Welfare Ministry in 194323, 
which have already mentioned in the previous section. The main focus of the 
documents titled ‘A Study on Weltpolitic Centred on Yamato Race’ was minzoku. 
According to this publication, minzoku was an extremely fluid category, and the 
Japanese were no exception: ‘[t]hat it [the Japanese] is not composed by one race is 
the truth that no one doubts’ (Administration Division, The Health and Welfare 
Minister’s Secretariat, 1943b: 2202). The point here is that although the Japanese is 
perceived as a mixed race, it became an ‘integrated’ race during the period of sakoku, 
purified by its historico-geographical factors. The hybridity (and purity) was a 
vindication of the extreme flexibility of the Japanese race, a disposition Japan had 
nurtured in its peculiar ecology as an island country. Minzoku had to be premised upon 
a ‘community of blood based on spatial identity’. The forthcoming new world order 
was a ‘moralistic order’ where the strong and the weak would live together, in contrast 
to the ‘ancient’ regime in international society constructed upon power politics (ibid.: 
2197-98, 2312-17). However, importantly, it would be incorrect to say that all nations 
would be equal under this new order. The community would have to be an organism 
in the sense that it ‘let all nations gain their own proper place’ according to their 
capability. This was important because ‘it is unequal to see equal what is not equal’ 
(ibid.: 2320). The documents described the governing scheme for the East Asian 
                                                
22 There are numerous official documents referring to this proper place theory, such as the statement 
made by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke on 1st August, 1940 (Miwa, 1981); the preamble to the 
tripartite pact of 1940 between Japan, Germany and Italy; several Imperial Rescripts (1940, 1941); and 
Shinmin no Michi (The Way of Subjects) published by the Education Ministry in 1941.  
23 The documents were later ‘discovered’ and published in eight volumes under the title Minzoku Jinkō 
Seisaku Kenkyū Shiryō (Policy Research Materials of Minzoku and Population) in 1982. It was said 
that many of the wartime documents were burned by the Japanese government before the occupation. 
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minzoku. Claiming that the fundamental principle of the scheme was ‘co-existence and 
co-prosperity’, it suggested that minzoku had an ‘inevitable destiny’ to form a 
cooperative community. Because the East Asia Cooperative Community was not fixed 
but generative and evolving, whose sphere is incrementally expanding, the ultimate 
ideal of the cooperative community was ‘to make the whole world under one roof’. 
Because the Japanese were ‘at this moment’ only one independent race in the organic 
community, it ‘naturally’ occupied the leading position endowed by its geography and 
history (ibid: 2331-2334).  
 
Conclusion 
Daitōa Chiseigaku was an inverted theory of European Geopolitics as the latter is 
understood today. It was idealistic rather than realistic, anti-scientific rather than 
scientific, subjectivist rather than objectivist, historical rather than a-historical. At least 
for the Japanese who were arguing for regionalism, it was inclusive rather than 
exclusive, and therefore peaceful rather than confrontational. The imagination that was 
projected as a result of the importation was different. In Japanese geopolitics, the state 
as a living organism was supposed to expand limitlessly, subsuming possibly all 
peoples on the globe. In this particular imagination, the ‘heavily mythologized triad 
of state-territory-community’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 230) of the Westphalian state was 
from the outset non-existent. This was because, in the Japanese tradition, the 
mythology of the state had been formed differently. In chapters 5 and 6, I have argued 
that Japanese geopolitics was fundamentally a product of Japan’s own history, just like 
European geopolitics was a product of Europe’s. Although geopolitics was an import, 
the Cartesian objectivism that had once buttressed the theory was unwittingly replaced 
by a long-standing context-dependent tradition in Japan, which might be called 
relational subjectivism. Thus, the imported theory was activated when it was 
supported by local practice.  
     This thesis, however, has not argued that a geopolitical theory can successfully 
migrate once the underlying basso ostinato is replaced. By emphasizing the cognitive 
gap, the thesis aimed to demonstrate the contingency and paradoxical inevitability of 
migration. The geopolitical theory was accepted by the Japanese because it offered a 
subjectivity to Japanese people. Because of this, the theory was mutated as the 
subjectivity defined the law to which it was subject. In this respect, geopolitics in 
Japan was the retriever of a forgotten tradition. As it made the Japanese realise the 
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importance of political space, the Japanese recalled a neglected gap in the imported 
geographical concepts engendered in the course of interpretation. Geopolitics 
encouraged scholars to reconceptualise and even re-name oceans and islands. The 
Japanese scholars, who apparently had not questioned for decades the meaning of 
imported geographical concepts from Europe such as ‘the state’, suddenly began to 
doubt what those concepts meant as they consulted geopolitics. The replacement of 
concepts was an accident, a part of a much larger social phenomenon. It was not 
geopolitics that created the policies; it only supported them. Therefore, the geopolitical 
imagination was fundamentally performative, and could not have been imposed by 
state elites or by foreign knowledge.            
     The alterations to the concepts, theories and ideas were forgotten equally 
precipitously once the war was over, probably because the continuous transformation 
of meaning did not require any consensus (given that the system with which one makes 
sense functions essentially in unconscious realm), and also because a particular 
meaning, developed largely upon a cognitive void in relation to the outside, was 
performed only within the community of experience in a particular period and 
therefore unnoticed from the outside. Moreover, the community is always in flux 
because of the concentric nature. 
     Yet is the observation above particularly true for geographical theories? The 
findings of this thesis suggest that a slightly more obvious tendency exists for 
geographical terms than for other political concepts and theories. As has been 
demonstrated, the theory of the state as a living organism differed substantially even 
within Europe, although the voids were seldom explained or investigated due to the 
belief that the meaning of the concept was considered to be self-evident. Yet, it has 
also been argued that the meaning of geographical concepts is actually highly context-
dependent. Such negligence in the gap of meaning arises because the materiality of 
geography elides the necessity to affirm meanings. However, what is overlooked is 
that the landscape imagined as the background for a concept can be significantly 
different among us. As Said (2003: 54) claims, the imaginative geography of the self 
does not require a consensus between the self and the other. Once the difference is 
acknowledged, however, the materiality that supported the concreteness of meaning 
would, on the contrary, open up new questions.  
     Let me address the question from a slightly different perspective. Why did 
Haushofer avoid theorising geopolitics? As Heske (1987: 137) identifies, one reason 
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must have been to reserve the flexibility of his geopolitics as an applied science. At 
the same time, we can infer that for Haushofer, living in a particular era of turbulence 
in which people were anxious in believing the bright future of the state, the self-
evident-ness of the state had to remain unchallenged and unshakable. The same could 
be said for wartime Japan: Geography was the only reality on which the Japanese 
could rely. Yet, on which geography shall one rely, and how to rely on such 
geography, depended on the contexts and the subjects. The social circumstances and 
the geographies of Germany and Japan during the period were substantially different. 
Despite these differences, both people tried to seek sameness among them. Evidently, 
it was geography that helped people associate the heterogeneous elements in the so-
called universal theory, which however had not received thorough theoretical 
investigations in practice. It was indeed this self-evident-ness of geography which was 
however comprehended differently that made geopolitical theory paradoxically 
kaleidoscopic through the voyages, rendering such theory ‘a fiction’ (Ó Tuathail, 
1996b: 15) that was convenient for every people living in different spatio-temporal 
contexts. 
     Last but not least, what was it in geopolitics that contributed to the war cause? 
Under this perspective, what come to the fore are the different imaginations, rather 
than boundaries. Here, boundaries are not constructed out of confrontational 
discourses, but instead emerge from the in-between of diverged discourses, the 
differences among which are in fact neglected. In this way, the shift of focus away 
from boundaries to the centre does demonstrate another key aspect in international 
politics. 
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Conclusion: A Successful Journey? 
 
This thesis has charted the trajectory of geopolitics as it migrated from Germany to 
Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. The travel could ultimately be 
considered a success, since geopolitics was enthusiastically accepted in popular 
imagination, and used to justify Japan’s entry in the Second World War. However, the 
appropriation was not ‘literal’ or ‘as it is’, for Japan did not follow the model of 
European-style imperialist expansion, but instead sought to contest Europe’s 
domination of the world, only to end up dragging other people into its plans unjustly. 
In Japan, geopolitics as a traveling theory did not disseminate the European 
geopolitical gaze, butinstead gave rise to a local and particular geopolitical view. It 
enabled Japanese people to realise how geography had affected the state of affairs in 
their political community. Replacing the subject of the theory and inflecting its power 
structure, Japanese geopolitics was accepted by the locals as the underlying way of 
thinking. In this way, a putatively realist theory was converted into an idealist theory. 
In absolute contrast to European geopolitics as a theory for the state, Japanese scholars 
attempted to justify, with the converted theory, the eradication of all boundaries in 
attempting to make the world one. For these scholars, the state was not imagined as a 
territorially-confined space, but a comprehensive entity that had a concentric structure 
without borders and would expand limitlessly to incorporate any people.  
      In the post-war world order, however, this conceptual metamorphosis has been 
forgotten by Japanese scholars and beyond, as can be seen in the current narrative that 
portrays Imperial Japan as a rigorous enforcer of racial purity. From this standpoint, 
Japan came to be perceived as the state that however behaved abnormally occasionally. 
By contrast, this thesis analysed Japan as a state, and demonstrated through the 
reconstruction of context that the abnormal state can be reconsidered as a different 
type of modern state, where the theory of the state was only comprehended differently. 
That is to say, it was not simply the presence of a consensus, but also the very absence 
of such a consensus, that helped disseminate the theory of geopolitics. In Japan, as in 
many other countries, foreign ideas were accepted when a relation was forged with a 
local idea. The different ideas were only superficially integrated with one another, 
leaving an unrecognised unsynthesisable void among multiple analytical spaces. In 
the course of the voyage, geopolitics, particularly the theory of the state as a living 
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organism, engendered many of such cognitive voids as the materiality of geography 
allowed its learners to consider the theory as self-evident. However, the uniqueness of 
every landscape allowed and assisted people to interpret the perceived axiom 
creatively. In this respect, the theory was never exclusively for the state. Thus, the 
theory was continuously morphed as it moved from one spatio-temporal context to 
another; the substantial transformations were either barely perceptible or forgotten 
from the outside of the community.  
     Ever since the end of the Cold War, critical scholars have tried to find alternatives 
to substitute the geopolitical discourse of the divided world, arguing for the plurality 
of geopolitics. The contribution I hope to have made with this thesis is to raise a 
different set of questions through excavating the neglected aspects in geopolitics in 
Japan, this most ardent follower of Western modernity. The quest for an alternative 
discourse is often represented as a move towards the prefix ‘post-’. However, this 
prefix requires us to delineate global intellectual history as the history, obliging a 
researcher to postulate that global knowledge production is governed solely by the 
West as the powerful. Critical theory invites scholars to doubt any premise, 
particularly a premise that claims objectivity. Nonetheless, it is likely that this 
postulation does not doubt the existence of the premise per se. By contrast, this thesis 
questions such analysis of global intellectual history as a single lineage, and 
reconsiders what alternatives there can be not only for the West but for plural subjects.   
     Daitōa Chiseigaku, a geopolitics nurtured in a context-dependent epistemic 
tradition in contrast to the logocentric Western tradition, had much more in common 
with critical geopolitics than with classical geopolitics as it is understood today. To be 
sure, in reference to the discussions today, this geopolitics might be better 
apprehended as a ‘reformed positivism’ (Smith, 2000) or a ‘reverse Orientalism’ 
(Nakano, 2010), since the discourse had in the end forced the others to accept a new 
standard of civilisation. However, the perspective of this geopolitics was still closer to 
that of critical geopolitics as it emphasised context, subjectivity, and historicity, and 
also argued for particularity. Labelling this geopolitics ‘post-positivist’ is however 
emphatically problematic given its regressive character. On the other hand, neglecting 
the similarity between Japanese and critical geopolitics is equally problematic given 
the motivation of the critical geopolitical enterprise. If hegemony is a ‘political type 
of relation’, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 139-140, emphasis in original) have argued, 
the plurality of political space has to be ‘the starting point of analysis’. This thesis 
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attempted to understand this plurality by hypothesising that it is the actual plurality of 
knowledge that supports the homogeneity on the surface. By focusing on spaces of 
politics rather than the politics of space, my work is an effort to reconsider how 
spatiality is manifest in the process of subjectification in global knowledge creation 
and dissemination. In so doing, I made it a point in this thesis to view any binary as 
relational for a better picture of plurality. 
     The aspiration of critical geopolitics was to overcome the boundary-making 
practices of the Great Powers. The borderless world Japanese geopolitics envisaged, 
on the other hand, questions this aspiration. In order to untangle this dilemma, this 
thesis has proposed to shift the focus from ‘boundary’ to the ‘inside’ of a community. 
An analogous concept can perform different meanings in different geographical 
spaces. If the state is an imagined community as the late Benedict Anderson (2006) 
has claimed, this imagination has to accompany each unique landscape that inspires 
the lived experiences of a community, thus making any state merely a state. What is 
needed then is a nuanced comparative perspective in addition to the one that 
emphasises the socialising aspect of the formation of the world of modern states. 
Without giving thought to this neglected difference, the quest for either eradicating 
borders or embracing difference has at best lukewarm success. We need to consider 
the possibility that an alternative can become alternatives, and to further elaborate on 
this, I will revisit in the following all the conclusions to my chapters in terms of a pair 
of questions. First, how can we consider plurality and difference in world politics? 
Second, what links the plural spaces up to form a global development? Finally, in the 
last section, I will briefly sketch out an agenda for future research.  
 
Differences in World Politics 
In order to explicate the different comprehensions of geopolitics, the present thesis 
approached the process of interpretation from two perspectives—a physical location 
and a hidden intellectual standpoint—and highlighted the importance of the latter. The 
first three chapters demonstrated that the fundamentally different understandings of 
politics are engendered less from what we see, but more from how we think. We spend 
our everyday life in a particular space. Although this space always undergoes 
relentless transformations, a stabilised image of this space tends to stay in our memory 
as the repetitive nature of the everyday. In this way, we construct our own place, which 
is still shared as a space with the others in a community. In this relational place-space, 
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a people would often come to form a loosely shared way of thinking. Spatiality in this 
way surreptitiously dictates the act of thinking even though thinking itself might be an 
act in solitude. Framing this less-than-conscious way of thinking as basso ostinato, 
this thesis attempted to capture the unrecognised mutation of theory. Taking an 
abductive approach, however, it did not posit basso ostinato as ‘real’, but rather set it 
up as a heuristic device to detect the transformation of theory. In practice, we will 
never be able to fully grasp this underlying pattern of thinking that literally makes ‘us’ 
into who we are, for it is in constant flux. For this reason, the community was 
conceptualised as a community of experience (chapter 3). In doing so, this thesis 
hoped to have shed light on the overlooked difference created by the spatial 
contextuality that helps us establish our subjectivity.  
     The unsynthesisable difference detected by basso ostinato paradoxically facilitated 
an intellectual globalisation that appears to be a synthesising phenomenon. To be sure, 
the dissemination of geopolitical knowledge has promoted the formation of an 
international society. The modern state is a template employed by many countries in 
the world to establish their political communities as a member of this international 
society. While what the concept of ‘the state’ signifies is rarely questioned, the way it 
is imagined as power must have been diverse, and such imaginations can, in turn, 
further transform the template of the state. The works of Japanese geopoliticians 
explicated in chapters 5 and 6 reveal how the concept was mutated significantly as it 
came to be imagined by the locals as a part of the familiar landscape. Such fluctuation 
in interpretation was however not noticed from Western perspectives, largely because, 
as Mannheim (1985: 22) argues, ‘[e]very concept represents a sort of taboo against 
other possible sources of meaning—simplifying the manifoldness of life in the sake 
of action’. Accordingly, what the concept means is seldom questioned.  
     In the late nineteenth century, Japan as a local political entity radically transformed 
itself to a European-style state in order to avoid colonisation. However, avoiding 
colonisation inevitably meant joining an international society based on the European 
model. In addition to this physical difference, Japanese people transformed foreign 
concepts into something that made sense for them, collectively envisaging how power 
worked in the global arena by relying on their own experiences. Thus, the European 
international world order expanded, not simply because non-Western people 
comprehended the concepts in ways that followed the European rule, but because 
traveling concepts inspired the formation of an assemblage of different imaginations. 
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Even though the respective constraints of each actor would force them to omit their 
difference with others, ‘the manifoldness of life’ Mannheim so aptly points out is 
irreducible when we survey the plurality of spaces. In this way, different people 
appropriate foreign knowledge for their own needs, thereby creating substantially new 
knowledges.  
     The imaginative theory of the state as a living organism was a patent visualisation 
of this practical variance of the concept of the state. The subtle inflections made to the 
theory become evident when it is projected as an image. As demonstrated in chapters 
5 and 6, the continuous travel of this theory had rendered it polymorphous even before 
it arrived in Japan. There, the state was imagined in Japan as a limitlessly expanding 
organism permeable to all places and composed by different minzoku. As minzoku was 
a social construction for the Japanese, all Asians, and potentially all people in the 
world, would together comprise this state organism where the Japanese would become 
the leading race. This privileged position was occupied by the Japanese not because 
they were inherently superior, but because they believed they were destined to do so. 
In their imagination, Japan was endowed with a rare fortunate match between 
geography and people. Japanese people became superior because they had been living 
on a superior land by chance. The torch of human progress, which had been carried 
by Europeans to that date, was now to be passed to the Japanese. Therefore, Daitōa 
Chiseigaku was fundamentally and even violently inclusive, subjective, anti-scientific, 
but thoroughly idealistic. This visualisation became possible not only because Japan 
wanted to present an antithesis to the European worldview, but also because this 
inclusive mode of power was more intelligible to the people living in Japan in 
reference to their history and its half-isolated geography. Through the appropriation 
of theory, Japan, once willingly to join the Western international society, changed its 
identification back to that of the East (Asia) and fought against the idea known as the 
West. In this way, Japanese people found their own political subjectivity in foreign 
knowledge. The identification of subjectivity paradoxically and simultaneously 
subjected them to a traditional and regressive disciplinary strategy, instead of a foreign 
strategy implied in the (Western) knowledge.  
     Thus, geopolitics is not a homogenising theory, but one that generates diverging 
views of world politics. In the global dissemination of knowledge, dissimilitude is 
developed out of similitude and vice versa. An assemblage in the global socialisation 
of knowledge cannot be seen as a proof of the existence of consensus (cf. Friedrichs 
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and Kratochwil, 2009), but is better observed as a node without consent which 
contains an unsynthesisable realm. The unsynthesisable cognitive voids in travelling 
political theories, however, have supported the synthetic tendency of globalisation. 
Reality plays an important role here, not because different actors perceive the same 
reality, but precisely the opposite: that it is comprehended differently. As Mannheim 
(1985: 31) argues, an ostensibly rational reasoning is supported by an irrational 
foundation. The framework employed in this thesis aimed to clarify this relation. 
Because the irrational foundation is barely recognised, an apparently contingent 
migration of theory contains an apparent inevitability, but if the reason of the 
assimilation of theory is sought only either in rationality or irrationality and only from 
a particular standpoint, no sufficient explanation of the contingency and inevitability 
can be achieved.  
     This contingent but inevitable intersection, to some extent, is what Allen (2012: 
191) refers to as an emergent ‘thingness’ (see chapter 2), which in his elaboration 
means ‘not relations per se … but those that set themselves up as internal relations 
and, on that basis, claim prior knowledge of what the power of a particular object or 
entity can necessarily do’. This ‘thingness’ can be considered in relation to a 
conundrum of the state as a concept. Despite repeated calls for a ‘retreat of the state’ 
(Strange, 1996), the concept of the state is still powerful, and it was this very concept 
that appeared to have facilitated the expansion of the European international society. 
This thesis argues that the expansion was not because the concept of the state was 
novel in its right, but because, when spread and projected to other landscapes of the 
world, it was recognisable in each context and conjured up a familiar mode of power. 
Through cognitive voids, the ‘inside’ is linked to the ‘outside’, actualising the power 
of the state in a different way. Here, an apparent cause is more in interiority than in 
exteriority, although it is not ‘autonomous’. Rather, it is the apparent autonomous 
subjectivity per se that paradoxically renders the subject into a docile body for the 
sake of gaining a new knowledge. Nonetheless, the power that is being imagined 
differently apparently supports a macro representation in the global arena. Here, what 
connects the different imaginations are the different languages that comprehend the 
supposedly same concept in diverged ways, creating dissimilitude out of similitude. It 
is this difference that constitutes the superficial sameness that this thesis tried to 
identify. This leads to another question, the one that the concluding section of chapter 
6 alluded to: In geographical concepts, do the function of unconscious consciousness 
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and the lack of consensus together indicate a stronger sense of thingness? The findings 
of this thesis gave a positive answer to this question by pointing out the materiality of 
geography. The thingness never works independently, and has to be embedded in a 
landscape in order to be actualised. A geographical concept that visualises a particular 
landscape is for this reason a blessed, creative traveller among numerous travelling 
theories.  
     Geography is ‘not a noun but a verb, a geo-graphing’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996b: 2); 
however, how to draw a map depends on the epistemic traditions to which people 
belong. Even if the maps look alike as final products, their production processes can 
be very different. Analysing geopolitical imaginations is important not just because 
they represents a hegemonic view, but because they can reveal how the superficial 
hegemonic projection actually comprises numerous different projections. The 
hegemony is not a stable one, but is rather precarious because of this clandestine 
manifoldness. The World politics is, in practice, imagined in numerous ways at 
different sites. These diverse imaginations are what supported the global voyage of 
political theories, whose trajectories are not uni-linear, but like a gigantic transactional 
web of ideas with multiple origins, incidentally linking up places, engendering 
numerous new interpretations of the theories. In this respect, theory should never be 
metaphorised as a single traveller, but a result of continuous conversations of both the 
conscious and the unconscious. The representation of the ‘Western’ traveller is 
seemingly evident not because it is consciously supported, but it essentially comprises 
a multiplicity of unconscious consciousness.  
      A profound puzzle in global intellectual history is whether the origin of a particular 
thought is identifiable. As this thesis has demonstrated, Daitōa Chiseigaku cannot be 
categorised as classical or critical, but only as Japanese. This fact reveals the important 
point that alternatives to dominant geopolitics must be conceived with a conscious 
inquiry of whose geopolitics. The same can be said with regard to relational thinking. 
In this thesis I drew on the current rise of assemblage thinking both in political 
geography and IR. It was not until my research was almost approaching the end that I 
realised the most salient tradition of thought in the society I was investigating was in 
fact a variance of relational thinking. This is evidenced by Nishida’s thought 
introduced in chapter 3. Basso ostinato is equally an assemblage concept, given that 
Maruyama’s concern was on the node where heterogeneous elements, both internal 
and external, meet in the space of the ‘inter’. However, again, it would be a mistake 
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to see Japan as more progressive than Europe in terms of political thought. On the 
contrary, as mentioned, Maruyama’s concept was criticised as regressive in the 1980s. 
Also, the Kyoto School of philosophers led by Nishida had shown support to the 
Greater East Asia War. The Chinese IR scholar Yaqing Qin (2016), in his recent 
research, proposes ‘a relational theory of world politics’. Arguing that ‘culture 
matters’, he outlines a ‘value-added’ theory based on Chinese Confucian tradition, in 
contrast to the ‘individualistic rationality’ as a ‘defining element of the background 
knowledge of Western culture’. In this context, relational thinking can be considered 
a rather classic way of thinking in the history of Japan and China. Following him, I 
have considered the different perspectives complementary, rather than alternatives. At 
the same time, however, unlike Qin, I am hesitant to see a particular thought as the 
product of a particular culture. Rather, I want to consider it as the product of a 
particular context in order to conceive global intellectual history as a gigantic 
relational web.  
     As explained, Japan imported from China the Confucian tradition and consequently 
relational thought, both of which have eventually evolved into something different in 
Japan (see chapter 3). On the other hand, while this thesis posits that geopolitics 
travelled from Germany to Japan, German geopolitics had, as Spang (2001) argues, in 
fact already been influenced by Japanese thought given Haushofer’s and the others’ 
experiences with Japan. In the meantime, I did not have enough space to point out that 
Western thinkers were an essential source of inspiration for Nishida’s theory. 
Maruyama, a specialist of Edo Confucianism, also relied heavily on German 
humanities. Likewise, the China-Japan relation has never been a one-way traffic, since 
some Chinese modern thinkers were influenced by modern Japanese thought as well 
(Jenco, 2015). It may be interesting to note as an aside that Robert Cox, who is 
influenced by Gambattista Vico, met a Japanese scholar who pointed out the affinity 
between his work and Nishida’s (Cox, 2002: 27; see chapter 3). All these arguments 
and observations make the question on the origin of a thought obsolete; it is of no 
importance to discuss, for example, whether Deleuze and Guattari were influenced by 
Chinese ideas, or if Maruyama had read their works. Theories, thoughts, and ideas are 
always travelling all around the globe, weaving entangled and endless webs that are 
never one-way or unilateral. As seen in the example of realism discussed in chapter 2, 
these intellectual developments often appear on a temporal scale as a revisionist 
movement. On spatial terms, however, similar thoughts, like the examples of relational 
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thinking and geopolitics, can emerge in different places. However, the seemingly 
identical thoughts are never the same. Yet, the multiplicity also contains synchronic 
elements. Foucault, in his lecture in Japan in 1977, relies on Maruyama’s work on Edo 
Confucianism and argues that the two political powers concurrently appearing in the 
West and the East were similar, but still different in form (Foucault, 1978b: 161). 
Foucault also points out that in contrast to the West’s scientific approach to sex, ‘the 
art of Eros’ was instead developed in Eastern societies. He insists that what 
distinguishes Western society from Eastern society is the West’s self-assertion of its 
scientificity and rationality (Foucault, 1978a: 118-119).  
    The case of Japanese geopolitics highlights this divergence well. For the Japanese, 
geopolitics was an art rather than science. Thus, a more nuanced difference can be 
detected in the ways of viewing the same event, making any -isms plural in practice. 
At the same time, however, it should be acknowledged that this difference is not 
eternal, but only ephemeral. Different ways of thinking are, as I have argued, 
composed of mundane elements, and give rise to distinct intellectual traditions that 
always evolve independently but still in relation to one another. A seemingly dominant 
way of thinking is in fact supported by a hidden premise. The various intellectual 
traditions incidentally and occasionally form similar ideas, as they experience 
sometimes identical, sometimes merely similar, events. The same event can be 
observed differently from different spaces. At the same time, those ways of observing 
are also undergoing changes as they are affected by experiences. Moreover, the 
landscapes in which the experiences are embedded are subject to changes in which 
humans are involved.   
     This global web of thought invites us to perceive difference in a fresh way. Basso 
ostinato indicates that difference is composed by numerous banal elements like how 
musical notes compose distinctive pieces of music. One’s uniqueness is only a matter 
of order of the notes (Maruyama, 1976a); if the order is only slightly changed, or if 
one flat is added on the score, it will be listened as a different piece of music. Human 
practices create a variety of ideas and make use of these ideas in different contexts, 
and then these different contexts happen to generate apparently identical ideas in 
different times. However, the same idea can be understood in diverged ways in 
different spaces. Views that emerge from different spatio-temporal contexts can never 
be exactly the same, for no two contexts are identical. This then means that 
particularity can become something that connects, rather than distinguishes, people. 
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Bluntly put, within difference there contains sameness, and vice versa, as both are 
composed of banal, everyday elements. If then it is the absence of consensus that 
facilitates the dissemination of theory, and if difference is but an aggregation of banal 
elements, in what way is theory of use to us? Or simply: Do we still need a grand 
theory (Buzan and Little, 2001; Solomon and Steele, 2015)? My answer is yes, but 
only to identify, instead of sameness, the differences among us, which at this particular 
point in time seem to be shrinking and getting smaller.       
 
Towards a New Research Agenda  
These findings can give rise to the following practical research agenda: Would these 
entangled developments merge at some point? In other words, can the unsynthesisable 
cognitive void identified in this thesis become synthesised in the course of further 
globalisation? And in terms of geopolitics, will we have the modern geopolitical 
imagination in the end, as Agnew (2003) has insisted? Or have the geopolitical 
imaginations already turned into a synthesised imagination in the course of accelerated 
globalisation since the end of the Second World War? While in this thesis I have so 
far argued that the global dissemination of knowledge is fundamentally 
unsynthesisable, I have also mentioned that because basso ostinato is composed of 
mundane elements, it is susceptible to change. Even a community that has an 
exceptionally homogeneous population such as Japan cannot avoid globalisation. The 
secluded geography of Japan, which once nurtured the Japanese imagination that 
protected the residents from invasion, has come to be perceived differently. As human 
flow increases, experiences become more and more global. And as interactions 
between different humans intensify, theoretically speaking one’s autonomy may be 
blurred if not totally disappear. This ambivalent conclusion, together with the 
historical fact that Japan literally became a member of the political West in the latter 
half of the last century, must then evoke the question whether the Japanese state 
followed Western geopolitical imaginations after its defeat in the Second World War. 
In order to set this question up as the next research agenda, let me briefly sketch the 
intellectual map in post-war Japan. 
    Geopolitics was completely abandoned in Japan after the Second World War. This 
forgetting in itself was not particularly a Japanese phenomenon, but in fact a 
worldwide one. What distinguished Japan’s collective forgetting from the others was 
the accompanying eradication of geographical moniker Daitōa or Tōa. In addition, the 
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term Nan-yō (the South) also almost disappeared and was replaced by ‘scientific’ 
geographical terms like ‘Southeast Asia’ (Yano, 1975). In Japan, the war that started 
in Hawaii in 1941 was called the ‘Daitōa Sensō’ (Great East Asia War). However, 
right after the US occupation of Japan had begun, the nomenclature was replaced by 
the ‘Pacific War’, first used by a series of articles published in all major newspapers 
in Japan in 1945 as some sort of ‘official history’ written by the General Headquarters, 
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).24  This new appellation 
however has caused another controversy, as it tended to frame the war as one between 
Japan and the United States, conveniently excluding the entire Second Sino-Japanese 
War from 1937, or even the Malayan Campaign in 1941, which started one hour and 
twenty minutes earlier than the attack on Pearl Harbour. Since the end of the US 
occupation in 1951, various alternative names, such as the Fifteen Years War, the 
Shōwa War, the Asia-Pacific War, the Japanese-American War, the Japanese-
American-English War, the Far Eastern War, and the Second World War, were 
proposed in search for a proper nomenclature (see for example, Thorne, 1986). 
Nevertheless, not even a slight change from ‘Pacific War’, such as ‘Asia-Pacific 
War’25, has successfully replaced the evidently inadequate original label. It is not 
surprising that the forbidden appellation ‘Daitōa War’ has repeatedly made 
comebacks, on the grounds that the ‘Pacific War’ was an ‘imposed name’ by the 
vanquisher (Hayashi, 1964). Curiously, however, the name ‘Pacific War’ had already 
been proposed by the Imperial Navy in as early as 1941 (Shōji, 2011). On the surface, 
then, Japanese people, at least as a collective, seem to be happy to abandon the term. 
To date, the war has no official name except ‘the previous war’ (saki no taisen). What 
is the implication of this curious, collective forgetting?  
     The most convincing explanation is that if the name contains the term ‘Asia’, it 
would mean that Japan’s enemies included both Asians and Americans, which would 
contradict the American discourse. In fact, the ‘official history’ written by the SCAP 
did not depict any Asian country as their allies. To a certain extent, then, it can be said 
that Japan discursively followed the United States by abandoning its own geography. 
However, this judgment is a little simplistic, for as this thesis has demonstrated, Japan 
                                                
24  The series of articles ‘The History of the Pacific War’ was published as a book in 1946 under the 
same title (Civil Information and Educational Section, SCAP, 1946). 
25 Although this name is used frequently within academic circles, the ‘Pacific War’ is normally used in 
journalism and school textbooks in Japan. 
  203 
regarded other Asians and even the West not as its enemy but as part of its organism, 
imagining the space of the globe as one world. The Japanese tried to lead the world 
because they believed that they were destined to do so. In this context, Japan’s 
disarmament in the post-war security arrangement might not mean relegating its 
security to others or abandoning the power of the state. It is equally misleading to think 
of it as only a pragmatic choice in which the state prioritised economic growth (cf. 
Kōsaka, 2006; Pyle, 1996; Samuels, 2007). Rather, it may be argued that, based on 
the mode of power in Japan, the Japanese understood the disarmament as a natural 
outcome of the war: The defeat made them realise that it was (still) not them who were 
destined to rule the world, but the Americans would lead the world as one organism 
of which Japan was a part. In the end, power rested on geography for the Japanese, 
and was not someone’s possession.  
     In the latter half of the century, modern Japan ultimately become part of the West, 
remarkably contributing to the Western-centric world order. The present thesis has not 
examined this final outcome. However, given the discussion of this thesis, it is possible 
to argue that the transformation of Japan’s identity—or its historical wandering 
between the West and the East—is better considered as a continuation of its particular 
epistemic tradition, rather than as a radical breakup from the past as a result of the 
defeat in the war. Simply put, Japan entered the West in its own imagination. In this 
respect, basso ostinato changes ever so slowly unless it is brought into a conscious 
recollection. Given the outcome of the Second World War, basso ostinato contains 
the danger of becoming a source of apocalypse. At the same time, however, it is a 
source of subjectivity to acquire knowledge and therefore inspire action. Because of 
this subjectivity, Japan has radically and repeatedly changed its identification in world 
politics from being part of the West, then part of Asia, and part of the West again. As 
Linda Alcoff (2000: 319) relying on Foucault has insisted, ‘the moment of 
subjectification—the moment at which we attain the status of subject—is 
simultaneously the moment of subjection. Only as subjects can we be made subject to 
the Law and subject to disciplinary strategies that produce docile bodies’. Here we see 
a contradictory double movement, in which Japan has been analysed as both a docile 
body and simultaneously an assertive subject in the Eurocentric world order. The most 
profound implication of basso ostinato, then, might be this: Basso ostinato is what 
hampers us from ‘sound’ knowing but does help us knowing creatively so as to ensure 
plurality of subjectivity and knowledge. It is what unwittingly constructs ‘us’, the ‘us’ 
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which is always in flux. Will the time come when polyphonic music is listened as 
monophonic, all differences between the melodies eradicated? If the answer is in the 
affirmative, what will happen to the plurality of global knowledge?   
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